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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify challenges confronting the reform of the 
Indonesian public sector, particularly in the area of institutional reform, and to 
ascertain the extent to which political and legal aspects influence such reform. In 
addition, this study proposes a design for a legal framework for establishing effective 
and efficient government organisations. The large structure of the Indonesian public 
sector potentially allows for significant overlap in function between institutions, which 
results in ineffective and inefficient governance. Government institution reform in 
Indonesia is often faced with political and legal obstacles. Sometimes, in the past, 
politicians or top-level echelons in the public sector have resisted reform measures in 
the interests of preserving their positions in the administration. Moreover, there are 
laws that provide for the preservation of certain ministries or agencies; reforming these 
often involves difficult political processes. 
Keywords: bureaucracy; reform; legal; politics; administrative; reorganisation 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview and Problem Definition 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify political and statutory challenges to 
bureaucracy reform, at the national level, in Indonesia. In the world of administrative 
governance, nothing has become more constant than change; most governments 
continuously receive pressure to reform, or to radically change and transform. The 
problems associated with bureaucracy are often structural. Therefore, reorganisation 
is a logical step. The blocks of organisations are rearranged to improve symmetry, 
logical grouping, coordination and efficiency. However, there are political and 
statutory impediments to conducting reorganisation. The large structure of the 
Indonesian Central Government means that there is significant duplication of function 
among ministries and agencies, in part because of entrenchment in legislation. This 
has led to ineffective government structures. There is also a significant overlap in 
function between existing institutions and newly created ones. The process required to 
amend legislation related to these institutions poses difficulties for reorganising them. 
This thesis takes a qualitative approach to examining such issues. Sociological and 
legal concepts are combined, merging political sciences, public policy and 
management concepts with legal research in the area of administrative law. 
The bureaucracy represents problems of inefficiency, red tape, obstructionism, 
incompetence and corruption. However, bureaucracy plays a crucial role in modern 
societies. It is necessary but problematic. There are many definitions of bureaucracy. 
It can be examined from different perspectives—from political science, to sociology, 
management and economics. In its simplest meaning, bureaucracy is the running of a 
public institution by officials to achieve specific goals for the government. In the 
context of this thesis, Goodsel’s definition of bureaucracy (or ‘the bureau’) has been 
adopted, in which he refers to bureaucracy as ‘all ministries, departments, or subunits 
of the public sector which are charged with administrative responsibilities and 
operated at public expense’.1 
                                                 
1 Paul du Gay, The Values of Bureaucracy (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 2 
The resignation of President Soeharto, following civil unrest in 1998, marks the 
beginning of the ‘reformation era’ in Indonesia. Since then, Indonesia has conducted 
bureaucracy reform in various areas, including reorganising government bodies.2 
However, the organisation of its government is still regarded as inefficient. Even the 
new government under President Joko Widodo has recognised the need to establish a 
more efficient government—evidenced by the process they put in place to redesign 
organisation and governance across ministries and agencies in Indonesia.3 In 2014 to 
2017, or during the first three years of the first term of Joko Widodo’s presidency, 23 
executive bodies were restructured in pursuit of efficiency.4  
Nevertheless, the bureaucracy in Indonesia is still bloated and expanded. Its 
government has 34 ministries, 29 non-ministerial/special agencies, and 103 auxiliary 
agencies.5 The reorganising of these executive bodies often faces political and 
legislative obstacles. Politicians reject reform to sustain their rent-seeking practices 
and patronage networks.6 Reform is constrained by political compromises and rejected 
by top-level officials.7 Caiden argues that the probable reason behind this is that public 
leaders’ support for administrative reform is often insincere, since they are careful to 
conduct reform which does not threaten their power, position and popularity.8 
Moreover, there is a traditional inclination among civil servants in Indonesia to serve 
the government, or political elites, rather than the people.9 It is no surprise then that 
the relationship between political elites and the bureaucracy has a background of rent-
seeking behaviours. Efforts to improve bureaucracy performance have the impediment 
                                                 
2 Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, Sosialisasi Undang-undang Administrasi 
Pemerintahan [Socialisation of Administrative Procedure Laws] (12 May 2015) 
<http://www.menpan.go.id/download/file/4956-sosialisasi-uu-ap-prof-dr-eko-prasojo>. 
3 President of the Republic of Indonesia, Nawa Cita Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla [9 Main Programs of 
Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla Presidency] (Online, 12 May 2015) <http://www.menpan.go.id/news-
ticker/3323-nawa-cita-2014-2019>. 
4 Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, ‘Menteri PANRB dan Ketua DPR RI Sepakat 
Wujudkan Reformasi Kelembagaan’ [Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform and 
Chairman of the House of Representative Agrees to Conduct Institutional Reform] (Web Page, 23 July 
2019) <https://www.menpan.go.id/site/berita-terkini/menteri-panrb-dan-ketua-dpr-ri-sepakat-
wujudkan-reformasi-kelembagaan>. 
5 Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of Indonesia, ‘Kelembagaan 
Pemerintah Indonesia’ [Indonesian Government Bodies Register] (2019) 
<https://www.menpan.go.id/site/kelembagaan>. 
6 Yuki Fukuoka, ‘Politics, Business and the State in Post-Soeharto Indonesia’ (2012) 34(1) 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 80. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Gerald E Caiden, Administrative Reform Comes of Age (Wolter de Gruyter, 1991), 3. 
9 Osamu Koike, ‘Institutionalizing Performance Management in Asia: Looking East or West?’ (2013) 
26(5) The International Journal of Public Sector Management 347. 
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of a patrimonial culture based on patron-client relations (in contrast to a merit-based 
rational-legal culture).10 
Political transactions drive the creation of agencies and the appointment of top-level 
officials.11 The democratisation process that started in 1998 has led to increased rent-
seeking behaviours and changed the relationship between political elites and 
bureaucratic elites.12 Fukuoka postulates that political elites are only willing to work 
with a government that shares power with them—Presidents have to form coalition 
governments by allocating some ministerial posts and the heads of executive bodies to 
political parties, for the sake of political stability.13 Parliament is willing to cooperate 
with the president regardless of his policy orientation, as long as he ‘remains attentive 
to the plurality of interests in the political arena’.14 
Kasim argues that bureaucratic problems in Indonesia are ‘multi-dimensional and 
protracted as a vicious circle’.15 He posits that the reform effort is not adequate because 
the focus of the reform is the implementation of legal rules.16 Reform efforts reveal 
that the government is still eager to work based on the existing legislative framework, 
focusing on performing existing policy instead of changing their mindset and 
harmonising policy contents and legal rules.17 For Kasim, this is ironic, considering 
that the major problem of bureaucracy is caused by the disharmony of policies and 
legal rules.18 Kasim highlights this situation with examples of the disharmony between 
local government law and state finance law, as well as between nine laws and hundreds 
of legal rules regarding land uses and titles.19 
Moreover, some ministries and agencies are statutorily established. Reorganising them 
requires amending the law relevant to their organisation. This would involve a long 
and difficult political process for achieving consensus and compromises between the 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Fukuoka (n 6) 93. 
12 Ibid 95. 
13 Ibid 94. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Azhar Kasim, ‘Bureaucratic Reform and Dynamic Governance for Combating Corruption: The 
Challenge for Indonesia’ (2013) 20(1) Bisnis & Birokrasi 18. 
16 Ibid 19. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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executive and legislative bodies.20 However, the extent to which political and 
legislative features shape the public sector and organisational changes in Indonesia has 
not yet been thoroughly studied. It is essential to conduct a study that examines 
political and statutory issues of reform, particularly in the area of reorganisation. This 
research identifies political and statutory reorganisation problems and recommends 
possible solutions. 
Any study related to restructuring government agencies in Indonesia must include an 
examination of the issues linked to the relationship between its bureaucracy and 
politics. The bureaucracy often becomes an object of political conflict between 
executive and legislative powers who clash in their attempts to control its influence.21 
Hammond and Knott state that bureaucracy can be autonomous, controlled by 
Congress or courts, under the control of the president or under the joint control of these 
institutions.22 Although limited to the USA’s political context, Hammond and Knott’s 
study supports the assertion that politics are heavily involved in managing the 
bureaucracy. Indonesia is adopting the same presidential system as the USA and the 
parliament in Indonesia is moving towards having a stronger role and power, similar 
to that seen in the USA. However, since politic-topographical features vary between 
countries, challenges hindering their reform are different.23 Hamond and Knott’s 
findings align with those of Palombara, who argues that top-level bureaucracy is often 
deeply involved with politics—despite the view that civil servants are neutral, they are 
frequently engaged in political processes.24 These findings indicate how the public 
sector works and how it is affected by political situations. 
One of the fundamental principles of the rule of law is that power is divided into 
executive, legislative, and judicative powers.25 Indonesia is a democratic country with 
                                                 
20 See General Secretariat of the House of Representative of the Republic of Indonesia, Handbook on 
the Legislative Process (UNDP, 2015). 
21 Thomas H Hammond and Jack H Knott, ‘Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, 
Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-
Institutional Policy-Making’ (1996) 12(1) Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 119. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis: New 
Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 
47. 
24 Joseph La Palombara, ‘An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development’ in Comparative 
Public Administration (Emerald Group Publishing, 2006) vol 15, 193. 
25 Hammond and Knott (n 21). 
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separation of powers, where executive power lies with the government, legislative 
power with the parliament, and judicial power with the court system.26 Indonesia’s 
government follows the presidential system. According to Article 4 of the 
Constitution, the President holds executive power, acting as the head of state and the 
head of administration; he has authority in the creation of ministries and government 
agencies, as well as in the appointment of ministers and heads of agencies.27 However, 
in the context of power separation and democracy, no institutions are free from 
politics.28 
Young argues that legislations played significant roles in the mushrooming of 
bureaucracy.29 Government structure is likely the second most significant reference, 
after the Constitution that citizens use to think about their government.30 Young 
suggests that in the US federal government, the mushrooming of bureaucracy was 
mostly a twentieth-century development, created in part by statutes passed by 
Congress and in part by presidential executive order. Evidently, politics and legal rules 
have played significant roles in producing the large governing structure.31 It is vital to 
include the relationship between bureaucracy, politics and legislation framework when 
discussing issues related to reorganisation in government institutions. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert note that, in understanding how politics become constraints to reform, it is 
important to examine the frontier and the relationship between civil service and 
politicians.32 
Legislation is a key aspect of any form of governance. However, there is a paucity of 
literature discussing the legislation obstacles to reorganisation in the Indonesian 
government. Chua suggests that there is an evident trend in the literature surrounding 
Southeast Asian countries—discussions of socio-legal issues focus on the relationships 
between laws and Islamic or customary norms, gender equality, land and the 
environment.33 Few authors discuss how politics and statutes constrain reorganisation 
                                                 
26 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945]. 
27 Ibid; Undang-Undang 39/2008 tentang Kementerian Negara [Act 39/2008 on the State Ministries]. 
28 M Carausan, ‘Institutional Uncertainties of the Rule of Law: The Public Prosecutor’s Office between 
the Executive and Judiciary’ (2009) (28E) Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences 104. 
29 Nancy Beck Young, ‘The Politics of Bureaucracy’ (2015) 43(2) Reviews in American History 327. 
30 Ibid 328. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Pollitt and Bouckaert (n 23). 
33 Lynette J Chua, ‘Charting Socio-Legal Scholarship on Southeast Asia: Key Themes and Future 
Directions’ (2014) 9(1) Asian Journal of Comparative Law 5. 
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in Southeast Asian countries, particularly in Indonesia. Considering the gap in existing 
literature surrounding these matters, it is evident that this thesis will enrich knowledge 
on the extent to which political and legislative influences shape reorganisation in the 
Indonesian government. 
1.2 Context and Theoretical Framework  
A literature review is generally required before research begins to help the researcher 
rationalise the research questions and situate the study within the context of the 
relevant discourse.34 This section seeks to consider reorganisation within the broader 
context of public administration theories and the principles of administrative laws. 
However, not all of the principles of public administration and administrative laws will 
be addressed; only selected principles are presented in this section. The examination 
of these particular theories and principles is important, as this thesis is a socio-legal 
study that covers aspects of public administration and administrative laws, as well as 
the areas of political science and public policy. 
Literature discussing the nature of public administration and administrative law in the 
Indonesian context is lacking, despite these two areas being very broad. This section 
discusses the theories and principles of international scholars, selected to be as relevant 
as possible to the Indonesian context. March and Olsen argue that administrative 
reform is influenced by the institutional and historical context within which it takes 
place.35 As politic-topographical features vary between countries, challenges facing 
reform in Indonesia may be different from those in other countries. 
Bureaucracy reform has enjoyed significant support in many countries; it has 
manifested in various ways, under numerous labels and within different national 
contexts.36 Most of these reforms have intended to change the culture of the public 
sector to enable increases in efficiency, effectiveness and accountability.37 Public 
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sector reform is a sustainable process—Peters states ‘civil service reform should not 
be seen as an end in itself’.38 Initiatives that are sustainable long-term and receive 
adequate support are valuable and rare in developing countries.39 
Public administration and administrative law are vast areas. Systematically evaluating 
literature in such broad areas presents a challenge. Some scholars have questioned 
whether public administration is a separate discipline, or simply a sub-discipline of 
political science.40 It is often discussed as a confused discipline.41 Scholars debate 
whether it should be independent of political science, in the same field or as a branch 
thereof.42 This section examines some major theories in public administration, then 
examines administrative law principles and the principles of reform and 
reorganisation. This examination is important, as this thesis is socio-legal research that 
combines political science, public policy and legal research. 
1.2.1 Major Theories in Public Administration 
There are, at least, three major public administration theories, namely neo-
institutionalism, rational choice theory and governance theory.43 The first, neo-
institutionalism, sees institutions as both shaping and being shaped by individuals.44 It 
reveals that public sector organisation is not as simple as it looks. Pollitt suggests that 
the public sector is, in this regard, ‘…like a sedimentary geological formation, with 
different aspects of culture and structure surviving alongside or on top of each other 
from different periods of time’.45 
The study of institutions is the root of political science.46 The theory of neo-
institutionalism was conceived by March and Olsen, who are regarded as the key 
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theorists in the area.47 Neo-institutionalism emerged in response to both economic and 
social-psychological explanations of political issues, which March and Olsen claimed 
were reductionist, instrumentalist and individualist.48 March and Olsen contend that 
these approaches threaten the concept of institutionalism. They reject the assumption 
that individuals are only involved in institutions for personal and material gain and 
argue that an institution can affect an individual’s behaviour and preferences.49 They 
argue that institutions are not only defined by their legal status and formal powers, but 
also by the procedures and structures that shape their values, norms and beliefs.50 Their 
approach does not deny the importance of individual decisions, but assumes that 
decisions are made under the strong influence of organisational context. Pollitt 
commented: 
Powerful organisations can themselves be viewed as a sort of actor, they argue, and 
they play an important role in shaping the norms and values of their members. Most 
decisions within such organisations are driven by the desire to act appropriately 
rather than by the desire to achieve some consequence of personal importance to the 
individual actor.51 
March and Olsen advocated for public administration as its own discipline. They argue 
that legal rules have significant implications for government institutions. Such rules 
are regarded as a ‘logic of appropriateness.’52 This ‘logic of appropriateness’ sees that 
institutions can influence their members’ behaviour—organisational members will act 
according to norms within the organisation.53 March and Olsen state: 
[I]nstitutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate 
actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involved 
determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the 
obligations of that role in that situations are. When individuals enter an institution, 
they try to discover and are taught the rules. When they encounter a new situation, 
they try to associate it with a situation for which rules already exist. Through rules 
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and a logic of appropriateness, political institutions realize both order, stability, and 
predictability, on the one hand, and flexibility and adaptiveness on the other.54 
However, March and Olsen’s theory has a weakness. Evidence supporting the 
assumption that institutions produce individuals’ behaviour is insufficient. 
The second theory is the rational choice theory. Rational choice theory not only applies 
to public administration, but also to other disciplines that deal with human behaviour, 
including economics, politics, sociology, psychology and behavioural biology.55 
Rational choice theory is different from neo-institutionalism, since it begins with 
individuals rather than institutions. It is the antithesis of the neo-institutionalist 
approach. The focus of this theory is how individuals make choices. It does not 
necessarily ignore organisational or institutional factors. Institutions are still important 
in rational choice, as they provide a framework of incentives, penalties and rules, 
within which individuals make their decisions. 56 The fundamental argument of this 
theory is that the individual’s primary motivation when making choices is based on 
how to maximise the satisfaction of their preference. This assumption is derived from 
the economic approach to politics.57 
Since the rational choice theory is based on the assumption of individualism, or self-
interest, Olson argued that it would be difficult for individuals within an organisation 
to work together to achieve collective goals.58 While rational choice literature often 
focuses on the relationship between individuals within an institution,59 it focuses more 
on the extent to which they perceive each other as credibly committed to the 
cooperative relationship, rather than the level of the participants’ commitment to the 
institution as an entity.60 However, there are doubts concerning this commitment to 
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cooperation, as individuals may waver in their commitment if they see potential benefit 
to themselves.61 
The third theory is governance theory. It is more recent than both neo-institutionalism 
and rational choice theory. The central focus of governance theory is neither the 
individual nor the organisation; it is focused on the entire system, across both public 
and private sectors that participate in public sector decision-making and public 
services.62 Terms of governance often mark changes in the nature of the government 
and have been associated with administrative reform in recent decades.63 Governance 
theory has become mainstream in public administration in most parts of the world.64 It 
emphasises collaboration and networking between government institutions, the 
economy and society.65 
Governance theory is based on the assumption that society has become more diverse, 
fragmented, and complex and so has policy-making. For effective policy-making and 
efficient delivery of policies, governments are required to work together with a wide 
range of non-government actors.66 Sørensen and Jacob argue that such relationships 
have become ‘a necessary ingredient in the production of efficient 
public governance in our complex, fragmented, and multi-layered societies.’67 
Widespread use of governance frameworks across governments has stimulated the 
adoption of the ‘good governance’ concept. This concept is now regularly used in 
political science and public administration. However, the principles and assumptions 
are still debated. Different perspectives, principles and practices have been subject to 
debates among scholars in an effort to define ‘good governance.’68 Agere describes 
the general character of good governance: 
Good governance is therefore, among other things, participatory, transparent and 
accountable, in order to ensure that political, social, and economic priorities are 
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based on a broad consensus in society, and that the voices of the poorest and most 
vulnerable are heard in the decision-making processes regarding the allocation of 
resources. Defined in this manner, good governance has major implications for 
equity, poverty, and quality of life. Political governance is the process of decision-
making to formulate policy. Administration governance is the system of policy 
implementation. Encompassing all three, good governance defined the process and 
structures that guide political and socio-economic relationship.69 
Davies posits that the governance framework arises for several reasons, namely:70 
a. the need for public participation in policy-making to build public trust; 
b. the information and technology revolution catalysed the widespread use of 
social networks and led to an unprecedented flow of information that cannot 
be controlled; 
c. reforms have fragmented governmental capacity, creating the need for 
collaboration between governments, markets and civil societies. 
Good governance is at the highest stage of its development when a democratic form 
of administration is in place, public services are delivered efficiently and the 
government is transparent, accountable and productive.71 This thesis examines the 
governance aspect of reorganisation in Indonesia. 
Also crucial to governance is the framework of administrative law. It provides a legal 
basis for any government to operate and perform its functions. The next subsection 
examines the principles of administrative law. It discusses the definition and scope of 
administrative law and its relationship with constitutional law. 
1.2.2 Administrative Law Principles 
1.2.2.1 What is Administrative Law? 
This thesis is framed within the Administrative law principles. Administrative law is 
an essential part of governance, which provides a legal foundation for managing 
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government administration.72 Ellis-Jones defines administrative law as a branch of 
public law that is primarily concerned with the functions, powers, and responsibilities 
of the executive arm of government and certain non-governmental bodies (often 
referred to as ‘domestic tribunals’).73 In addition, administrative law is concerned with 
issues of extra-judicial ‘administrative review’, which involve assessing decisions 
made by administrators and other mechanisms to ensure the accountability of public 
administration.74 
Similarly, Katzen and Douglas define administrative law as ‘the body principles, 
practices, and institutions which provide for supervision, regulation and structuring of 
the exercise of power of the government.’75 It is the body of principles that govern the 
relationship between the government and the governed.76 Head states that to 
understand the scope of administrative law, it should be placed in its historical, 
political, socio-economic context, as well as its constitutional, institutional, 
bureaucratic and policy settings.77 He further states: 
Administrative law is about challenging official power. Hence, it is, by definition, 
strongly influenced by political considerations. Administrative law is concerned 
with defining the powers of the state, as well as protecting, or limiting, the rights 
and liberties of citizens. As such, it is a constant battleground. It is therefore vital 
never to assume that a government or official agency has the legal authority to do 
what it has purported to do … 
Administrative law is primarily an area of public law that regulates the relationship 
between the citizen and the state. This is wider than ensuring that an administrative 
body acts within the law. It involves understanding the way governments operate, 
the nature of the administrative power and process, the function of those who 
participate in it, and the practices procedures, manuals, guidelines and other internal 
policies or rules which may influence the way they behave. It also requires a keen 
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sensitivity to various ways in which commercial, economic, and political pressures 
impact on governments, administrators, tribunals, and courts. 78 
Administrative law is a branch of public law. Traditionally, administrative law also 
includes the laws that govern the structure of the bureaucracy.79 However, despite the 
fact that administrative law is an essential determinant of how the government 
manages administration, Head posits that it tends to be left as the focus of public 
administration.80 Understanding the scope of administrative law is to also understand 
its historical, political, socio-economic context, and its constitutional, institutional, 
bureaucratic and policy situations.81 The scope of administrative law is discussed in 
the next part of this subsection, followed by a discussion on its relationship with 
constitutional law. 
1.2.2.2 The Scope of Administrative Law 
Head observes that administrative law is formed by economic and financial interests, 
underlying political traditions and interests and the need for official expediency.82 
Bishop assumes that the primary goal of administrative law is neither to create a big 
or small government; instead, it should have an objective to create a better 
government.83 Hence, administrative law should be able to help to reduce the agency 
cost of inefficient governance.84 It is a body of law that developed to ensure and 
promote greater government accountability and transparency.85 Administrative law is 
full of technicalities.86 Compared with other areas of law, Head argues that 
administrative law is more filled up with political debates. 87 
Administrative law is considered ‘public law’ as it deals with accountability and 
disputes in the public realm.88 The public, in this context, comprises central or local 
governments, their departments and other statutory bodies.89 If a legal dispute arises 
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in the private realm, administrative law will not apply. Activities outside the public 
sphere are governed by private laws, such as contract, tort and family law.90 However, 
if there is a dispute involving a government institution, administrative law can be 
applied.91 The distinct feature of administrative law, compared with other areas of law, 
is that it cannot be separated by contemporary political debates, as Head states: 
Many debates surround the impact on administrative law of the often competing 
demands of legal requirements, administrative functions, political and policy 
constraints, and economic and social considerations. The weight of these factors 
varies, depending on the type of administrative processes involved and the status of 
the parties affected. 
A wide variety of issues arises in administrative law, often very interesting and even 
controversial. In many instances, it is crucial to make an assessment of the various 
political and socio-economic forces at work, as well as the precise legal questions. 
Rigorous attention to legal detail is vital, but how the legal arguments can be most 
effectively brought to bear may depend on the circumstances.92 
1.2.2.3 Administrative Law and Its Relation to Constitutional Law 
Most constitutions tend to say relatively little about administrative structure, though 
the establishment of government structure is a core function of the constitution.93 The 
rules governing the selection and function of the President and legislative and judicial 
powers in Indonesia are described in the Indonesian 1945 Constitution. However, it 
does not detail rules regulating the sub-political institutions. In this regard, Ginsburg, 
in Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth (eds), states: 
Written constitutions tend to focus on providing chains of accountability and 
democratic legitimacy for the decisions of administrators, rather than detailed rules 
regulating the administration. In other words, constitutions tend to regulate 
administration structurally rather than legally.94 
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The constitution has a role in establishing a broader structural apparatus of governance 
and accountability.95 Administrative law often overlaps with constitutional law. Yet, 
there is a clear line between the two. Constitutional law can decide that a statute is 
unconstitutional, while administrative law takes legislation as a binding authority.96 In 
understanding the administrative law of a country, it is important to examine its 
political, legal and constitutional history. Several key concepts are necessary for an 
understanding of administrative law, such as separation of powers and the role of each 
branch of power.97 The traditional understanding was that the constitution and 
administrative law shared common goals concerning the protection of rights, the 
control of agencies and the limitations of government.98 Katzen and Douglas state: 
Administrative law has developed within a constitutional framework defined both 
by law and concepts. The development of administrative law was itself fashioned 
by constitutional concepts, such as the rule of law, separation of powers and 
responsible government. Constitution principles are often discussed as part of 
administrative law, because in providing for the structure of government, they often 
control the operation of the state by limiting the power at the disposal of officials.99  
There is a close relationship between constitutional law and administrative law. The 
differences between the two are obscure, particularly when discussing certain areas, 
such as the state and its authority, the power of the executive and public rights. Some 
scholars advocate for not making a dichotomy between constitutional law and 
administrative law and posit that administrative law is a part of constitutional law.100 
In this view, administrative law is regarded as a lex specialist of constitutional law.101 
Nevertheless, constitutional law is somewhat different from administrative law. 
Constitutional law discusses the functions between branches of power, while 
administrative law focuses on the relationships between those branches and, 
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additionally, the relationship between branches of power and the people.102 Similarly, 
Ginsburg states that ‘constitutional law regulates the highest norms of the state, while 
administrative law governs sub-legislative action, somewhat lower in the hierarchy of 
sources, and hence in importance.’103 Further, universities’ separation of constitutional 
and administrative law and their separate practice in public sector institutions support 
the view that constitutional law is different from administrative law.104 
However, Ginsburg argues that administrative law is more ‘constitutional’ than the 
constitution itself: 
[M]any would place the function of constitutionalism itself or limitation of 
government by law, at the fore. With regard to this limiting function, it is quite 
obvious that administrative law overlaps a good deal with constitutional law, and 
has a wider scope in the sense that it touches far more behavior. The average citizen 
is not a dissident who is concerned with the state limiting her political speech; nor 
is the average citizen a criminal concerned with criminal procedure provisions in 
constitutions. Rather the average citizen encounters the state in myriad petty 
interactions, involving drivers’ licenses, small business permits, social security 
payments, and taxes. It is here that the rubber meets the road for constitutionalism, 
where predictability and curbs on arbitrariness are least likely to be noticed but most 
likely to affect a large number of citizens. So it seems clear that administrative law 
is constitutionalist in orientation and arguably more important to more people than 
the grand issues of constitutional law.105 
At a symbolic level, there is one function of the constitution that administrative law 
cannot accomplish—a constitution constitutes the nation and binds its citizens together 
through the same goals and understandings.106 Perhaps not all constitutions have this 
symbolic role, but most do. In contrast, administrative law rarely has this symbolic 
function.107 However, administrative law is still worthy of greater attention, as 
Ginsburg states: 
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But this symbolism is in turn based on an illusion and a misunderstanding of the 
crucial constitutional characteristics of endurance and localism. Constitutions serve 
as important symbols because people believe they do things that they do not. 
Administrative law systems, in turn, are more localized and more enduring, and 
hence worthy of greater attention in trying to understand the effective legal 
regulation of government. … Administrative law concerns the control of regulatory 
institutions, and regulatory institutions are difficult to establish. Once established, 
they are even harder to get rid of. An alternative to eliminating agencies is to seek 
to exercise greater control over them, and administrative law becomes a natural 
solution.108 
In addition to being written within the framework of administrative law, this thesis is 
also written within the framework of political science and public management. This 
study examines how politics and statutes restrain reform and reorganisation. 
Therefore, the next part of this section discusses the principles of reform and 
reorganisation, as presented in the relevant literature. 
1.2.3 Reform and Reorganisation Principles 
Pollitt and Bouckaert define public sector reform as ‘deliberate changes to the 
structures and processes of public sector organisations with the objective of getting 
them (in some sense) to run better’.109 The key terms of this definition include 
‘changes’, ‘structures’, ‘processes’ and ‘organisations’. All government institutions 
are subject to change,110 and changes to structures and organisations are normal 
consequences of reform. Pollitt and Bouckaert state that ‘structure and processes’ 
could refer to the organisational structures of ministries and agencies, processes within 
the organisation or to relevant legal and administrative relationships; ‘getting them to 
run better’, they say, could mean ‘to run more efficiently’.111 
Governments at the national level usually formally take the key reform initiatives; the 
process tends to begin in the upper, rather than the lower, level governance.112 Politics 
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and legislation framework can both drive and restrain reform and the political system 
often has a strong influence on the process of public policy decision-making.113 This 
framework is relevant to this research, as this research intends to examine political and 
statutory impediments to reform in the Indonesian government, at the national level. 
The public sector is considered the steering centre of society in many political 
theories.114 In keeping with this, Palombara argues that major changes in society are 
almost impossible to conduct without a large amount of intervention from the 
government.115 The government sometimes becomes the sole entity to bear the 
responsibility of transformation.116 
Basic changes in social and economic structure require the optimisation of 
bureaucratic capacity.117 The bureaucracy needs to be reformed when the government 
finds that they cannot perform as expected, in regards to achieving policy goals, 
because of poor performance, swollen bureaucracies, incompetent civil service and 
ineffective administration.118 However, history shows that reform in the public sector 
often goes beyond the aspect of managerialism.119 
The nature of the government at the national level and the relationship between 
political elites and civil servants are key features in reform.120 The nature of the 
government is a mixture of structural and functional elements, including the nature of 
the political system.121 To understand how politics restrain reform and reorganisation, 
it is important to examine the boundary between civil service and politicians and their 
relationship to one another.122 There is a strong relationship between politics, 
bureaucracy and institutional reform. This relationship, and the legislation framework, 
are vital to consider when discussing issues related to the restructuring of government 
institutions. 
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In a contrasting study, which examines reform in Jordan, Tbaishat asserts that a large 
bureaucratic structure is the root of inefficiency—particularly when governance is 
linked to a country’s economy.123 However, to understand issues in public sector 
governance, dealing only with the relationship between economy and governance is 
not sufficient. Other aspects should be included, one of which is the organisation of 
the public sector and its influence on public sector operations.124 The economic aspect 
alone is not sufficient to determine the outcome of reform. In this regard, an 
examination of duplication, which causes inefficient operation, is also important.125 
Every government institution is subject to change, and such change is often politically 
driven.126 However, reform does not always obtain the necessary political support. 
Caiden argues that reform agendas often receive insincere support from top-level 
politicians or bureaucrats, since they are careful to conduct reform which does not 
threaten their power, position and popularity.127 Besides, policymakers rarely have a 
strong commitment to feedback and evaluation in public sector reform.128 
Reorganisation is a principal instrument of administrative reform.129 It is the primary 
need of reform.130 The need for reorganisation often arises out of the need to reduce 
public expenditure, with the hope that the productivity of the public sector will 
improve.131 This finance-driven reform often results in downsizing.132 The assumption 
is that a reduction of structures and personnel will result in savings.133 Nevertheless, 
bureaucracy reform may go wrong and spin-off in unforeseen directions. Stokes and 
Clegg state that reform does not always introduce the effects of good governance.134 
They observe that reform may create an unaccountable and personally politicised elite 
                                                 
123 Rami Mohd Tbaishat, ‘Administrative Reform in Jordan: Urgency for Reforming the Bureaucracy 
Structure’ (2015) 5(2) International Review of Management and Marketing, 45.  
124 Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (ed), The Public Sector: Challenge for Coordination and Learning (W. de 
Gruyter, 1991). 
125 Young (n 29) 329. 
126 Kim (n 110). 
127 Caiden (n 8). 
128 Pollitt and Bouckaert (n 23) 17. 
129 Ron Seyb, ‘The Death and Rebirth of Reorganization Planning: Symbolic Action, Divided 
Government, and Orthodox Administrative Theory’s Enduring Appeal’ (1994) 24(4) Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 725. 
130 Caiden (n 8) 81. 
131 Agere (n 63) 31. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Jon Stokes and Stewart Clegg, ‘Once Upon a Time in the Bureaucracy: Power and Public Sector 
Management’ (2002) 9(2) Organization 225. 
 20 
and demoralised civil servants, where some senior civil servants engage in a struggle 
for power.135 
In regards to political and statutory impediments to bureaucracy, Young argues that 
legislations passed by Congress have played significant roles in the mushrooming of 
administration.136 As such, political and legal rules have played significant roles in 
producing large and fragmented governing institutions, many of which have 
overlapping functions and authorities.137 Bozeman’s study views legal rules and 
procedures as the closest relative of red tape. One of the legal constraints in 
bureaucracy is ‘the rule entropy’—a condition where regulations that are applied in 
many organisations can be applied differently between them.138 The more 
organisations, levels of the organisation and authorities involved in applying such legal 
rules, the more likely that the meaning of the rules will be lost and create red tape.139 
Bozeman claims that an overregulated bureaucracy may cause organisations or 
individuals to interpret rules differently and become inefficient; he argues that too 
many governing rules can be a constraint to public sector management and lead to 
inefficient use of resources.140 
Still, legal rules are the central feature of public sector management.141 Bevir suggests 
that legal rules should be viewed as a ‘moral concept’ rather than as a blueprint for 
institutional structure.142 Bevir does not discuss how legal rules can become a 
constraint for reorganisation, even though legal frameworks are a key aspect of 
improving public sector management and encouraging good governance.143 It is 
difficult, in particular, to find literature discussing the extent of the legislation 
challenges facing bureaucracy reform in Indonesia. This aligns with findings reported 
by Chua, who says that there is an imbalance in how literature in Southeast Asian 
countries discusses socio-legal issues, as authors tend to discuss laws in relation to 
                                                 
135 Ibid. 
136 Young (n 29) 328. 
137 Ibid. 
138 B Bozeman, ‘A Theory of Government “Red Tape”’ (1993) 3(3) Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 273. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Bevir (n 57). 
142 Ibid. 
143 Agere (n 63). 
 21 
Islamic or customary norms, gender equality, land and the environment.144 There is a 
lack of literature that discusses the intersection of laws and public administration in 
the Indonesian context. 
Bozeman concludes that abundant legal rules have a negative effect. However, beyond 
this claim, he provides no real evidence. Therefore, further examination of how legal 
rules can be a constraint to bureaucracy is required. Further, a study by Goldfinch, 
DeRouen and Pospieszna posits that administrative reform may have mixed effects in 
different countries with different administrative laws.145 Their study also notes the 
issue of there being insufficient reliable data on how laws affect public sector reform, 
particularly in developing countries.146 Thus, more detailed work is needed, 
particularly in the Indonesian context. 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to examine the governance structure of 
bureaucracy reform in Indonesia, particularly in the area of organisational changes, 
and to investigate the extent to which political and statutory aspects influence and 
constrain reorganisation. It argues that successful reform is dependent on capability to 
overcome the political and statutory challenges of reorganisation. This thesis proposes 
a new legislative framework to support reorganisation that not only takes into account 
how politics shape the organisation of bureaucracy, but also the current statutory 
framework and legal culture in reorganisation. More specifically, this thesis addresses 
the following research questions: 
1. Does the legislation and surrounding political interests constrain reorganisation 
in Indonesia? 
2. Would a bloated bureaucracy result in the need to reform, and what realistic 
reform measure can be implemented to overcome the political and statutory 
challenges in reorganisation? 
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To answer these questions, three objectives provide the framework for this thesis: 
1. To understand the progress of, and the current practice of, bureaucracy reform 
in Indonesia. 
2. To investigate the political and statutory aspects of reorganisation and the 
extent to which they shape the bureaucracy and constrain bureaucracy reform 
in Indonesia. 
3. To determine the legislation reform required to overcome the political and 
legislative problems facing reorganisation and develop a new legislation 
framework to support reorganisation. 
1.4 Research Design and Methods 
1.4.1 Methodological Approach 
To answer the research questions, this thesis took a qualitative approach to identifying 
political and statutory challenges, to reform the extent to which these challenges shape 
the governance structure of the Indonesian bureaucracy. Auerbach and Silverstein 
describe the qualitative approach as hypothesis-generating research.147 Creswell 
defines it as a research process that uses inductive data analysis to understand the 
issues.148 
Qualitative methodology is characterised as inductive, emerging and shaped by the 
experiences of the researcher when collecting and analysing data.149 This research used 
an approach from a social constructivism interpretive framework, in which multiple 
realities are constructed through experiences and interactions with others.150 The 
inductive method was employed in this research, through interviewing and analysis of 
texts. 
This thesis combined political science, public policy and management and legal 
research concerning administrative laws to answer its research questions and form 
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conclusions. Data were collected through a combination of desk-based study and in-
depth interviews. 
The Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (MoABR) of the Republic 
of Indonesia is responsible for formulating policies and conducting administrative 
reform in the ministries and agencies of the central government. 151 This thesis 
comprises a case study, which examined the process of reorganisation conducted by 
the MoABR in national level government institutions and examined the political and 
statutory impediments surrounding that reogranisation. 
1.4.2 Research Paradigm 
This thesis is a socio-legal study that covers aspects of public administration and 
administrative laws, as well as political science and public policy. This study falls 
within the regulation perspective. This standpoint is concerned primarily with the 
necessity for the rule of societies or human behaviour.152 The regulation perspective is 
relevant to this research as concerns how institutional reform can be improved—and 
this research concerns how public sector organisation can overcome the political and 
statutory challenges of reorganisation. This research employed an interpretive 
paradigm, which has the same meaning as interpretivism.153 The concern of this 
paradigm is to understand the essential values in the organisation, with the main focus 
of finding irrationalities.154 This paradigm takes the researcher into the realm of 
politics in the Indonesian bureaucracy, where they can observe how power is used and 
how legislations are applied.155 
There are three types of legal research, namely doctrinal research, socio-legal studies 
and international and comparative legal research.156 This research is a socio-legal study 
that combines political science, public policy and management and legal research in 
the area of administrative law. The benefit of using other disciplines to support legal 
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research is been widely known and socio-legal research expands legal discourse, which 
guides the course of the research and methodologies to produce evidence to answer 
the research questions.157 Socio-legal research is defined as qualitative and categorised 
under ‘problems, policy and law’ reform based research, which involves the 
consideration of social factors and the social effects of current practice and law.158 This 
research can be categorised as socio-legal research, since it examines the political and 
legal problems facing the reorganisation of public institutions and considers the effects 
of social factors (politics) and relevant laws in institutional reform. 
The components of the research paradigm are ontology, epistemology, methodology 
and methods.159 Ontology refers to the perception of the nature of reality.160 The 
approach to this research was that reality is subjective, since the reality in this study 
was the participants’ points of view.161 The epistemology of this study was 
interpretivism, wherein the participants created meanings which were different from 
the physical phenomenon to which they referred.162 Since the primary focus of the 
interpretivism paradigm is to make sense of the world around us,163 this approach 
aimed to create new and richer understandings and interpretations of bureaucracy 
reform in Indonesia, specifically related to the political and statutory challenges of 
reorganisation, from the perspective of the interviewees. 
1.4.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
1.4.3.1 In-depth interviews 
The primary data were collected using face-to-face, semi-structured interviews. Key 
interview questions were developed to answer the research questions. Fourteen 
interviewees were selected, based on their capacity to conduct or influence the 
direction of institutional reform in Indonesia. These samples were relatively small. 
However, this study emphasised the rich insights from the participants rather than the 
sample size. These interviewees were namely: 
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1. The Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of 
Indonesia; 
2. The Deputy Minister for the Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic 
Reform—Institutional Affairs and Governance, Ministry of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of Indonesia; 
3. The Special Adviser for Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, 
Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of 
Indonesia; 
4. Two director-level officials at the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic 
Reform of the Republic of Indonesia, who are responsible for developing 
policies related to reorganisation and conducting reorganisation for technical 
institutions; 
5. A director-level official from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia; 
6. The Head of Division for Religion, Education and Technology at the Ministry 
of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia; 
7. The Head of Legal Division, Ministry of Trade; 
8. Two professors and experts in public administration and public policy, namely 
the Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration at the University of Indonesia, 
and the Dean of the Faculty of Administration at Brawijaya University; 
9. Two members of Parliament, namely Chairman of Commission I of the House 
of Representative (DPR) and the Head of Committee I of the House of 
Regional Representative (DPD); 
10. A  project manager for KOMPAK (Kolaborasi Masyarakat dan Pelayanan 
untuk Kesejahteraan – Public Collaboration and Services for Welfare); and 
11. A senior researcher for the Parliament / House of Representatives. 
Face-to-face interviews have the advantage of time and place synchronised 
communication; the interviewer and interviewee can react to what the other says 
directly.164 This method also can give additional information from social cues, such as 
the expression, tone and gestures of the interviewee.165 The benefit of semi-structured 
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individual interviews is the ability to develop trust, enable interviewees to express their 
thoughts and feelings openly and provide an opportunity for the researcher to establish 
personal contact with the respondents.166 
The study had no issue obtaining access to the informants, as the MoABR support this 
research. The researcher is also a civil servant at the MoABR and is sponsored by the 
Indonesian government. Access to the members of parliament was not difficult, as the 
MoABR is the counterpart of the Second Commission of the House of Representatives. 
The questions in the interview plan of this study were broad and complex. To 
understand the problem and formulate a solution, interview questions were divided 
into four major groups: 
1. Overview of bureaucracy reform in Indonesia: 
i. the goals of bureaucracy reform; 
ii. progress and achievement of reform; 
iii. identification of major reform challenges. 
2. The current practice of reorganisation: 
i. overview of the structure of bureaucracy in Indonesia; 
ii. what makes an effective and efficient organisation; 
iii. the business process between and within ministries and agencies; 
iv. reorganisation procedures and the process of organisational change. 
3. Political and statutory challenges in reorganisation: 
i. the current administration’s political will regarding bureaucracy reform; 
ii. public leaders’ support for administrative reform; 
iii. support from both executive and legislative branch of powers to reform; 
iv. political motives for reform; 
v. political and legislation aspects that shape the governance structure in 
Indonesia; 
vi. the current legal framework for reform. 
4. What are the possible solutions for political and legal problems in reorganisation? 
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The details of the above interviews and interview plans are further discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
1.4.3.2 Desk-study 
A desk-based study was necessary to understand the political and legislative elements 
of the Indonesian administration. As a socio-legal study, secondary data in this 
research were derived from literature and archival research was conducted from 
various documents, such as legislations, regulations, policies and government reports 
and archives. The researcher examined the laws relevant to the organisation of the 
ministries and agencies and reorganisation activities. The body of law, together with 
relevant legislation and policies, was collected and analysed, with the aim of 
describing the body of legislation and policies and how they apply. Secondary 
literature relating to the Indonesian public sector was also informative on these 
political and legal issues. 
1.4.3.3 Data Analysis 
In this study, the analysis included data reduction, reorganisation and presentation, 
followed by drawing conclusions. The transcript was learned and similar or repetitive 
meaning was lessened. Grouping of responses to each question was established. The 
data analysis included data familiarisation, coding, searching for themes and 
recognising the relationship, refining themes and testing propositions and 
evaluation.167 This research conducted data analysis using the inductive method and 
perspective. Saunders suggested that, in this approach, the researcher should analyse 
the data as it collected to develop a conceptual framework to guide the study.168 
1.4.3.4 Ethical Considerations 
This study adhered to all of the ethics regulations standardised by Curtin University. 
The researcher obtained ethics approval from the Research Ethics Committee at Curtin 
University (Approval Number: HRE2016-0474) before the data collection process. 
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Generally, this research was regarded as low risk, in terms of Curtin’s ethical conduct 
of research regulations. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
This thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the background of the research 
and defines the research problem. It articulates and justifies the methodological 
approach, research paradigm and data collection techniques, together with its ethical 
considerations. This chapter also identifies the aim and scope of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review on Indonesian democracy and its political 
system. Multiple aspects of the Indonesian political and administrative system from 
legislation are examined in this chapter to develop a conceptual framework for this 
thesis. The examination of these aspects is crucial to obtain an initial understanding of 
how democracy and the political system in Indonesia shape and influence the posture 
of bureaucracy. This thesis is a socio-legal study, which covers aspects in the area of 
public administration and administrative laws, as well as the area of political science. 
Chapter 3 details the interview process taken in this study. This chapter discusses the 
interview strategies and their relation to the methodological approaches. It elaborates 
on the selection of research participants, such as their backgrounds and criteria for the 
selection of the interviewees. The grouping of interview questions and some of the 
answers are also presented here. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 provide findings based on the 
in-depth interviews, structured according to the grouping of the interview questions. 
Specifically, Chapter 4 provides an overview of bureaucracy reform in Indonesia. It 
examines the goals of bureaucracy reform, followed by a discussion on the progress 
and achievement of reform, as well as major reform challenges. In addition, it also 
identifies the legal culture of bureaucracy reform and reorganisation. 
Chapter 5 discusses the current practice of reorganisation. It provides an overview of 
the structure of bureaucracy in Indonesia, discusses the elements that constitute the 
‘effective and efficient’ organisation, business processes and the reorganisation 
procedure and process. In addition, this chapter considers how reorganisation is 
conducted in other countries and lessons Indonesia can learn from other countries’ 
experiences. 
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Chapter 6 discusses the political and statutory challenges associated with 
reorganisation. It addresses the second research objective: ‘to investigate the political 
and statutory aspects of reorganisation and the extent to which they shape the 
bureaucracy and constrain bureaucracy reform in Indonesia’. It examines the political 
attitude towards bureaucracy reform, which includes a discussion on public leaders’ 
support of bureaucracy reform and the extent of support from both the executive and 
legislative powers. Then, it discusses the political and legal aspects that shape the 
governance structure, the current legal framework to reform, and the problem of 
disharmony in laws and policies. 
Chapter 7 discusses possible solutions to the political and legal problems facing 
reorganisation that were presented in previous chapters. It draws lessons from the 
findings presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, as well as from interview answers relevant 
to this theme. This chapter addresses the third research objective: ‘to address the 
legislation reform required to overcome the political and legislation problems facing 
reorganisation and develop a new legislation framework to support reorganisation.’ 
This chapter explores the legislation reform required to address the political and 
statutory challenges facing reorganisation and develop a new legislation to support 
reorganisation. 
Chapter 8 provides conclusions, recommendations, limitations and direction for future 
research, with concluding thoughts from the author. 
1.6 Significance 
This thesis will contribute to the literature surrounding administrative law and 
institutional reform. It will provide knowledge of the key determinants and challenges 
in reorganising government bodies in Indonesia. In particular, it will identify political 
and statutory aspects that influence reform in the Indonesian government. The extent 
to which political and legal features shape public sector governance in Indonesia, 
particularly in organisational changes, has not been thoroughly studied. This thesis 
will highlight that something need to be done to overcome the political and legislative 
problems facing reorganisation and the bloating of the bureaucracy.  Significantly, it 
will contribute to the development of public sector governance and the legal 
framework of bureaucracy reform in Indonesia. This research will help the Indonesian 
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government transform from rule-based administration to dynamic governance, a key 
for achieving success in the context of accelerating globalisation.169 
Practically, the significance of this thesis is that it will bring awareness to the 
government and legislatures of how bloated the bureaucracy is and why changes are 
required. As far as can be ascertained, none of the previous studies undertaken in this 
study area have included key determinants and a deep analysis of the political and legal 
aspects of Indonesian government institutional reform, nor provided recommendations 
for the political and legal problems facing institutional reform. This thesis will achieve 
research significance by filling these important gaps in knowledge. It will also 
contribute towards finding the best solutions to political and legal challenges when 
conducting organisational changes. The outcome of this study is beneficial for 
policymakers in developing good governance and improving the legal rules of the 
bureaucracy. 
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Chapter 2: The Indonesian Political, Legislative and 
Administrative Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
Administrative law is an essential part of public administration. It provides a legal 
basis for the government to manage administration.170 Traditionally, administrative 
law is the law that governs the bureaucratic structure and is primarily concerned with 
the function, power and responsibility of the government.171 As mentioned in Chapter 
1, there is a close relationship between administrative law and constitutional law and 
administrative can operate as a lex specialist of constitutional law. 172 The core 
function of the constitution is to establish functions for branches of power, while 
administrative law is a branch of public law that involves understanding the way 
governments operate, the nature of administrative power, the government’s 
administrative process, and the function of each administrative institution.173 
This thesis is structured according to the principles of administrative law and considers 
the power of each political function created in the Constitution. Discussing these 
principles is necessary for examining the problems presented in this study. To examine 
how the government operates and how political pressures influence the government, 
this thesis first needs to examine the ultimate source of administrative power, the 
Constitution.174 According to the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia is a democratic country 
where executive power lies with the government, legislative power lies with the 
parliament and judicial power lies with the court system.175 Indonesia is a country that 
follows the presidential system for its administration. Based on Article 4 of the 
Constitution, the president holds the executive power, acting as the head of state and 
the head of administration; he has the authority to create ministries and government 
agencies as well as to appoint ministers and heads of agencies.176 
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This chapter discusses aspects of Indonesian democracy and its political system and 
how they shape the bureaucracy. Multiple aspects of the Indonesian democratic, 
political and administration system, derived from the constitution and relevant statutes, 
are examined in this chapter as a means to develop conceptual frameworks for this 
thesis. Applying these conceptual frameworks to the discussion of political and legal 
challenges facing institutional reform in the Indonesian bureaucracy provided findings 
related to the political and statutory aspects of reorganisation, as presented in the 
subsequent chapters. The subsequent sections provide insights into the Indonesian 
Constitution, branches of power in Indonesia, involvement of politics in 
reorganisation, the relationship between legislation and reorganisation and Indonesia’s 
legal culture, followed by the chapter summary. 
2.2 The 1945 Constitution 
The 1945 Constitution was adopted on 18 August 1945, a day after Indonesia declared 
its independence. Over the next 57 years, Indonesia adopted four different 
constitutions, namely the original version of the 1945 Constitution, the 1949 Federal 
Constitution, the 1950 Provisional Constitution and the amended version of the 1945 
Constitution. The 1945 Constitution has been amended four times (in 1999, 2000, 2001 
and 2002) to become the current Constitution. These amendments were made as forms 
of constitutional reforms, following the downfall of Soeharto’s authoritarian 
leadership in 1998.177 
The amendments to the 1945 Constitution are very significant, because the highest 
state organ during the period of amendments—the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR))—effectively created a new constitution.178 
Article 37 of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that amendments to the Constitution can 
be made if they are agreed upon by at least 50% plus one member of the total 
membership of the MPR.179 At least two-thirds of the MPR membership should be 
present in the session to amend the Constitution. A constitutional amendment proposal 
can be accepted in the MPR agenda if it is submitted by at least one-third of the total 
                                                 
177 Denny Indrayana, ‘In Search for a Democratic Constitution: Indonesian Constitutional Reform 
1999—2002’ (2010) 17(1) Jurnal Media Hukum, 115. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945]. 
 33 
membership of the MPR.180 No provision in the constitution is forbidden to be 
amended, except for the provisions relating to the form of the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia.181 
During Indonesia’s early years, not enough time was allowed to implement the 1945 
Constitution. Shortly after the establishment of the Indonesian Government in 1945, 
with Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta as the first president and vice president, 
respectively, the newly-established government announced the so-called ‘Maklumat 
X’ (Announcement X), whereby the government became a parliamentary government, 
rather than a presidential system, as intended by the 1945 Constitution.182 Indonesia 
then had to defend its declaration of independence through an independence war 
against the Netherlands, who tried to reoccupy Indonesia after Japan was defeated in 
the Second World War. Indonesia and the Netherlands agreed to make peace and the 
Netherlands acknowledged Indonesian independence in 1949, on the condition that 
Indonesia became a federal country, or Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS), referred to 
as the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. The 1949 Federal Constitution was 
adopted for the RIS. 
However, Indonesia as a federal state—the RIS—did not last long. It was dissolved on 
the fifth celebration of Independence Day on 17 August 1950. It was replaced with the 
Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia 
[NKRI]) and adopted the 1950 Provisional Constitution. This constitution was 
intended to be temporary—until Indonesia had formed a new constitution. Under this 
interim constitution, Indonesia still applied a parliamentary system of government.183 
The first general election was held in 1955 and dozens of political parties obtained 
seats in parliament. Three biggest political parties obtained most of the seats. They 
were the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia [PKI]), Islamic 
Consultative Council (Majelis Syura Muslimin [Masyumi]) and the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia [PNI]). After the 1955 general election, 
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the Constituent Assembly (Badan Konstituante) was formed in parliament with the 
task of drafting a new constitution. In 1959, four years later, this assembly still had not 
completed the task because of heated debates between the political parties about the 
foundation of the state.184 
Following the 1955 general election, there was a widespread increase in bureaucracy 
politicisation and officials who were sympathisers of rival political parties were often 
dismissed from their office. The PNI Cabinet at the time kicked out officials who 
supported Masyumi and PKI, after which, the Masyumi cabinet retaliated. Soekarno, 
as the president at that time, saw the need to intervene and declared the Presidential 
Decree of 5 July 1959, which reinstated the 1945 Constitution and ended the 
parliamentary democracy. 
Soekarno saw that political parties, during the period of the parliamentary system, were 
oriented toward their own ideologies, without considering national unity. Thus, 
Soekarno—backed by the military—saw the need to intervene, on the basis that 
parliamentary democracy was only ‘noises’ and not consistent with the Indonesian 
identity, which was based on collectivism and family values.185 For Soekarno, 
parliamentary democracy was no different from liberal democracy; he thought it 
brought nothing but instability. Therefore, he tried to seize control of parliament.186 
Contravening the terms of the 1945 Constitution, he created his own version of 
parliament, with members who were appointed by him.187 
After a bloody conflict that led to the massacre of hundreds of thousands of alleged 
communists in 1967, General Soeharto came into power to replace Soekarno. Similarly 
to Soekarno, Soeharto saw political parties and their leaders as troublemakers. Both 
Soekarno and Soeharto’s administrations marked the era of authoritarianism for more 
than 50 years, until the downfall of Soeharto in 1998. Hanan stipulates that there were 
three characteristics of the Indonesian administration during these periods, namely 
executive dominance (including the bureaucracy), a limited degree of institutionalising 
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political institutions and the development of consensus (musyawarah mufakat) as a 
political norm.188 
Soeharto came into power under the premise that he would commit to the 1945 
Constitution. Thus, it was impossible to position the legislative power under his own 
control as Soekarno did. To legitimise his administration, Soeharto had to find a way 
to ensure that he could control the parliament and the political parties with democratic 
processes. Since he could not rely on the existing political parties, he created the 
Functional Group (Golongan Karya [Golkar]), supported by several intellectuals and 
the military. Soeharto did not call Golkar a political party. However, it was assumed 
to be a political force, and therefore could contest in a general election. The creation 
of Golkar was also to legitimise the role of the military in the administration through 
a doctrine of dwi-fungsi (dual function). This doctrine stipulates that the military serves 
not only as security and as a defence force, but also as a socio-political force, which 
could hold political and administrative positions in the government.189 Golkar won the 
first general election in Soeharto’s era, in 1971, by mobilising the structure of the 
administration and military across the country. It won the election by obtaining 68.2% 
of the votes. The massive mobilisation of the civil service, through the Corps of Civil 
Service (Korpri), and the operations of the military territorial commands (that had 
roots in rural areas) helped Golkar win the election. 
One of the main uncertainties in the original 1945 Constitution is that it did not specify 
a limit on how many times the president could be re-elected. The 1945 Constitution 
(before the amendments) stipulates that the president and the vice president are elected 
by the MPR (Article 6) and shall serve their terms for five years and can be re-elected 
after that (Article 7). This constitution did not clearly state the term limit and that 
became the justification for Soeharto to be continuously re-elected and hold power for 
more than 30 years. Sarsito argues that the original 1945 Constitution facilitated 
Soekarno and Soeharto’s development of an authoritarian political system.190 The 
elasticity of the 1945 Constitution and the dominant role of the president trapped 
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Indonesia in an authoritarian administration under the leadership of Soekarno and then 
Soeharto.191 
The original 1945 Constitution was a relatively short document that comprised 37 
articles, four clauses of transitional provisions and two clauses of additional 
provisions. This constitution was supplemented by a preamble, which set the state’s 
five ideologies (Pancasila) and elucidations of each article. Indrayana argues that the 
current 1945 Constitution underwent such significant amendments that it became more 
like a new constitution.192 However, none of the political factions involved in the 
amendments admit that they made a new constitution.193 Therefore, after being 
amended four times, from 1999 to 2001, it is still known as the 1945 Constitution. 
The four amendments were described as measures to reform the constitution from a 
text that could potentially create an authoritarian government into a more democratic 
constitution.194 The systematic amendments to the 1945 Constitution were seen as 
evolutionary changes that ended the temporary character of the 1945 Constitution. 
These amendments also established a clearer division of powers between the 
executive, legislative and judicative areas and improved human rights protection.195 
The downfall of the New Order regime under Soeharto paved the way for altering the 
1945 Constitution. The idea of altering the 1945 Constitution culminated in 1999, 
when the MPR began to amend the Constitution. The 1999–2002 amendments were 
not an easy process, as there was strong debate over the relationship between Islam 
and the state and the amendments in general were protested by some retired military 
generals and political elites.196 The debates saw the rejection of an Islamic state, in 
favour of a nationalist state ideology, which was stipulated in the preamble of the 1945 
Constitution, the Pancasila.197 Indrayana argues that the debates between the Islamic 
factions and the nationalists regarding the foundation of the state have been ongoing 
since the establishment of the republic: 
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Notwithstanding the agreement to keep the preamble, the Islamic factions kept 
fighting for the insertion of the ‘seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter into Article 29 
of the Constitution, that is, for an expanded application of syariah. This was 
understood by the nationalist groups as an initial step towards establishing an 
Islamic state, something that the nationalist groups (including the military) saw, and 
still see, as non-negotiable. In the end, the insertion of the ‘seven words’ of the 
Jakarta Charter was rejected, just as it was during the constitutional debates of 1945 
and 1956-1959.198 
Officially, the first amendment was made in 1999 and comprised mainly provisions 
linked to the presidential powers.199 The idea to amend the constitution emerged soon 
after Soeharto’s forced resignation in 1998, during Habibie’s presidency. Soon after 
he was installed as the president, Habibie established popular initiatives for the better 
protection of human rights, released political prisoners and reformed the electoral 
laws. Those initiatives created a favourable atmosphere in which to suggest changing 
the constitution. Habibie’s initiative to bring forward the general election, which was 
supposed to be held in 2002, to 1999 was another critical pre-amendment arrangement. 
The result of the 1999 general election provided a legitimate MPR that could amend 
the Constitution.200 
After the first amendment in 1999, the second amendment was made in 2000. It 
focused on the form of local governments, restating the form of the state, citizenship, 
improved protection of human rights, defence and security, the flags, language and the 
symbol and anthem of the republic. The third amendment in 2001 addressed the issue 
of people’s sovereignty, the structure and power of MPR, the presidential election, the 
structure and power of the regional parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah [DPRD]), 
the national general election and the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia. The 
last amendment, in 2002, was to dissolve the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan 
Pertimbangan Agung [DPA]), establish the House of Regional Representatives 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah [DPD]) and refine the provisions related to the 
presidential election, national economy, education and social welfare. 
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The 1999–2002 amendments to the 1945 Constitution changed the structure of the 
parliament. Before these amendments, sovereignty was in the hands of the people but 
carried out by the MPR, which consisted of members of the House of People’s 
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), delegates of regions and functional 
groups, including the military. During his leadership, Soeharto—as the President and 
the Chairman of Golkar—used his power to appoint members of Golkar and the 
military to sit in the MPR. During Soeharto’s era, with the help of the mobilisation of 
the bureaucracy and the military, Golkar always won the general election. Thus, the 
majority of MPR was under the control of Soeharto and he used the MPR as the means 
to preserve his power for more than three decades.201 
After the amendments, Article 2 stipulated that the members of MPR consisted of the 
members of DPR and the DPD. As stipulated by Article 22, the members of DPR 
represent the interest of political parties, and the members of DPD represent the 
regional, or provincial, interests. The people now directly elect the members of those 
two chambers. Further, the MPR is no longer the sole holder of sovereignty or the 
highest institution of the republic that holds unlimited power. Sarsito states: 
Before amendment, MPR had the authority to carry out fully the people’s 
sovereignty. MPR, under the Presidential shadow, was the only one super body that 
could do anything they liked, including to impeach the president. After amendment, 
sovereignty remains in the hands of the people but must be carried out in accordance 
with the Constitution. In the past time, before amendment, members of MPR 
consisted of members of DPR, delegates from regions and functional groups. The 
procedure to elect these members was regulated by law, made by the President with 
the approval of DPR. There was a space for manipulation done by the President 
because the Constitution 1945 did not at all reaffirm that they all had to be elected 
through national election. In fact, only around 40 percent of the members of MPR 
were elected. Others were only appointed by the President. Nowadays, the 
Constitution, article 2 (1), reaffirms that members of MPR consist of members of 
DPR and members of DPD, and all of them have to be elected through national 
election.202 
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Indrayana argues that the changes to MPR power under the constitutional amendments 
shows that the MPR has been able to reform and limit its power.203 The MPR, after the 
1999–2002 constitutional reforms, now has limited powers, compared with before the 
amendments. The table below provides a comparison of MPR powers before and after 
the amendments, as posited by Indrayana. 
Table 2-1 The MPR: Before and After the Amendments204 
Provisions Before the amendments After the amendments 
Sovereignty of 
the people 
The MPR was the sole holder 
of the sovereignty.  
The MPR is not the sole holder 
of sovereignty, which shall be 
implemented in accordance 
with the Constitution. 
Position The highest institution, with 
unlimited powers. 
No longer the highest 
institution, nor the most 
powerful. 
Presidential 
Election 
The president was elected by 
the MPR. 
The MPR only inaugurates the 
president and vice president, 
who are directly elected by the 
people. 
The Broad 
Guidelines of 
State Policy 
(GBHN) 
Prepared by the MPR and 
implemented by the president, 
who had to account for their 
implementation to the MPR. 
The MPR is no longer has this 
authority. 
Constitutional 
Amendments 
Amended and determined by 
the MPR. 
The MPR still have this power. 
However, the amendment 
procedures have been changed.  
Presidential 
Impeachment 
The MPR had the power to 
remove the President. 
However, the procedures were 
not clearly stipulated in the 
Constitution. 
The MPR’s power in 
presidential impeachment and 
its procedures are clearly 
stipulated in the Constitution. 
Vacant 
Presidency 
The Constitution was silent on 
this issue. 
The MPR has the power to 
appoint the president or vice 
President, in the event that one 
or both positions are vacant. 
 
                                                 
203 Indrayana (n 177) 22. 
204 Ibid. 
 40 
The 1945 Constitution divided powers into executive, legislative and judicative 
powers, the next section further examines the role and power of each branch of power 
in Indonesia. 
2.3 Branches of Power 
Under the current 1945 Constitution (after the amendments), Indonesia has become a 
democratic country with limited separation of powers. The government holds 
executive power, legislative power lies with the parliament and judicial power w the 
court system.205 Montesquieu argues that ideally, those different branches of 
government should have different powers and should not intervene in the affairs of the 
others.206 
However, Mahfud MD, former Chief Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, 
posits that Montesquieu’s framework is no longer relevant to modern 
administration.207 In particular, he argues that the idea of ‘separation of powers’ should 
be regarded as ‘division of powers’ and ‘distribution of powers’, since it is almost 
impossible to make a rigid separation between the branches of power; he believes they 
should be interconnected by maintaining the mechanism of checks and balances.208 In 
addition to the legislative function, Article 20 of the Constitution also provides 
parliament with the power to conduct budget and supervisory functions. The branches 
of power in Indonesia, according to its Constitution, are described in the figure below. 
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Figure 2-1 Branches of Power in Indonesia 
2.3.1 Executive 
Indonesia has a presidential system of government. Based on Article 4 of the 1945 
Constitution, the president, assisted by the vice president, is the apex of executive 
power—acting as the head of state and the head of administration.209 The legislative 
power is vested in both the government and the parliament, while the judicative power 
is independent of the executive and legislative powers. Political reforms that took place 
via the four instances of constitutional amendments from 1999 to 2002 have given 
more power to the parliament (DPR) to implement checks and balances on the 
government; thus, the Indonesian administrative system has been described as 
‘presidential with parliamentary characteristics’.210 King states: 
One of the primary weaknesses of the 1945 Constitution is the lack of clarity 
concerning one of the fundamental dimensions of any democratic system: is it 
presidential or parliamentary? Since the greater weight is on the presidential side, 
perhaps it is appropriate to call it 'presidential with parliamentary characteristics.'211  
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Article 17 of the constitution stipulates that the ministers, who are appointed and 
dismissed by the president, assist the president in performing his duties. Each minister 
is responsible for a specific area of governance. The procedure of establishing, 
changing and dissolving a ministry is regulated by law. The president and his cabinet, 
along with the heads of local governments, form the executive arm of power.212 As the 
head of the executive power, the president also has the power to appoint and dismiss 
the heads of agencies.213 
2.3.2 Legislative 
The House of People’s Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) holds legislative 
power as the lower house (or the parliament), and the MPR as the upper house. Article 
2 of the Constitution states that the MPR comprises the members of the DPR and DPD, 
who are chosen through general elections.214 Following the 2004 election and the four 
constitutional amendments in 1999–2002, the MPR became a bicameral parliament, 
with the DPD, as regional representatives, as its second chamber. The DPD is the upper 
house of the MPR and the DPR is the lower house. Both the government and the DPR 
have the power to make laws. Each bill must be discussed between the DPR and the 
president (the executive) to reach a joint agreement and the President must endorse 
into law a bill that has reached a joint agreement. If a bill fails to reach a joint 
agreement, it may not be reintroduced into the DPR during the current term (Article 
20). 
The MPR holds the power to amend and ordain the constitution, install the president 
and the vice president, and to dismiss the president or vice president. The other arm of 
the legislative power is the DPD, which has only limited legislative power, since the 
Constitution only grants it advisory powers, in which it can advise the DPR on local 
governance and legislative matters. Article 22D of the Constitution provides that the 
DPD can propose a bill into the DPR for issues related to regional autonomy, central 
and local governments’ relationship, creating a new region and matters related to the 
financial balance between the central and local governments. While the powers of the 
MPR became more limited after the 1999–2002 constitutional reforms, the era of post-
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amendments have witnessed a considerable increase in power for the DPR. Indrayana 
points out that the DPR’s involvement in certain administrative matters has shown off 
how much power the DPR has after the amendments. Further, he posits that the DPR 
has shifted from a ‘rubber-stamp’ institution to a supreme organ of the republic, 
detailed in the table below. 
Table 2-2 The DPR: Before and After the 1999–2002 Constitutional Reforms215 
Before After 
There was no stipulation of the DPR’s legislative, budgetary and 
supervisory functions in the Constitution. 
Stipulated 
The DPR’s power to do interpellation was not stipulated, nor its 
rights to conduct inquiries and to express an opinion to the 
government. 
Stipulated 
The DPR’s approval to declare war, make peace and conclude 
international treaties were not required by the Constitution. 
Stipulated 
The Constitution did not stipulate the DPR’s power to select the 
members of the Audit Board, and judges of the Constitutional 
Court. 
Stipulated 
The Constitution was silent on the DPR’s role in the impeachment 
processes.  
Stipulated 
 
The DPR currently consists of 11 Commissions and 6 Committees; the 11 
Commissions refer to legislative issue areas, and the 6 Committees are responsible for 
the DPR internal administration. Fractions in the DPR distribute commissions’ 
leadership positions on a basis proportional to the party’s seats in the parliament. The 
influential commissions are Commission 1 (issues of defence, foreign affairs and 
information), Commission 2 (home affairs and decentralisation), Commission 3 (law, 
human rights and security) and Commission 11 (fiscal and development planning). In 
addition to passing bills, the commissions are used as venues for members of 
parliament to express their views on issues related to their commissions’ respective 
area, as well as their views on the performance of the executive. These commissions 
often hold hearings with their government representatives regarding issues relevant to 
their area. 
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2.3.3 Judicative 
The judicative power in Indonesia is exercised by the Supreme Court (Mahkamah 
Agung [MA]) and its subordinate courts and by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah 
Konstitutsi [MK]). The MA’s subordinate courts are public courts, religious courts, 
military courts and administrative courts. Article 24 of the Constitution stipulates that, 
to maintain the justice system, the judicial powers of the MA and the MK are 
independent of other branches of powers. The 1999–2002 constitutional amendments 
established two new institutions in the judicative system, namely the Constitutional 
Court and the Judicial Commissions. Through these amendments, the Constitution 
gave the MK the power to conduct a judicial review of statutes—a power it avoided 
handing over to the MA. Indrayana argues that this was a better solution, given the 
acute corruption problems in the MA and existing lower courts during that time.216 
The power to conduct a judicial review of the laws is a crucial power that was not 
available before the constitutional amendments. Article 24C of the Amended 1945 
Constitution provides the MK with the power to conduct a judicial review of 
legislation against the Constitution, settlement disputes regarding powers between 
state bodies in the Constitution, the dismissal of political parties and settlement 
disputes regarding the result of general elections. The MK’s decision in these matters 
is final, which means that the MK is both the lowest and highest level of court to make 
such decisions. 
The law binds every branch of power in Indonesia. The next section of this chapter 
examines the legislation framework in Indonesia. This examination provides insights 
into the hierarchy of legislation, as well as the nature of the law in Indonesia. 
2.4 Legislation Framework 
The law is a primary source of power for administrative decision-makers in Indonesia. 
The Indonesian legal system is based on the civil law legal system, intermixed with 
customary law and Roman-Dutch law. In Indonesia, the DPR, together with the 
president, declares the law. However, under Indonesia’s legislative system, the law is 
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usually general in nature, lacking in both definitions and implementation.217 Rather, 
the laws work as normative declarations of will or brief guidelines.218 Implementing 
regulations, in the form of government, presidential, ministerial and regional 
regulations or decrees, is necessary. These regulations and decrees provide further 
details stipulating how exactly the laws will be implemented. The executive has the 
power to govern how the legislation applies and is responsible for making 
administrative decisions under that particular law, in the form of regulations and 
decrees. The executive power, which consists of the president, ministers, head of 
agencies or government departments and public servants, are considered those who 
hold the administrative power. 
Regarding the hierarchy of legislation framework in Indonesia, Article 7 of the Act 
12/2011 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations sets forth the hierarchy of the 
Indonesian legislation as follows:219 
 The 1945 Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 or UUD 1945); 
 The People’s Consultative Assembly Decisions (Ketetapan Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat); 
 Law (Undang-Undang or UU) and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law 
(Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang or Perpu); 
 Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah or PP); 
 Presidential Regulation (Peraturan Presiden or Perpres); 
 Regional–Province Regulation; 
 Regional–Regency/City Regulation. 
As aforementioned, the laws are usually general, since they only provide statements 
of general principles. Perpu is a government regulation at the same level as the law, 
which substitutes certain laws and is made by the president in urgent situations, such 
as in times of crisis. Government regulations, or PP, were made to provide specific 
guidelines to implement certain laws, often drafted and discussed between ministries 
and signed by the president. The president, as the head of the executive power, issues 
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the Presidential Regulation or Perpres. The provincial or the regent/city government, 
in agreement with the Regional House of Representatives in their respective area, pass 
regional regulations. 
In addition to the above hierarchy, Article 8 of the Act 12/2011 establishes the binding 
authority of regulations promulgated by executive, legislative and judicial bodies that 
are binding as long as they have been made under the directive of higher law or 
regulations or made under its respective authorities. Those promulgating bodies 
include: 
i. The People’s Consultative Assembly; 
ii. The House of People’s Representative; 
iii. The Supreme Court; 
iv. The Constitutional Court; 
v. The State Audit Board; 
vi. The Judicial Commission; 
vii. The Bank of Indonesia; 
viii. Ministers, agencies, institutions or commissions established by law; 
ix. Regional Parliaments; 
x. Governors, Regents or Mayors. 
In practice, there are also administrative decisions in the form of the following decrees, 
instruction and letters: 
 Presidential Decree (Keputusan Presiden); 
 Presidential Instructions (Instruksi Presiden or Inpres); 
 Ministerial Decrees (Keputusan Menteri or Kepmen); 
 Regional Government – Governor’s Decrees (Keputusan Gubernur); 
 Regional Government – Regent or Mayor’s Decrees (Keputusan 
Bupati/Walikota); 
 Circulation Letters (Surat Edaran). 
Those decrees, instructions and letters sometimes conflict with each other. Ministerial 
and other lower decrees do not have the same binding power as regulations. However, 
they are binding in their respective sectors as administrative decisions. If there is a 
conflict between one authority in the hierarchy and a lower one, the higher authority 
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prevails. For example, if there is a conflict between a Ministerial Decree and a higher 
authority such as a Presidential Regulation, the higher Presidential Regulation will 
prevail. The legislation is a political product, which shapes the bureaucracy. How the 
government works is influenced by the political system and the legislation it produces. 
The next section will explore these aspects further and consider how the literature 
describes the influence of politics on reorganisation. 
2.5 Involvement of Politics to Reorganisation and Why the Law-
Making Process is a Political Process 
2.5.1 Politics and Reorganisation 
Administrative organisations and the political system are intercorrelated. The 
effectiveness of any political system is subject to the effectiveness of relevant 
administrative organisations. The design and control of administrative structure is a 
major concern for any political entity. In the literature surrounding public 
administration, politics and public administration are presented as separate activities. 
The political process produces political decisions and public officials—who are 
politically neutral—develop policies in line with those decisions and their underlying 
values.220 Political processes can have a strong influence on policy-making and can 
both drive and restrict reform.221 
The problems of bureaucracy are often structural.222 Kettl and Fesler argue that 
bureaucracy and democracy have an intimate relationship.223 Restructuring a 
government organisation can imply more than a plain administrative measure, as 
legislation framework and political forces are controlling the shape of administrative 
organisations.224 To be able to identify the challenges facing governance in Indonesia, 
it is also important to understand the oligarchic structure of political elites.225 Mietzner 
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postulates that attempts to establish a workable government in Indonesia are 
sometimes blocked by the personal interest of elites and their rent-seeking practices.226 
Mietzner’s in-depth study concerned post-Suharto era Indonesian leadership and 
events related to Indonesian political conditions, following the instalment of Joko 
Widodo as the Indonesian President. It also presented events related to the presidential 
election campaign and how Widodo obtained the presidency. However, the paper is 
heavily involved in the populism of Widodo and provides little examination of the real 
condition of the Indonesian bureaucracy. Mietzner does not adequately clarify some 
of the events. For example, Mietzner’s states that the previous government, during 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, rejected major attempts at administrative 
reform. In fact, it was during Yudhoyono’s presidency that significant laws in 
bureaucracy reform were enacted; some of which include the Public Services Act 
25/2009, the Civil Servants Act 5/2014, the Administrative Procedures Act 30/2014, 
and the Local Governments Act 23/2014. 
In government management organisations, political values often prevail over the 
values of public administration.227 Caiden posits that politicians can intervene in 
organisational management, even in small organisational details, and use reform for 
their political purposes, which are sometimes irrelevant to managerial problems.228 He 
further argues: 
Governments shuffle and reshuffle ministries, for instance, without too much (if 
any) concern for their organisational, administrative and managerial effects. Indeed, 
reorganisations like many other administrative reforms are often motivated by 
political considerations than by concerns with efficiency …229 
March and Olsen also argue that reorganisation is political rhetoric and a political 
struggle between contending interests.230 They state that ‘Fundamental political 
interests, within the bureaucracy and outside, seek access, representation, control and 
policy benefits’.231 Bureaucracy reform is not just a simple public management 
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exercise; more often, it reflects a shift of influence from involved political interest 
groups.232 Thus, reorganisation is a political theatre, as March and Olsen state, 
‘changes in administrative structure or procedures can be seen as challenging elements 
of the core system of meaning, belief, interpretation, status, power and alliances in 
politics’.233 
March and Olsen and Caiden likewise posit that reform may succeed if it obtains 
implicit support from political forces.234 In contrast, Caiden describes that within every 
system of administration, there are individuals who can be described as ‘professional 
reformers’.235 Caiden describes these individuals: 
These dedicated administrative reformers develop new proposals on their own and 
then legitimize them when they can by serving on task forces and study 
commissions that puzzled governments often find handy when they seek fresh ideas. 
They serve government as “in and outers” or the trusted “great and good” to advise, 
recommend, and implement reforms.236 
Caiden posits that the main concern of these reformers is not power; they prefer to deal 
with issues related to efficiency, rationality and accountability.237 To some extent, 
politics can be a constraint to reform, as Caiden states, ‘Politics limits how far reforms 
can be taken and because politics cannot be stretched too far, reforms are compromises 
and invariably incremental and tentative and therefore incomplete’.238 
Cruz and Keefer conclude that political actors often resist reform that reduces their 
popularity.239 Public leaders’ support for administrative reform is often insincere, since 
they are careful to conduct reform that does not threaten their power, position and 
popularity.240 Yet, it is hard to reject the idea that reform depends on the extent of 
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political support.241 Reform also needs support from other stakeholders outside the 
political system and should be seen as a sustainable program, accoding to Caiden: 
Administrative reform is or should now be seen as continuous activity, 
institutionalised somewhere within government, professionally staffed, given 
adequate resources, allowed sufficient time, and politically supported so that 
reformers do not just spin their wheels but make a real impact on the conduct of 
public business. To overcome the cost of change and inertia, administrative reform 
cannot be isolated; it has to involve everyone interested in public affairs …242 
Every institution in the government is subject to change, and these changes are 
sometimes politically driven.243 However, reform agendas are not always supported 
politically, particularly when the power of political actors and public leaders is 
threatened.244 In the past, bureaucracy reform has been accompanied by attempts to 
review and reorganise the apparatus for reform.245 Administrative reviews occur in a 
wide variety of political circumstances and involve political discussions and the 
investment of time and money.246 It appears that politics are always involved, in any 
reform. March and Olsen state: 
Administrative reorganisations are interesting in their own right. The effectiveness 
of political systems depends to a substantial extent on the effectiveness of 
administrative institutions, and the design and control of bureaucratic structures is 
a central concern of any polity.247 
The frequent theme in contemporary literature is that administrative reform is a 
primary agenda of politics. Therefore, collaboration between branches of powers are 
essential in reorganisation.248 March and Olsen, using the US experience as an 
example, argue that participants in administrative reform are those who operate in the 
network of ‘iron triangles’, which comprises congress, the president, the 
administrative agencies and bureaus and organised interests.249 According to March 
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and Olsen, reorganisation that ignores the importance of these networks of power and 
interests will fail, or become inconsequential.250 Evidently, reorganisation will succeed 
if all stakeholders support it politically. 
In political studies, the bureaucracy is subordinate to politics and subject to political 
supervision.251 While elected politicians are accountable to the public, Raadschelders 
and Stillman posit that civil servants are accountable to their political superior.252 
Bureaucrats in the civil service are policy implementers; they are responsible for 
translating political decisions into manageable actions.253 Raadschelders and Stillman 
state that they are ‘the chameleons who will serve any government, whatever its 
political colour’..254 
Thus, there is a direct relationship between unelected bureaucrats, who exercise or 
execute policies, and public representatives (politicians).255 Pollitt and Bouckaert 
argue that ‘politics’ are not limited to certain elected politicians or political arenas, 
such as parliament and presidential or ministerial officers; rather, the term is defined 
by the processes involved.256 Political activity is an activity that involves the exercise 
of power and mobilisation of resources to achieve a set of goals that concern various 
parties.257 Despite the belief that civil servants are neutral, not partisan and not 
associated with any political party, they frequently engage in the political processes, 
in the sense that they conduct activities to enhance the chance of success for policies 
and programs associated with their agencies.258 
The above findings align with those of Palombara, who argued that the bureaucracy, 
particularly in the upper echelons, is often deeply involved in political processes.259 
For example, high-ranking civil servants are responsible for implementing their 
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minister’s policies; they will negotiate with various involved parties and run programs 
on the minister’s behalf to make the policy work.260 Palombara states: 
Indeed, it is impossible even in the most structurally differentiated political systems 
to conceive of the complete separation of function that would be required were there 
to be an attempt to restrict the bureaucracy strictly to an instrumental role. Those 
who have looked closely at the public administrative systems of the Western world 
have long since abandoned the misleading fiction that assumed a neat, dichotomous 
separation between policy and administration.261 
These findings indicate that the workings of bureaucracy organisations are affected by 
political situations. In this sense, the bureaucracy is not politically neutral. In most 
democratic countries, politicians formulate the law, which is then executed by civil 
servants.262 There is a question of whether politicians have the right to tell civil 
servants what to do, or not to do, including intervening in reorganisation.263 Raj 
suggests that the primary consideration of political intervention in government 
organisations should not be just the question of power, but doing what is right for 
public interests.264 Thus, politicians should be able to prioritise public interests before 
their political self-interest. Similarly, Hicks states that ‘The politician, therefore, has 
to have regard for all the interests, however trivial, of his constituents and at the same 
time has a duty to concern himself with the affairs of the state, both great and small’.265 
Hicks argues that having an independent civil service is important for modern 
societies.266 Politicians and civil servants should realise that they serve the people, and 
at the same time, they should recognise the boundaries of their power.267 In this regard, 
Wilson cautions that ‘Although politics sets the task for administration, it should not 
be suffered to manipulate its offices’.268 Therefore, any reorganisation should not be 
manipulated by politics. While the bureaucracy must execute decisions and policy 
from their political leaders, they also should have the capacity to reject illegitimate 
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political demands and pressures through the sufficient legal framework of the civil 
service systems.269 
The bureaucracy is an important agency for any government.270 Essentially, 
bureaucracy is a crucial tool of any political government.271 As in other challenging 
and difficult tasks, good preparation of the tool is vital, and reform is one way of 
preparing the tool of governance.272 In this regard, specifically in the context of 
Indonesia, Tjiptoherijanto explains why the bureaucracy should be reformed: 
An important agency of the government is its civil service or bureaucracy. The civil 
service has the potential to empower a government to achieve a country’s goals, that 
is, to improve its citizens’ standard of living. The ability of a civil service to 
successfully support the government depends heavily on the characteristics of the 
civil service. In the case of Indonesia, the civil service is slow; lacks transparency, 
accountability, initiative; and is sometimes corrupt. Therefore Indonesia’s civil 
service is badly in need of reform, both in relation to its institutional aspects as well 
as in relation to moral issues.273 
Tjiptoherijanto argues that it is important for Indonesia to have a reform with a focus 
on institutional building and ethical conduct.274 To cope with the challenges of 
globalisation, the Indonesian government has to refine its bureaucracy by developing 
a modern and efficient structure.275 The establishment of an efficient and innovative 
civil service is important for any country that undertakes improvement in its public 
services; one way to achieve this objective is by creating a clean and efficient 
bureaucracy, through bureaucracy reform.276 
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Reform is a ‘top-down’ process, in the sense that it is decided by political elites and 
executed by civil servants.277 To succeed, reform must be involved in, and supported 
by, top to bottom administration, as Caiden states: 
If those at the apex of government are not consulted or given a front role, then those 
below may not consider reform to be important enough to bother with. So key 
politicians and senior administrators must be involved, however reluctantly..278 
In this regard, March and Olsen postulate that successful reforms may also depend on 
their time horizons; they are likely to achieve a higher degree of success if they are 
seen as sustainable processes, rather than just ‘short-term fluctuations in attention.’279 
Hence, there is no end to reorganising and improving government organisations. In 
this regard, March and Olsen state: 
Such reform attempts create loosely structured situations with few limitations on 
access, making the reform process highly sensitive to the details of the political 
environment. Frequently the result is a complex mixture of participants, problems, 
and solutions in garbage can processes. The political system seems unable to digest 
comprehensive reforms in one single operation, and the development of meaning 
becomes a more significant aspect of the reform process than the structural changes 
achieved.280 
Reorganisation is a continuous activity to improve administration. However, reform 
and reorganisation are sometimes unpopular. As Caiden argues, most reform is 
intended to remove sluggish bureaucracies, tackle systemic shortcomings and failures, 
and change the administrative culture.281 Those who have vested interest in the 
bureaucracy might be rejecting such measures as it will harm their power, popularity 
and other personal gains. 
Bureaucracy reform requires long-term commitment and patience as government 
institutions were not created in a day, and they cannot be reformed in a day either. 
Reform is not a revolution; thus, it should not sweep away the previous progress and 
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replace it with entirely new programs. March and Olson state that ‘Each new 
administration needs to be reminded that it can learn from its predecessors – if it takes 
time to – and this one probably no exception’.282 Certainly, previous reform results can 
be continously improved in certain, essential aspects. Similarly, Caiden suggests that 
a comprehensive overhaul of the administration is not always practical and is likely to 
be counterproductive.283 
However, organisations in the public sector are not always built to accommodate easy 
changes and are not always open to new ideas. The status quo of self-interest among 
bureaucrats prevents cultural transformation in the bureaucracy. Pessimism towards 
new ideas means that transforming a system that already works is not easy.284 Still, 
reform should involve all levels of the organisation; not only the proponents of reform, 
but its key opponents should be involved. All of the relevant stakeholders should own 
the reform and support it along the way. There is no conclusive instruction on who 
should be involved in reform, but it would be beneficial if everyone who could be 
involved took part.285 
Some reforms have failed, though they started very well and with novel ideas. They 
failed to go beyond sympathetic hearings, symbolic backing and courteous formalities 
because of vested interest and bureaucrats’ apathy.286 Although laws were changed, 
structures were organised and procedures were revised, some reforms did not succeed 
because they were barely touching the fundamental aspect of reform, the 
administrative culture (beliefs and values in the bureaucracy).287 In this regard, March 
and Olsen postulate that reorganisation may become a ‘garbage can’ containing 
‘collections of solutions looking for problems, ideologies looking for soapboxes, pet 
projects looking for supporters, and people looking for jobs, reputations or 
entertainment’.288 When the reorganisation process becomes a ‘garbage can’, it may 
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go in unforeseen directions and the goals of reorganisation will likely be hard to 
achieve.289 
The political process can have a strong influence on how the government works. It 
drives how reorganisation is conducted. Politics can influence the shape of 
bureaucracy, through the process of law-making. The next part of this section 
examines the process of law-making in Indonesia and why this process is considered 
political. 
2.5.2 Law-Making in Indonesia: a Political Process 
Legislation in Indonesia affects how reorganisation is conducted. The procedure of 
passing legislation depends on the initiator of the bill, which can be either the 
government or the DPR. Bills initiated by the government are often drafted by a task 
force of relevant ministries/agencies, relevant experts and academics and the Ministry 
of Law and Human Rights. According to the Act 12/2011 (the Law Making Procedures 
Act), a bill should be accompanied by a naskah akademik. Although it uses the term 
akademik (academic), it is not necessarily a document prepared by academic scholars. 
Article 1 paragraph 11 of the Law Making Procedures Act stipulates that naskah 
akademik is a legal, research-based document that explains certain issues that need to 
be addressed by the proposed bill and provides justification of why the new law is 
needed, including the breakdown of all clauses.290 The task force responsible for 
drafting the bill prepares this document. 
After the bill is finalised within the government, the president sends it to the DPR. 
Subsequently, the leadership of the DPR (speaker and deputy-speakers) pass the bill 
to the DPR’s steering committee, which decides the commission responsible for 
overseeing its passage in parliament. The relevant DPR commission and the 
representative of the executive will then discuss the bill. The minister usually 
represents the president when attending the initial meeting; in the subsequent meeting, 
the minister is represented by the ministry officials. At the initial meeting, the general 
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views of each party in that particular commission are presented, which then generates 
a response by the government. 
A bill initiated by the DPR will undergo further steps. One or more commissions may 
propose a bill initiated from the DPR, which must be signed by at least ten members 
of parliament. The bill is then submitted to the leadership of parliament and 
subsequently declared as a DPR initiative in a plenary session. The leadership of 
parliament will then request that the president assign ministers to represent the 
government in the discussion of the bill. The bill is endorsed by the president and 
passed into law after a joint agreement has been reached between the DPR and the 
government. 
After the end of Soeharto’s presidency in 1998, Indonesia was entering the ‘era of 
reformation’ (reformasi). This reformasi period shifted the method of policy-making, 
which became more subject to political bargaining within a multi-party system; the 
policies produced in this manner tend to be political rather than technocratic.291 During 
the Soeharto leadership from 1967 to 1998 (the New Order era), Indonesia had only 
three parties in parliament, namely the Unity for Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan [PPP]), the Party of Functional Groups (Golongan Karya [Golkar]) and 
the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia [PDI]). During the 
New Order period, the function of parliament was merely rubber-stamping bills 
proposed by the ruler. 
As a result of the 1999–2002 constitutional amendments, the Indonesian parliament 
shifted from having limited powers, and mainly giving consent to legislation drafted 
by the government, to having a more powerful role in Indonesia’s law-making.292 
Having served as a rubber-stamp parliament and the legitimating body for executive 
power during Soeharto's leadership, the DPR gained significant power and is now 
increasingly assertive in overseeing the government.293 The amendments also 
facilitated the direct election of the president by the people and limited the presidential 
term to two five-year terms for both the president and the vice president. The first 
presidential direct election was held in 2004. The result of the 2004 legislative and 
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presidential elections resulted in the adoption of the multi-party-presidential system 
and the mushrooming of political parties in parliament.294 Currently, nine political 
parties have seats in the DPR. 
Table 2-3 Political Parties with Seats in the DPR (Results of 2019 General 
Election)295 
No. Parties Seats % 
1 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)—
Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle 
128 22.26 
2 Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)—Functional Group 
Party  
85 14.78 
3 Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)—Great 
Indonesia Movement Party  
78 13.57 
4 Partai Nasionalis Demokrat (Nasdem)—Nationalist 
Democrat Party 
59 10.26 
5 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)—National 
Awakening Party 
58 10.26 
6 Partai Demokrat—Democratic Party 54 9.39 
7 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)—Welfare Justice Party 50 8.70 
8 Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)—National Mandate 
Party 
44 8.57 
9 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)—Unity for 
Development Party 
19 3.30 
Total 575 100% 
 
The current largest party in the parliament, PDIP, is the party that facilitated the 
election of Joko Widodo as president. However, despite being the largest party in the 
DPR, the PDIP seat percentage in the DPR is relatively small; only 128 of 575 seats 
(22.26%). The small size of the president’s party in the parliament means that the 
government must garner the support of other political parties to receive significant 
support from the majority of the DPR. The president and his party have to form a 
coalition with other political parties. 
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A coalition is important for the Indonesian multi-party-presidential system. Although 
the executive power is not entirely dependent on the legislative power, the president 
still needs support from parliament to run the administration. Otherwise, the executive 
policy agenda may be thwarted by members of parliament, who have law-making and 
budgetary powers, oversight and other powers provided by the constitution. A 
coalition is even more important if the executive has minority support in the DPR. 
Hanan’s argues that, because of the small size of the president’s party, the president 
should compromise with other political parties to secure majority support in 
parliament.296 
After the constitutional reforms carried out between 1999 and 2002, the DPR’s power 
was no longer limited to giving consent to legislation drafted by the government. The 
power of law-making in Indonesia shifted from executive towards legislative. Before 
the amendments, the president, as the executive body, had stronger power to pass laws, 
with the agreement of a ‘rubber-stamp’ DPR. The President’s position in the power 
system was dominant, despite the fact that he was the MPR’s mandatory. 
Constitutional amendments gradually shifted the power to pass laws into to the hands 
of the DPR. The amended 1945 Constitution (Article 20) reaffirmed that the DPR, 
together with the president, should discuss bills to be endorsed and that they should be 
approved by both sides. The draft law concluded by the DPR and the president was 
then legalised by the president and entered into force. The president could never again 
dismiss the draft of the law that he had concurred upon with the DPR. 
The DPR’s other significant role is their participation in the budget process. In the 
past, during the New Order era, the DPR only formally approved the budget presented 
by the government. Now, the DPR engages in all stages of the budget process and is 
able to hold, stop or postpone the executive budget. In the current era, reformasi, 
members of parliament in the DPR have drafted numerous and increasing amounts of 
legislation, particularly in the vast area of social issues. The post-Suharto leadership 
era has revealed a significant increase in the DPR’s power, which is sometimes 
regarded as too much. Datta et al. states: 
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The growing assertiveness of the legislature has given way to discourse, suggesting 
that the parliament has become too powerful in relation to the executive branch. For 
instance, MPs are often seen as potential veto players, helping to water down, delay 
or block supposedly ‘good legislation’ drafted by executive agencies. Under the 
glare of the media, the general public and their political party, legislators are often 
seen to sacrifice constructive engagement for a more adversarial relationship with 
officials from the executive.297 
Similarly, Hanan characterises the current form of Indonesian government as 
‘presidentialism with a highly fragmented multiparty system’ and argues that the 
Indonesian parliament is now constitutionally powerful: 
[T]he DPR is also fundamentally changed from a merely rubber-stamp legislature 
into a powerful one with clear lawmaking and check and balance power. The power 
of legislation constitutionally is now in the hands of the DPR. Other powers such as 
oversight, budget amendment, the appointment of various state commissions, and 
approval of various executive positions are also granted by the constitution to the 
DPR. There is no doubt that the Indonesian legislature is constitutionally powerful, 
especially in its relation to the executive.298 
Constitutionally—after the four instances of amendments to the 1945 Constitution—
the increasing power of the DPR as the legislature is not only in the making of 
legislation. They have also become assertive in addressing managerial issues in the 
government, such as performing oversight, budget making and approving the 
appointment of various state commissions, such as ambassadors, the chief of the 
national military forces, the chief of the national police, heads of certain agencies and 
other various, top-level executive positions. Data et al. concludes that the Indonesian 
administration is overwhelmed with the increased power of the parliament and that 
their approach to engaging with the DPR is not ‘sufficiently sophisticated.’299 
It is likely that, under the increasing assertiveness of the DPR, the government often 
has to follow the terms dictated by the DPR in regards to law-making, including those 
related to reform. This section has demonstrated that the process of law-making is 
political. Wheare argues that legislation is a product, based on political consensus and 
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compromises300 and influenced by the political environment and other social and 
cultural contexts.301 This section has not yet examined how legislation—as a political 
product—influences reorganisation. For this reason, the next section provides insights 
from literature into how statutes influence reorganisation and shape the bureaucracy. 
Kasim argues that in Indonesia, the problem of overlapping legal rules is common and 
results in overlapping policies produced by executive bodies.302 In this regard, Rabin 
posits that certain structural features in legislation are a significant factor in shaping 
public policies and incoherent legislations are counterproductive for the 
bureaucracy.303 While the focus of reform is implementing policy, laws and 
regulations, civil servants in Indonesia face difficulties implementing policies because 
of incoherent policies and legislations. The Indonesian government has to find 
solutions to the issue of disharmony of laws and policies that become constraints to 
reform.304 This disharmony of laws and regulations is often described as a red tape—
an excessive structural constraint in the form of legal rules. 
Moreover, some legislations state the establishment, nomenclatures or the authority of 
a large number of ministries and agencies. Altering the organisation of those ministries 
and agencies requires amending their relevant laws. Thus, restructuring is sometimes 
not merely an administrative measure. Kettl and Fesler argue that reorganisation 
decisions often depend more on political considerations than on administrative 
efficiency.305 
Constitutionally, the president, as the apex of executive power, holds the power of the 
government (Article 17). Thus, the president holds the power to create and appoint 
ministers and heads of agencies. However, some government bodies are statutorily 
established; this not only makes them difficult to reform but also reduces the 
constitutional prerogative rights of the president. Undang-Undang 39/2008 tentang 
Kementerian Negara [Act 39/2008 on the State Ministries] lists 46 functions of the 
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government and this law also provides that the number of ministries shall not exceed 
34. As nomenclatures of administrative functions are stated in the law, the president 
has limitations to determine and establish the nomenclature of the ministries—their 
names should differ significantly from the 46 functions stated in the Act 39/2008. 
As a basis for their mandates and authorities, almost all ministries are mentioned in 
their sectoral legislation. As such, the president does not have the flexibility to merge 
or dismantle ministries. This kind of reorganisation requires a law amendment, an 
action that constitutionally requires another political consensus between the executive 
power and parliament. Ministries that are mentioned in statutes can be seen in Chapter 
4. 
Dissolving a ministry that is mentioned in a statute without first amending it can be a 
breach to the terms of that statute. It will also raise the question of how the law will be 
implemented under the absence of the responsible ministry. Therefore, reorganisation 
requires a comprehensive examination of legislation framework relevant to the 
structure of each organisation. Kettl and Fesler argue that a vast assortment of legal 
rules and political forces exercise too much control over the discretion of the 
administrator.306 In addition to ministries, the Indonesian government also has 29 non-
ministerial agencies (Lembaga Pemerintah Non-Kementerian [LPNK]), 15 of which 
are statutorily established and 103 of which are independent agencies (Lembaga Non-
Struktural [LNS]), of which 76 are established by legislations.307 
Often, when a new law is passed to address certain issues, it also instructs the 
establishment of a new agency for that particular issue, despite the issue becoming the 
responsibility of existing ministries or agencies. This is the root of inefficiency, since 
it produces overlapping authorities and functions between institutions.308 Therefore, it 
is essential to have a coherent legislation framework, particularly in areas related to 
the institutional configuration, as more coherent legal frameworks produce more 
integrated policies.309 
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Bozeman argues that legal rules are the closest relatives of red tape and may cause 
‘rule entropy’—a condition where legal rules are applied differently between 
organisations.310 The more organisations, levels of the organisation and authorities 
involved in applying a legal rule, the more likely that the meaning of the rule will be 
lost. Too many governing institutions may cause institutions to interpret rules 
differently and make inefficient use of resources.311 Moreover, the process of law-
making itself is full of cross interests that result in the adoption of contradictory 
statutes and policies. Kettl and Fesler state: 
At times, the legislative process itself is so stormy and full of crosscurrents that 
resulting statutes incorporate contradictory policy guidelines, leaving agency 
managers to use their own judgment in making sense out of the mishmash. 
Sometimes, too, the necessity of reaching a compromise solution leads to legislative 
language that papers over disagreement – but whose deliberate ambiguity leaves the 
agency wide scope for administrative interpretation.312 
Optimisation of existing functions and organisations is a key factor in establishing 
efficiency. Even if the existing institutions are not performing well, or do not meet the 
public demands, establishing a new agency with similar tasks and functions will not 
solve the issue, since this may lead to duplications and result in poor coordination.313 
Since changes in administrative organisations are often politically driven,314 
reorganisation should also have political supports from every political force, both in 
executive and legislative bodies. 
Although the law may be changed, reform can still fail if it does not touch on the 
cultural aspect of reorganisation.315 The process of reorganisation is also influenced 
by the legal culture of the country, particularly how the law is made. Therefore, the 
next section of this chapter examines the legal culture in Indonesia in its historical 
context. It will also explore why reorganisation needs a new legal culture. 
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2.6 Legal Culture in Indonesia: Historical Context 
Some reforms did not succeed because they were barely touching the cultural aspect 
of how the bureaucracy works.316 The statutory constraint to reorganisation shows that 
there is a problem in the legal culture surrounding reorganisations. Law itself is a 
culture—the work of an individual or the work of the society.317 Each community has 
its legal system because of its particular historical evolution. Dauchy states that ‘Law, 
to a great extent, influences how society looks, and society determines how its law 
looks’.318 The world’s two current major legal systems—civil law and common law—
were born from the western legal tradition and developed in the Middle Ages. The 
legal system was one of the ‘export products’ of European colonisers and, along with 
their Western culture, it spread around the globe. It is no surprise that the Western 
legal traditions of both common law and civil law can be found in Latin America, 
Africa, Asia and Australia.319 
Continental Europe developed the civil law tradition, while common law was by the 
British. The former follows the framework of Roman law, sourced from the codified 
main principles. In the civil law tradition, the pre-established written rules play a more 
decisive role.320 Civil law is a codified set of rules or customs, but published law 
reports play a more critical role in the common law legal system. The common law 
tradition is a case law-based system, developed from judge-made decisional law and 
the doctrine of judicial precedent. This English common law is rich in Christian 
heritage—Zimmerman observes that the theory of Christian natural law heavily 
influenced common law.321 As such, he argues that Christianity has always been an 
important element of the common law.322 However, civil law and common law also 
share common features, such as the role of customary law and statutes, courts’ 
practices and scholars’ influence—all known and recognised by the two legal 
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traditions. To a certain degree, Dauchy observes, legislation and other statutory rules 
are important sources of the law in the common law tradition.323 
The 350 years of Dutch colonisation, before the declaration of independence on 
17 August 1945, influenced the Indonesian legal system, culture and the lives of its 
people. Like other former Dutch colonies, Indonesia generally follows the legal system 
of civil law. Before the Dutch came in the late sixteenth century, indigenous kingdoms 
along the vast archipelago applied a system of adat law (customs law). There have 
been three strands of law applied in Indonesia, from under the Dutch reign to the 
present date, namely Dutch civil law, adat law and religious (Islamic) law. The Dutch 
colonial government, to some extent, allowed the pribumi (indigenous Indonesians) to 
use adat law for some matters, such as land acquisition and family issues. However, 
the Dutch were not strong supporters of legal pluralism, and did not consider adat law 
as a law.324 After its independence from the Dutch, Indonesia has been trapped in a 
contradicting legal system, as it attempts to introduce a foreign, Western legal tradition 
(civil law) into a society dominated by either cultural tradition or religion.325 Despite 
the attempts to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of over 17000 islands, diverse 
cultures and languages under one nation, one language and one flag, Indonesia faces 
the lingering issue of contradicting legal systems. 
After Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, its legal system was born. This was 
a critical point in the history of the Indonesian legal system, as legal institutions, along 
with judiciary issues, were handed over to the sovereignty of Indonesian people. The 
1945 Constitution is the basic law; any laws and regulations should be based on this 
constitution. The Constitution declared that any laws from the Dutch that contravene 
the Constitution have to be repealed. However, many laws enacted by the Dutch still 
apply in Indonesia, such as the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht or Kitab 
Undang-undang Hukum Pidana), Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek or Kitab Undang-
undang Hukum Perdata) and the Commercial Code (Wetboek van Koophandel or 
Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Dagang). Since Independence Day, Indonesia has 
developed its legal system based on the principles of law and justice, with three strands 
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of co-existing law—Dutch, adat and Islamic law. Along the way, some Dutch laws 
were supplemented by several new laws, for example, the Commercial Code is 
supplemented by the Banking Act, Company Act, Intellectual Property Act, 
Antimonopoly Act, Trade Act, Investment Act and more. Islamic legal principles 
significantly influence civil matters, such as Marriage Law, Islamic Banking Law, 
Inheritance Law and so forth. Some adat law principles, such as musyawarah untuk 
mufakat (consensus in decision-making) also appear in post-independence legislation. 
As a part of the legal system, the political concept also plays a significant role in 
developing the Indonesian legal culture. Under the regime of the first president, 
Sukarno, in 1945–1965, known as Orde Lama (Old Order), all powers were centralised 
in the president’s hands. In 1945, Sukarno formulated Pancasila, the philosophical 
basis of Indonesia. The word Pancasila itself is derived from the Sanskrit words 
‘panca’ meaning five, and ‘sila’ meaning principle—the five basic principles of 
Indonesians. These five principles form the core ideology of the Indonesian 
government and its citizens, comprising belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism 
or just and civilised humanity, democracy and social justice. The establishment of 
Pancasila was intended to alleviate religious tensions and promote pluralism. Pancasila 
is a concept of constitution alike, which became the driving force of the laws. In 1967, 
Suharto came into power, as the second president in Indonesia’s history, and his 
government was known as the regime of Orde Baru (New Order). He was promising 
economic improvement but still maintaining authoritarianism, which forbade political 
and legal freedoms. Despite some reforms in orde lama and orde baru, the post-
colonial legal system did not change significantly from the colonial era, as reflected in 
the similar pattern with the Dutch laws, until the reformation era in 1998. After the fall 
of Suharto in 1998, major reforms were made to the legal framework and democracy 
in Indonesia. 
The long interaction between indigenous customs and the multiple religions brought 
to Indonesia, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Islam, shaped the 
Indonesian culture. Then the Dutch brought the Dutch legal system and Christianity, 
which further complicated the legal system in Indonesia. Because of the complexity of 
the legal system, soon after gaining independence, Indonesia wisely chose the rule of 
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law instead of the rule of the majority of Islam. However, neither Sukarno nor 
Suharto’s regimes succeeded in creating a flourishing rule of law and democracy. 
After the collapse of orde baru, era reformasi conducted major reforms in the areas of 
decentralisation and democratisation and improved the legal system. After ruling for 
more than 30 years, Suharto resigned following the economic crisis and riots in May 
1998. His vice president, BJ Habibie, took over and was sworn in as the third president. 
Habibie began the reformation by decentralising central government powers to the 
regional governments, bestowing greater control for provinces over their finances and 
releasing political prisoners that were held captive during the New Order regime. 
According to the old version of the 1945 Constitution, the president was appointed and 
received his mandate from the MPR. Habibie’s presidency only lasted for 1.5 years 
and he failed to extend his term because of MPR disapproval. Nevertheless, Habibie 
successfully introduced the freedom of the press, established the first stage of the 
constitutional amendment that limited the presidency to a maximum of two terms of 
five years each, and allowed the establishment of new political parties.326 
Indonesia is the world’s third-largest democracy, after India and the United States of 
America.327 The four constitutional amendments in 1999–2002 allowed Indonesia to 
hold a direct presidential election in 2004, with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as the 
first president directly elected by the people. Saldi, Ferdi and Hilaire argue that these 
amendments opened the doors for Indonesia to enhance democracy and implement the 
rule of law.328 Yudhoyono served ten years, or two terms, of presidency and left office 
in 2014, replaced by Joko Widodo, who won the presidential election that year. Since 
1998 to date, five presidents have ruled Indonesia, namely Habibie (1998–1999), 
Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004), Yudhoyono 
(2004–2014) and Joko Widodo (2014-date). This demonstrates an improvement in 
democracy and freedom to vote in Indonesia after the constitutional amendments 
following the reformation era. 
Yet, corruption remains a problem that undermines the bureaucracy. According to 
International Transparency, Indonesia’s corruption perception index ranks 89 of 180 
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countries, with a score of 38 out of 100.329 Most of the recent corruption cases occurred 
in the sphere of legislative bodies. In 2018, of 178 corruption cases were addressed by 
the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Commission for Eradication of Corruption 
[KPK]), 91 involved legislative members and 20 of those cases involved the 
bureaucrats of the executive.330 
As many legislatures were involved in corruption, laws and policies were also 
contaminated with corruption. It is no surprise that bad culture in law-making has 
resulted in a swollen bureaucracy. Besides, the current legal culture also results in 
confusing laws and regulations deemed inconsistent or unsynchronised. There is no 
perfect legal system and legal culture. However, Saldi, Ferdi and Hilaire note that the 
need to minimise confusion and uncertainty of the laws is more than crucial.331 They 
further argue that ‘Laws that contradict one another or confuse the mind of individuals 
are no laws at all for law is order and harmony’.332 Legislation has been used to state 
the establishment and function of a particular ministry and agency. Because of this, 
the government became so large it became a barrier to reorganisation.333 Therefore, 
effective reorganisation needs a new legal culture, specifically in regards to how 
legislation relevant to government organisations is made. This is discussed further in 
the interview findings in subsequent chapters. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
Administrative power in Indonesia derives from the 1945 Constitution. It defines 
Indonesia as a democratic country with a separation of powers. The executive power 
lies with the government, legislative power lies with parliament, and judicial power 
reposes in the court system. The Indonesian legal system was born after Indonesia 
declared its independence in 1945. The 350-year Dutch administration influenced the 
Indonesian legal culture. After the Constitution, the law is the primary source of 
                                                 
329 Transparency International, ‘Indonesia—Corruption Perception Index 2018’ 
<https://www.transparency.org/country/IDN>. 
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administrative decision-making. The Indonesian legal system is based on a civil law 
system, intermixed with customary law and Roman-Dutch law. In Indonesia, the DPR, 
together with the President, declares the law. Law-making is a political process; it is 
evident from the literature examined in this chapter that the law is a political product, 
based on political consensus. As a part of the legal system, the political concept plays 
a significant role in developing the legal culture. 
Reorganisation and the political system are interrelated. The workings of bureaucratic 
organisations are affected by the political environment. Ideally, politics should not 
manipulate reorganisation. Yet, restructuring a government organisation implies more 
than a plain, administrative measure, as legislation framework and political forces 
control ways of managing administrative organisations. The law-making culture has 
influenced the shape of the bureaucracy. Laws are in place that provide for the 
preservation of certain ministries or agencies in Indonesia. This chapter concluded that 
there is a knowledge gap regarding the extent to which political and statutory aspects 
shape reorganisation in the Indonesian government\. The interviews conducted for this 
research will help to fill this gap. 
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Chapter 3: Examination of the Extent to Which Political 
and Legislative Aspects Shape Reorganisation in the 
Indonesian Government 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the interview process taken in this study. It begins with the 
interview strategy and its relationship with the chosen methodological approaches. It 
also discusses participant selection, including participant backgrounds and criteria for 
selection. This is followed by descriptions of the interview question categories and 
some answers from interviewees. This chapter merely describes the answers provided 
by the interviewees. They will be analysed in subsequent chapters, for the purpose of 
probing the theme of this thesis. This chapter concludes with a chapter summary. 
3.2 Interview Strategy 
This thesis employs a qualitative approach to meet its objectives. This approach is 
designed to examine the political and statutory challenges involved in conducting 
reorganisation within the Indonesian government. Qualitative research is a process of 
research that uses inductive data analysis to understand the issues.334 This thesis 
comprises a case study that examined the process of reorganisation at the national level 
in Indonesia. 
There were 14 interviewees interviewed in this research. This sample is relatively 
small. However, this research emphasises the rich insights from the participants, rather 
than the sample size. Paton argues that validity, significance and insight are tied to 
information richness, not the size of the sample.335 
Face-to-face, in-depth interviews were conducted in 2017 and 2018. Interviews were 
held in Bahasa Indonesia. Qualitative analysis is interpretive. The researcher has the 
role of interpreting the data and it is acknowledged that the researcher cannot avoid a 
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personal interpretation. The interview recordings were transcribed to allow the 
researcher to identify themes and further process the results. 
All recordings were transcribed fully to comprehensively record the responses in 
writing and maximally capture the ideas conveyed by the participants. All the 
interviews were transcribed in Bahasa Indonesia. Then, the transcripts were translated 
into English. The researcher performed all of the transcribing and the translation 
because the transcripts contained specific terminology that professional translators 
may not be familiar with. 
Key themes were coded for further analysis as they emerged. Open coding was used 
to analyse the data,336 which was based on social contexts and structures. In analysing 
the data, the researcher considered, for example, the participants’ experiences and 
position in society. Specifically, the researcher examined their crucial role in 
influencing reorganisation in the Indonesian government, whether as a minister, 
bureaucrat, a member of parliament, a representative of a NGO, as an academic or in 
other relevant roles and positions. 
Therefore, this study falls under the research theme wherein ‘Qualitative Research 
Uses the Research Participants as Expert Informants.’337 According to Auerbach and 
Silverstein, this theme of research clarifies that qualitative research can study diversity 
without first formulating a general hypothesis.338 It does so by encouraging the 
researcher to step aside from the ‘expert’ role and uses the research participants as the 
experts on the issue being studied.339 This approach encourages the researcher to focus 
on finding answers from the people they study.340 The qualitative researcher recognises 
that participants who have direct life experience with the issue know more about it 
than the researcher does; that the participants, rather than the researcher, are the 
experts.341 Instead of developing hypotheses, creating survey instruments or designing 
an experimental procedure that either accurately or inaccurately addresses the 
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interviewees’ experiences, the researcher can ask them directly about their insight and 
experience and learn from what they say.342 
The next section discusses the selection of participants. Specifically, it discusses the 
background of the participants and criteria for selection. 
3.3 Selection of Participants 
All participants in this study signed the consent form and consented to be identifiable. 
As mentioned in the methodology section in Chapter 1, the primary data for this thesis 
was obtained through face-to-face and semi-structured interviews. This study 
interviewed 14 research participants. Despite the small size of the sample, it is still 
reliable, as this study emphasises obtaining the rich insights and experiences of the 
participants, rather than the sample size.343 Further, interviewees were selected based 
on their capacity to conduct and drive bureaucracy reform and reorganisation in 
Indonesia. 
As mentioned, this study used the participants as expert informants. This approach 
enabled the researcher to abandon the literature stance and treat the participants as 
experts of their own lives.344 The spread of participants was chosen to avoid bias. For 
a balance of perspectives, participants were selected not only from those who held a 
position in the executive, but also from members of parliament, NGO, senior 
researcher for the parliament, and academia. The researcher knew some of the 
participants, however, the researcher remained impartial in both the questions posed 
and the manner in which the interviews were conducted so that an objective view of 
the interviewee’s opinions could be obtained. Also, in order to minimise bias and 
subjectivity, the researcher has corroborated other sources and interviewees to ensure 
that the thesis reflects the correct views.  The researcher interpreted what the 
interviewees said and then checked these interpretations with statutes and literature. 
The ‘experts’, or research participants, interviewed in this study are listed in the table 
below.   
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Table 3-1 Research Participants 
No. Name Position/Institution Place and Date 
of Interview 
1. Asman Abnur Minister of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
Jakarta, 
26 April 2017 
2. Rini Widyantini Deputy Minister for the Minister 
of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform of the 
Republic of Indonesia–
Institutional Affairs and 
Governance 
Jakarta, 
4 May 2017 
3 Teguh Widjinarko Special Adviser for Minister of 
Administrative and Bureaucratic 
Reform of the Republic of 
Indonesia for the Cultural and 
Public Servant Performance 
Issues 
Jakarta, 
18 April 2017 
4 Yanuar Ahmad A director-level official (Assistant 
to Deputy Minister) at the 
Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 
responsible for developing 
policies related to institutional 
development and governance 
Jakarta, 
17 April 2017 
5 Vera Yuwantari A director-level official (Assistant 
to Deputy Minister) at the 
Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 
responsible for conducting 
institutional assessment for 
ministries and agencies in the area 
of national human capital and 
cultural development 
Jakarta, 
17 April 2017 
6 Adi Budiarso A director-level official (Director 
of the Centre for Climate Change 
Finance and Multilateral Policy), 
Chief of Organisational 
Transformation Office, Ministry 
of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia 
Jakarta, 
5 May 2017 
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No. Name Position/Institution Place and Date 
of Interview 
7 Arief Wibisono Head of International Trade Law 
Division, Ministry of Trade of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
Jakarta, 
25 April 2017 
8 Diah Arianti Head of Division for Religion, 
Education, and Technology at the 
Ministry of State Secretariat of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
Jakarta, 
20 April 2017 
9 Bambang 
Supriyono 
Professor of public administration 
and Dean of the Faculty of Public 
Administration at Brawijaya 
University, Indonesia 
Malang, 
21 April 2017 
10 Eko Prasodjo Professor of public 
administration, Dean of the 
Faculty of Social and Political 
Science at the University of 
Indonesia, and former Vice 
Minister of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
Jakarta, 
3 May 2017 
11 Abdul Kharis A member of parliament, 
Chairman of Commission I of the 
House of Representative of the 
Republic of Indonesia (DPR), a 
politician from the Welfare 
Justice Party (PKS) 
Solo (Surakarta), 
23 January 2018 
12 Ahmad Muqowam A member of parliament, Head of 
Committee I of the House of 
Regional Representative (DPD) 
and former Chairman of 
Commission 2 of the House of 
Representative of the Republic of 
Indonesia (DPR), a politician 
from Unity for Development 
Party 
Jakarta, 
3 May 2017 
13 Erni Murniasih A Project Manager for KOMPAK 
(Kolaborasi Masyarakat dan 
Pelayanan untuk Kesejahteraan – 
Public Collaboration and Services 
for Welfare). KOMPAK is a NGO 
that receives funding from 
Australian and Indonesian 
Government as part of Australia – 
Indonesia partnership. It dealing 
Jakarta, 
28 April 2017 
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No. Name Position/Institution Place and Date 
of Interview 
with the issues of social 
developments in Indonesia 
14 Riris Khatarina Senior researcher for the 
Parliament or the DPR, actively 
engaged in assisting the MPs 
conducting lobbying with the 
executive and provide advice to 
the bills proposed by the DPR 
Jakarta, 
21 January 2018 
 
The next section discusses the grouping of interview questions and some of the 
answers from the interviewees to these questions. 
3.4 Grouping of Interview Questions and Some Answers 
3.4.1 Themes of Interview Questions 
An interview plan was made for this study to guide the researcher in asking questions 
to participants.345 Questions have been asked to the participants were quite broad and 
complex. There were occasions when the researcher had to ask a question outside the 
list of questions in the interview plan, to further explore the issue. 
Key interview questions were developed, with the main focus of meeting the aim of 
this study. The major themes of the interview plan were developed to obtain a general 
idea of bureaucracy reform in Indonesia. After obtaining an overview of bureaucracy 
reform, interview questions were developed to identify the political and statutory 
challenges of reorganisation, specifically. To answer the research questions, as well as 
to understand the problem and to formulate solutions, interview questions were 
categorised into four themes: 
1. Overview of bureaucracy reform in Indonesia 
2. The current practice of reorganisation 
3. Political and statutory challenges in reorganisation 
4. Possible solutions to address the political and legal problems of reorganisation 
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The next part of this section details each theme of the interview questions. It also 
details interview questions according to these four groups. 
3.4.2 Overview of the Bureaucracy Reform in Indonesia 
This group of interview questions seeks to find answers from interviewees pertaining 
to the goals of bureaucracy reform, progress and achievement of reform and initial 
identification of major reform challenges. 
a. What are the goals of bureaucracy reform in Indonesia? 
Most participants in this study think that the goals of bureaucracy reform are 
to establish a proportional, effective, efficient and accountable government that 
is able to serve its citizens better. Some of their answers to this question were: 
[I]nstitutional change has become the main focus of bureaucracy reform, as 
the reform also has the goal to create the right function, right size and 
proportional organisations.346 
[W]ith the reform, we want to make government organisations as efficient as 
possible to execute their functions and mandates given by the president as the 
executive leader. With so many administrative functions, we want to make 
sure that all those functions can be accomplished by using organisations that 
able to do their tasks accountably, effectively and efficiently.347 
[T]here are three main objectives of bureaucracy reform: first, to establish 
accountable and clean bureaucracy; second, to form the effective and efficient 
bureaucracy and third, creating a bureaucracy that is capable of delivering 
high-quality public services.348 
[T]o improve efficiency, improving coordination between 
ministries/agencies, or internally between units in such ministry and most 
                                                 
346 Interview with Vera Yuwantari, Assistant to Deputy Minister / Director for Institutional 
Assessment—Human Capital and Cultural Development, Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic 
Reform of the Republic of Indonesia (Mas Pungky Hendra Wijaya, Jakarta, 17 April 2017). 
347 Interview with Rini Widyantini, Deputy Minister for Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform—
Institutional Affairs and Governance, Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Mas Pungky Hendra Wijaya, Jakarta, 4 May 2017). 
348 Interview with Teguh Widjinarko, Special Advisor / Expert Staff for the Minister of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform, Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Mas Pungky Hendra Wijaya, Jakarta, 18 April 2017). 
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importantly, to provide easy access for the public in obtaining services from 
their government.349 
[T]he bureaucracy reform aims to improve our nation’s capability, as well as 
to improve professionalism in our public services. Reform should be intended 
to bring our country to become a developed country.350 
However, not all interviewees have a positive attitude towards the goals of 
reform. For instance, the former Vice Minister of Administrative Reform, who 
also a professor in public administration and the Dean of the Faculty of Social 
and Political Science at the University of Indonesia, is sceptical regarding the 
goal of reform in Indonesia. He expressed:  
[W]e often talk about the right size and reorganisation, or maybe about ‘fewer 
structures more functions,’ performance-based structures, and so forth, but the 
truth, they were only political rhetoric. There was no real seriousness in 
designing the architecture of the government. What we have been done were 
only reviewing, then establishing a plan to dissolve particular non-structural 
agencies. We also made some evaluations to merge some directorate generals, 
replacing them, or elaborate them to other ministries, but we never had the 
grand design of the administration architecture. If I asked what the goals of 
bureaucracy reform are, probably there is no goal of it.351  
b. What is the extent of progress and achievement in reform? 
In this subtheme, interviewees were asked their thoughts on the extent of 
progress and achievement in reform in the Indonesian government. Most 
interviewees believe that there is still a lot of work needed to achieve successful 
reform. Some of their answers are: 
There are ten political parties in Indonesia; each of them has their agenda for 
this country. Their interests dominate our parliament. These can be seen in 
                                                 
349 Interview with Erni Murniasih, Project Manager, Kolaborasi Masyarakat dan Pelayanan untuk 
Kesejahteraan (KOMPAK) [Public Collaboration and Services for Welfare] (Mas Pungky Hendra 
Wijaya, Jakarta, 28 April 2017). 
350 Interview with Ahmad Muqowam, Member of the House of Regional Representative (Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah (DPD) or the Senates), Head of Committee I DPD (Mas Pungky Hendra Wijaya, 
Jakarta, 3 May 2017). 
351 Interview with Eko Prasodjo, Former Vice Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of 
the Republic of Indonesia, Professor of Public Administration, Dean of the Faculty of Social and 
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every hearing to discuss a bill; their vested interests are reflected in the bill 
being discussed. The problem is their interests are often incompatible with the 
government’s organisational needs. That is why we have so many agencies, 
because their creation is embedded in the law. This is a consequence of 
interference by political parties through their members of parliament by using 
the process of law-making. It was hard to reform because of these.352 
[R]eform was fragmented and partial. It was just like extinguishing the fire 
when there is a fire. We did something without having a comprehensive 
picture of it, and our assessment was fragmented and partial, all we could do 
was examine non-structural agencies that may not have been functioning 
properly. But we never discussed the main design for the organisation of the 
government, how many ministries we need, how many non-ministerial 
agencies, independent agencies. Thus, the results [of reform] were partial and 
did not have long-term strategic value.353 
Despite the above sceptical answers, there were also some answers saying the 
Indonesian government had accomplished significant achievements in reform: 
President Joko Widodo started his presidency by restructuring 34 ministries. 
This was a significant effort in reorganising the central government. The 
President also stated his commitment to continue reforming the government; 
he wants to restructure LNS [independent agencies]. In Kemenpanrb 
[MoABR], this is also our primary concern. At this stage, we have dissolved 
15 LNS and [are] restructuring some LPNKs [non-ministerial agencies].354  
There are some significant achievements [in reform]. From the institutional 
aspect, we have made efforts to streamline the organisation of executive 
bodies, including the dismissal of non-structural agencies that overlap with 
the functions of ministries in their respective areas. Second, the government 
commits not to propose a new agency through its initiated bill. The President 
has issued a directive for his executive bodies not to propose the establishment 
of a new agency when discussing a bill [with the DPR]. Third, in the area of 
                                                 
352 Interview with Asman Abnur, Minister of Administrative Reform of the Republic of Indonesia (Mas 
Pungky Hendra Wijaya, Jakarta, 26 April 2017). 
353 Interview with Eko Prasodjo (n 351). 
354 Interview with Vera Yuwantari (n 346). 
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human resources, the landmark law of the Civil Service Act was passed in 
2014.355 
[T]he Ministry of Finance has two phases of reform. Specifically, for 
bureaucracy reform, we have achieved significant outcomes, like 
restructuration of our organisation, improving human resources, as well as the 
standard operating and procedures, these are in the first phase [of reform]. In 
addition, we also implemented [a] balance scorecard, reconfiguring our 
remuneration; those are some achievements of the first phase. The second 
phase was the institutional transformation. In [the] institutional 
transformation, we had 87 strategies for change; from these 87 initiatives, 
there are five main themes of institutional programs and nine trajectories for 
organisational changes.356 
c. What are the major reform challenges? 
This question is seeks initial identification of major reform challenges. The 
interviewees answered that politics, legislation framework and sectoral ego are 
among the major reform challenges; below are some of the answers. 
[B]ureaucracy reform is difficult to do because of that political interest. It is 
unavoidable in a democratic country like us.357 
[T]he biggest constraint is always the law, we always create a new law for 
every problem.358 
[T]he system we have produced a mindset that in a large organisation, there 
will be new positions, they do not think [of an] organisation as a tool to 
achieve our goals. Instead, it [is] only used as a tool to obtain position ...359 
[T]here was a time when our ministry was requested to restructure the LNS 
(independent agencies). Since 85 of 105 LNS are statutorily established, it 
was not easy for us to reorganise them. This also applies to the reformation of 
ministries and non-ministerial agencies; it is also difficult to reorganise these 
bodies as many of them are protected by their sectoral legislation. As an 
                                                 
355 Interview with Teguh Widjinarko (n 348). 
356 Interview with Adi Budiarso, Chief of Transformation Officer (CTO), Ministry of Finance of the 
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example, it is hard for us to reorganise the DG Tax [Directorate General of 
Taxation], since the Taxation Act stipulates the name of the DG Tax in its 
provisions explicitly. We were unable either to dissolve or to upgrade the DG 
Tax into an agency or a ministry without amending the Taxation Act. As such, 
when we need to restructure an organisation to achieve our development 
goals, it may be difficult if we do not first amend the relevant statutes.360 
Regarding the sectoral ego, a participant answered: 
[T]he vested interests of politicians were often involved in how institutions 
were made; the main reason is to strengthen the position of their institution. It 
mostly happened to non-ministerial agencies, as they want recognition of their 
existence; as such, they endeavour to have a relevant provision in the 
legislations.361 
Findings from interviews related to the theme of this subsection (Overview of the 
Bureaucracy Reform in Indonesia) are discussed in Chapter 4. The next part of this 
section provides a few answers to the interview questions related to the theme ‘Current 
Practice of Reorganisation’. 
3.4.3 Current Practice of Reorganisation 
This theme explores the current practice of reorganisation in the Indonesian central 
government. This group of interview questions sought answers from participants on 
the followings aspects: 
 Overview of the structure of bureaucracy in Indonesia; 
 What makes an effective and efficient organisation; 
 The business process between and within ministries and agencies; 
 Reorganisation procedure and the process of organisational change. 
Below are some insights from the research participants in answer to this group of 
interview questions: 
a. The overview of the bureaucracy structure in Indonesia 
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Some interviewees said that the bureaucracy structures in Indonesia are still 
too large and are also complicated by the budgeting system and coordination 
problem: 
Still too large. We have too many personnel…handling administrative matters 
despite [the fact] that what we need is more staff who have specific expertise. 
I often call [for] our public sector to be smarter than the private sector. Some 
aspects of our public administration do not make sense to me. For example, 
we create a structure only to accommodate someone to have a top position; 
this is wrong. It was easy to create [a new structure], but when we want to 
eliminate a structure, it can be quite challenging because, in the culture of our 
bureaucracy, we tend to prevent someone losing his position.362 
[W]e still need to readjust our structure to be aligned with our national 
strategic goals. Nevertheless, not all organisations have the same level of 
maturity; some of them tend to develop a large structure without sufficient 
justification.363 
It is wasteful for most agencies to have a large organisation. However, in our 
financial system, of the State Financial System Act 17/2007, if they do not 
build a large organisation in which at least an echelon one structure [similar 
to directorate generals], they are not allowed to manage their budget 
independently. Its budget should come from their parent agency. This is a 
reason why agencies want to build a large structure.364 
[E]xecutive bodies made unnecessary enlargements to their organisation so 
that they will be able to provide a top job for a senior civil servant.365  
[C]oordination is an issue, and sometimes it is difficult to conduct 
coordination because we do not have the map of the process of our 
administrative institutions. Instead, we create institutions to conduct 
coordination; we have several coordinating ministries or coordinating 
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agencies. As such, the way we conduct coordination has become inflexible 
since we see coordination as an ‘institution’ rather than a mechanism.366 
Often, ministries are…keen to enlarge their operational elements. They are 
not interested in the techno-structure or the supporting elements. In a ministry, 
this operating element is formed as a dirjen [directorate general]. They tend 
to enlarge their dirjen, as it can utilise and manage a larger budget.367 
b. What makes an effective and efficient organisation? 
The interviews found that being effective and efficient is a crucial requirement 
for an ideal government. Interestingly, not all interviewees in this study see a 
lean structure as effective and efficient. Some of their answers include: 
We do not have a formulation on the ideal number of how many ministries or 
agencies we should have. I personally think that we would have an ideal 
administration if there was no duplication and collaboration between our 
institutions could be done without any problems or egos.368 
The goal of institutional reform should not merely [be] to shrink organisations 
and reduce agencies. Instead, it should aim to improve public services, 
professionalism, and administrative roles, regardless of the size of the 
bureaucracy. It should be fine to have a massive structure as long as it can be 
justified.369 
 Easy adaptation to changes is more important than being effective and 
efficient: 
[An] [i]deal organisation is an organisation that is easy to adapt to changes. 
The public demands our ministry to be more dynamic and…able to control 
the flow of trade. This required an ideal organisation. Since the changes are 
fast, it will be hard if the organisation is unable to adjust.370 
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Some of the interviewees believe that the government still needs to reduce the 
number of its executive bodies to establish an effective and efficient 
organisation: 
[T]his is a big problem, I see that, instead of getting leaner, the organisational 
structure of our central government is getting bigger, and it is too big. We 
already have a decentralised government, many functions already handed over 
to local governments. Our central government still needs to adjust their 
functions based on decentralisation design.371 
We still need to streamline the government to establish an efficient 
government. A good linkage of activities between agencies should be 
established to improve the effectiveness of the government.372 
c. The business process between, and within, ministries and agencies 
The interviews found that coordination and duplication of function are major 
issues of governance. Hence, the Indonesian administration needs to improve 
the business processes which involve multiple ministries and agencies, as well 
as the processes within such ministries and agencies. Answers include: 
As an example, see how we handle the issue of our rural area, to implement 
the Rural Laws, from its financial aspect, the formulation of the rural fund is 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The determination of the 
allocation of those funds is [the responsibility of] the Ministry of Rural Areas; 
its assistance facility is held by the Kemendagri [Ministry of Home Affairs]; 
we also had the Coordinating Ministry of Human and Culture Development 
as the orchestra leader of those activities. Hence, the field is too crowded. We 
have so many institutions working on a single issue, and sometimes we also 
had an institution [that] didn’t do anything to solve the problems.373 
[A] good linkage of activities between agencies should be established.374 
[W]e need to develop a good business process. If the obstacle was from the 
law, then we need to amend that law, which is difficult. The goal of providing 
public services is to satisfy the public through our services in a timely and 
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efficient manner. The public ‘should not need to deal with multiple 
institutions for a particular service from the government; whether they are 
institutions A, B or C. We still need to establish an efficient business process 
…375 
[W]e need a comprehensive refurbishment, not only for the organisation, but 
also related to the business processes and so forth.376 
[I]n every hearing with the Parliament, I am sorry to say that if we accept what 
they want, then the new agency will be established despite [the fact] that we 
do not need it. We often persuade them by explaining that we already had 
certain ministries or agencies to handle such issues; what is more important is 
how we address the business processes between our existing institutions.377 
In the institutional system, we need to regulate the institutional clusters. While 
in the business process, we need to establish a link and synergy between 
ministries and agencies, so it will not be fragmented like what we have now. 
When we performed a task, let’s say in the event of natural disaster, we have 
BASARNAS [National Search and Rescue Agency], Ministry of Social 
Affairs, BNPB [National Agency for Disaster Management], that is why we 
need a business process here, what agency will doing this and what agency 
will doing that.378 
[W]e should know first the map of the processes; we do not have such map. 
Then, how can we examine and determine if such business process is right or 
wrong?379 
d. Reorganisation procedure and process of organisational change 
Interviewees believe that reorganisation should refer to the vision and mission 
of the president: 
Every time we reorganise the structure of a ministry, we need to depart from 
the visions and missions of the president and our strategies to achieve them. 
Kemenpanrb [MoABR] needs to ensure the accomplishment of the 
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president’s goals through the development of an organisation that supports 
it.380 
Reorganisation needs to be conducted based on the nation’s strategic needs: 
[T]he vision and mission of the government are detailed in its strategies. 
Organisations should be made based on our strategic needs to achieve the 
government’s vision and mission. For example, the president expressed that 
we need to optimise the exploitation of our maritime resources. Hence, we 
created a coordinating ministry on maritime affairs. Then, other organisations 
are directed to optimise the exploitation of maritime resources and the 
establishment of ‘maritime axle.’ Like when we design the organisation of the 
ministry of trade, we design it to support our maritime goals. We also did this 
to other ministries, like the ministry of tourism, ministry of industries, 
ministry of fisheries, and so forth.381 
Reorganisation sometimes requires a law amendment and political consensus: 
[I]f an organisation is statutorily established, it can be difficult to reform it, 
even for just a small unit of technical service delivery inside a ministry. 
Frequently, it was not easy for us to reorganise the ‘mother’ ministry of that 
technical unit since the name of such technical unit is mentioned in the law. 
Thus, without changing the law related to that unit, its ‘mother’ ministry 
cannot be reorganised.382 
[A]s most ministries and agencies want to preserve their existence, they 
develop their sectoral legislation to achieve preservation, not only in the 
statute but also in the form of Presidential Regulations. That is why it is 
difficult to harmonise our laws and regulations. When the mandates of a 
ministry and its role and function are mentioned in the statute, we need the 
consent from the Parliament [in the form of the law amendments] to abolish 
or reduce the organisation of that ministry.383 
[W]e had many agencies being mentioned in our laws, and now we are lost. 
This is because first, the function of those agencies are overlapping with the 
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existing ministries. Second, rapid changes sometimes require us to respond 
with institutional changes. Since their nomenclatures are mentioned in the 
laws, we first need to amend the laws to reform, and this will require a lengthy 
process.384 
Above are some of the interview answers related to the theme of ‘current practice of 
reorganisation.’ More answers and findings related to this theme are presented and 
discussed further in Chapter 5. The next part of this section will present some interview 
answers for the group of questions with the theme ‘Political and Statutory Challenges 
in Reorganisation’. 
3.4.4 Political and Statutory Challenges in Reorganisation 
This interview theme consists of the core problems to be investigated in this study. 
The topics presented to the participants were: 
 The current administration political will on bureaucracy reform; 
 Public leader’s support for administrative reform; 
 Support from both executive and legislative branch of powers to reform; 
 Political motives for reform; 
 Political and legislation aspects that shape the governance structure in 
Indonesia; 
 The current legal framework for reform; 
 Problems of disharmony of laws and policies. 
Some of the answers given by participants for this interview theme follow. 
a. The current administration political will on bureaucracy reform 
Some participants think that the reform has strong support from the President: 
Jokowi [President Joko Widodo] has a strong commitment to this 
[bureaucracy reform]. He is firm that he wants to make changes to our 
bureaucracy. If only it is possible, we want to make a total reform.385 
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[T]he President, in a meeting with echelon two officials across ministries and 
agencies, gave a directive not to create a new agency in a bill that is prepared 
by the government. He instructs his administration not to formulate a 
provision which includes the creation of a new institution. He thought that the 
existing ministries and agencies already cover all functions [that] need to be 
performed by the government.386 
Nonetheless, if there is no existing ministry or agency for the issue on the 
table, it is much better to have existing ministry or agency that has the 
responsibility in the area that is close with the issue … handle the problem.387 
Our President has a strong commitment to this issue. He really wants us to do 
efficiency. For this purpose, every month there is a progress report from the 
Ministry of Administrative Reform to the President on the progress of 
reform.388 
An interviewee answers that the political will should start from the highest 
position of administration: 
Political will should be started from the leadership [of administration].389 
 However, there are also critics of the commitment of both the government and 
parliament regarding their political will to reform: 
Political will, the truth is, it was just jargon, and the Commission 2 of the DPR 
says that we need to re-evaluate our government bodies, to either merge or 
dissolve them, or to preserve what we need. However, the fact is, almost all 
the bills initiated by the DPR were intended to create new agencies. While, in 
the government, even [when] we have a directive from the President, not all 
ministries fully comply with the President’s directive ... 390 
[P]erhaps we [the government] should communicate effectively with the 
DPR. I do not think that all of our members of parliament have sufficient legal 
or constitutional law backgrounds. It is a bit difficult for us to argue with the 
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DPR (that new agency is not needed). The government needs to address [the] 
DPR effectively. At least, we need to obtain a commitment from the 
leadership of the DPR to not propose a new agency.391 
A member of parliament criticises the government’s commitment to reform: 
I do not see [that] they have such commitment; sometimes it [the reform] [is] 
just a procedure. Meaning that bureaucracy reform in Indonesia is merely to 
fulfil what the President wants, not as an effective measure to improve the 
function of our public services.392 
Another interviewee answered similarly: 
Political will, from time to time, is not changing. The intention to develop a 
coherent structure at the national level of government is just a commodity of 
political campaign and political rhetoric. We have not made this [political 
will] … an integral commitment … actualised in a roadmap document that 
has the purpose of streamlining the government. The multi-party system 
heavily influences this situation. The reform was not integrated and [was] 
rather fragmented, and so is the business process and governance between 
executive bodies.393 
b. Public leader’s support for administrative reform 
Reform still lacks support from public leaders and their support for 
administrative reform is based on their personal interest: 
[T]he extent of support is sometimes only based on their personal interest. 
Some agencies’ leader wants their institution to remain in existence and to 
reject any future idea for its liquidation. In reality, any agency should be a part 
of a bigger strategy for change and improvement to our bureaucracy … 394 
[F]irst, from leadership, they said they support bureaucracy reform. However, 
mostly, it was just lip service or only on paper, without real implementation. 
It is only in a document, to show that bureaucracy reform is one of the 
programs, to show the public they have made a LAKIP [an annual 
accountability report]. Sadly, our public leaders and political elites are not 
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fully aware of the essence of bureaucracy reform. It is shown from the policies 
produced by the government. It is even worse in local governments; most 
policies are heavily influenced by … motives for … political and personal 
gain, because they do not understand the essence [of reform].395 
I am in doubt that the theme of bureaucracy reform is an important theme for 
our government. The administrative reform is written as one of our nawacita 
[nine development goals]. However, I see that the government does not have 
a sufficient commitment to achieving it. It is unclear how we should do the 
institutional reform.396 
c. Support from both executive and legislative branch of powers to reform 
Reform requires a stronger and same level commitment from both the 
executive and legislative powers: 
[T]he legislative and executive should have the same frequency; both should 
[be] aware [that] organisations are created as an engine for the 
government ...397 
[W]ithout support from our legislators, either from legislative or executive, it 
is difficult [to reform].398 
I think commitment is of the utmost important between the legislative and the 
executive. The advantage of legislation-making is in the legislative, if the 
executive disagrees, there are ways to make it pass, so the highest 
commitment I think should be from the legislative. We do not need to create 
a new institution in every new law. … we need to assess which existing 
institution … is responsible for that issue.399 
 Not all commissions in the DPR support the reform: 
Our counterpart commission in the DPR—the Second Commission, support 
(reform) very well, but with other commissions in the parliament, we struggle 
to have their support, this is not easy.400 
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A member of parliament suggested that the strongest support should instead 
come from the executive: 
If the government wants to be efficient, reform should be started by the 
government. For us in the DPR, when … the government creates a new 
agency, it means that there is a new, specific problem that needs to be taken 
care of by the government, using a specific new agency. This new agency is 
not necessarily given a large organisation. I think inefficiency is everywhere. 
If the government wants to have an instrument to determine whether an 
institution is being efficient or not, it is up to the government to develop this. 
The thing is, the government itself should support efficiency measures.401 
The legislative’s support for reform may also depend on whether the 
government can persuade the DPR: 
I can see that our legislatures’ support, if we can persuade them for the right 
reason, they can accept [not to propose a new agency in their bill]. As an 
example, in the bill of Cultural Law, the DPR wanted a new agency to address 
our cultural heritage issues, but we told them that, at this time, we already 
have 18 ministries and agencies sharing the work to handle such issues. They 
agreed that this issue is handled by our existing bodies.402 
It seems to me that our colleagues that are dealing with drafting the law need 
to be convinced by the government that a new agency is unnecessary.403 
d. Political motives for reform 
Institutional reform can drive other areas of reform: 
The institution is the locomotive of change. If we have good policies on how 
to manage institutions, improvement to other areas—such as human resources 
and budgeting—will follow.404 
Reform is constrained by the oligarchic structure of political parties, political 
motive and vested interests: 
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The members of parliament are a representation of the interest of political 
parties and their elites. The influence of party leaders to their respective 
members who serve in the parliament shapes the product of our parliament.405 
The DPR’s power is dominant in deciding the appointment of the leader of 
top agencies; the government can only propose the candidates [to DPR]. It is 
the DPR who decide who will obtain the position, like in the Supreme Audit 
Council. Certainly, there is a certain motive and interest in this process.406 
[M]aybe … interests with political motives make political elites keen to have 
an individual affiliated to them … obtain a top job in the government. Instead 
of [being] created to solve problems, organisations were created to 
accommodate this interest.407 
Everyone is playing politics; this is why the legislative and the executive need 
[to be] in the same boat, no more speaking on behalf of the party. Some 
interests of the party can be unavoidable, but these should be framed for the 
greater good of this republic.408 
For instance, they [the DPR] threaten to amend the Civil Service Law, and 
use it as their bargaining power, if the Civil Service Commissions [one of the 
LNS] is dissolved. Therefore, in my opinion, instead of supporting the reform, 
they broke their own commitment to reform.409 
As long as the President has a strong political commitment, it should not be a 
problem, the administrative power held by the President, he has a big privilege 
to determine the number of ministries, as well as non-ministerial agencies. I 
know there will be resistance to reform, and we cannot avoid that. There is 
also a measure to accommodate the interests of a particular political party in 
our organisational design. These should be able to be addressed with a strong 
political commitment and the clarity of the design of the organisational 
structure to achieve our development goals as a whole. So we need to 
comprehensively see that we need to design our government organisation to 
improve productivity and efficiency.410 
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There are two sides of political motives to reform, and the managerial and 
operational elements of the bureaucracy should be independent of politics: 
From the negative side of politics, reform is driven by rent-seeking practices 
and transactional politics and opportunist people play a significant role in 
here. The process of top-echelon appointment and budget planning are among 
the examples. On the other hand, from its positive side, if reorganisation is 
designed to improve effectiveness and efficiency, we will be able to install 
the best people for the job. However, I still did not see that we [were] already 
there. Money, politics and other forms of corruption still influence reform.411 
[W]e sometimes have no choice but to think of how we combine the interests 
of the government with the interests of so many parties to the maximum extent 
possible to benefit the public.412 
There is a big difference between the term ‘administration’ and the term 
‘management.’ The former is more general, while the latter is a more specific 
area. Administration tends to be discussed in qualitative while management is 
more quantitative. From the aspect of administration, we need to fix the 
political influence of our bureaucracy. The managerial aspect of bureaucracy 
is a specific problem. The bureaucracy itself has elements that consist of 
policy, managerial and operational. Whenever possible, politics should not 
intervene with the managerial and operational elements of the bureaucracy.413 
e. Political and legislation aspects that shape the governance structure in 
Indonesia 
Answers regarding the political aspects that shape governance structure 
included: 
[W]e created organisations without placing first a load of works that needs to 
be done. The loads should come first. It can be derived from the focuses of 
our country, and these should be prioritised. We need to see the vision and 
mission of our president to understand what needs to be achieved, then 
priorities can be arranged. … we have a number of ministries that we do not 
need, but again, there are political interests here, so we create a new 
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organisation here, whether it was ministry A or B. I do not need to mention 
the name of such ministries specifically.414 
The government is weak in negotiating [with the DPR], maybe because of 
some executive leaders are also from a political party. If the president is from 
the PDIP (a political party) and PDIP also dominates the DPR, it can be easy 
for them to tell the president: ‘You become a president because of us, so he 
lose’ ...415 
We are struggling to prevent the creation of new institutions through the 
process of law-making. Some institutions also tend to preserve and increase 
power. Sometimes, I saw that our bureaucrats were working based on fear, 
like afraid of losing their position, without thinking about the interest of the 
republic. We try to stop this by returning to the mindset that the president 
holds a prerogative power to decide [the creation of a new agency], so it is the 
president to decide whether we need a new agency or not. The president, as 
the head of administration and the head of state, should have the flexibility to 
manage his apparatus. Secondly, we intensify our communications with all 
commissions of the parliament. However, the hearing process in the 
parliament is divided into sectors, with each commission handling different 
sectors; sadly, there is no linkage between activities across the commissions. 
Thus, when the Second Commission of the DPR was already in the same boat 
with us for not creating a new agency from a new law, other commissions are 
still doing this. So, I think, in our institutional reform, there is a significant 
political issue in it, and both the government and the legislative should sit 
together to solve this issue.416 
[T]here was an anxiety of our top-leaders on this and sometimes they 
disagreed with the reform initiative, they afraid some officials might lose their 
positions.417 
 Regarding the legislation aspect, interviewees said: 
Laws and regulations form many organisations; these could be done by an 
Act, PP [Government Regulation], or a Presidential Decree. There is no 
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instrument to filter the proposal to create a new agency. Moreover, our laws 
and regulations are fragmented because each sector wants their organisation 
to be independent, secure from any liquidation. If we want to reform our 
institutions, we also need to address our legislation. The successful key of our 
bureaucracy reform is also to reform our laws and regulations because these 
(laws and regulations) are what makes us have so many ministries, UPT 
(technical service delivery units), non-structural agencies, and so forth. These 
bodies are well-preserved in Indonesia because of legislation.418 
[O]ur agencies requested to be mentioned in the law because it will make their 
existence and position stronger, despite [the fact] that, in our system, it is 
already sufficient to create an executive body by a presidential regulation. 
Certainly, there is an interest in doing this. The main reason is that it will be 
difficult to reorganise them because changing the laws compared to changing 
a presidential regulation is more difficult, so many steps to do for amending 
the law.419 
There was a time when the President wanted to dissolve some ministries and 
agencies. It took years because we do not have a grand design for our 
administrative structure. There was no guidance on how we should streamline 
the administration. When we streamline our organisations, change 
management should be in place, and there are a few things to consider, such 
as what to do with the people of such organisations. How we handle our 
human resources is a sensitive issue; losing an institution can cause a 
traumatic experience as it may cause some people to lose their position. To 
prevent losing their position, they make efforts to prevent their institution 
from being reorganised and strengthen the power of their institution at the 
same time. Essentially, a function can be shared with other institutions. 
However, some people in our administration are greedy. To strengthen the 
existence of their institution, they do not want other institutions to share the 
role. Instead, they tried to make their institution to be mentioned in the 
statutes. Since the law is the second strongest legislation after the constitution, 
this will make them stronger. Last, because of certain motives of the political 
elites, like the need to have someone as a “puppet” in the administration. 
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Ultimately, organisations were not created to solve problems. Instead, it will 
lead to other problems in our governance.420 
[W]ith the increasing demand from the members of parliament, as well as 
from the new sectors of development in Indonesia, to create new institutions, 
new councils, new commissions, etc., they often use the laws to establish such 
institutions. On the other hand, the government is also doing the same, by 
using presidential regulations or government regulations in cabinet meetings. 
Thus, the organisation has become swollen because of so many pragmatic 
interests. We often try to solve problems by creating a new organisation 
structure.421 
f. The current legal framework for reform 
Participants believe that laws and regulations curb the bureaucracy: 
Today, I met with the head of Basarnas [National Search and Rescue 
Agency]; I tested him and asked what the job of his agency is. He replied that 
the job of his agency is to conduct search and rescue. I was then asked whether 
Basarnas had a program for the prevention of any incident. He said then that 
the laws and regulations related to Basarnas do not mandate them to do that. 
It shows that when we perform our duties, it always overshadowed by legal 
rules. Things like this are curbing our bureaucracy.422 
The current legislative framework of reform does not support the reform. The 
legislation is in disharmony because of sectoral ego that exists amongst 
institutions, resulting in overlap and duplication: 
[W]ith the OJK [Financial Service Authority] and BI [Bank of Indonesia] for 
example, it was not easy to approach them. OJK has regulations addressing 
the provision of an LPI [import guarantee], but we in the Ministry of Finance 
also have regulations addressing the same issues. There is a disharmony 
between our regulations and theirs. We are of the opinion that this is our area 
of work, and it is our responsibility to regulate this area, but they are also 
thinking the same.423 
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[A]s an example, between BKPM [the Drug and Food Safety Agency] and the 
Ministry of Health, they are working on the same area and each of them has 
their sectoral laws or regulations. The other example is between BNP2TKI 
[the National Agency for the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers] and 
the Ministry of Manpower. These bodies are sharing work in the same area; 
there should be no issue as long as a good business process between them is 
in place. Therefore, when the President instructs us to protect our workers 
overseas, we need to focus on the issue and execute the required tasks 
effectively. To do this, it should be clear who the responsible agency for this 
issue is. As for now, it seems like every institution, especially non-ministerial 
agencies, claim they are more responsible. They forget that, according to 
article 17 of the Constitution, all administrative roles are to be executed by 
ministries as the helper of the president. Ideally, we need to integrate the 
function of non-ministerial agencies to the ministries. However, it seems 
impossible, as we need to change many laws to do this.424 
I think our laws and regulations do not support [the reform]; each of them is 
still talking in the eye of their sector. The sectoral ego in our public 
organisations is still high. We cannot rely on existing laws for doing the 
reform. We need to change this in our future legislation. It does not mean we 
should not allow the creation of a new agency. However, it should be noted 
that (according to the Constitution), the creation of a new agency should only 
[be] decided by the President. In my opinion, by including terms which decide 
the creation of a new agency in statutes could mean that the intervention of 
the legislative branch of power into the executive is still significant.425 
Even if the law is passed after the DPR and the president have concluded to 
agree for a bill to become law, this is still not good for the flexibility, for the 
movement of his organisations. Therefore, it would be better if the law were 
only focused on building the systems, goals and philosophies for 
organisational management of our bureaucracy. We need to give the 
flexibility to the President [to reorganise]; the public already voted [for] him 
to do this anyway. Because legislation trapped our institutions, the President 
implies that we are going nowhere when the discussion on the institutional 
issue is on the table. The institutional reform is a central issue; when we 
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discuss why our public services are poor, it will be related to how the 
institutions are.426 
The major challenge of reform is the culture of sectoral ego. Since the 
beginning of the reformation era [1998—the year when Soeharto resigned 
from power], each ministry and agency tried to pass their own legislation 
which mentioned the nomenclature of its own institution. This has happened 
because the leadership of these institutions is afraid their institutions will no 
longer exist because of being reformed. They formulate the laws to give 
protection to their agency. Since then, we have so many ministries and 
agencies that are mentioned in statutes. This will make it hard for us to make 
rapid changes to our organisations.427 
The findings of this theme—the Political and Statutory challenges in Reorganisation—
are discussed in Chapter 6. The next subsection provides a few answers from the 
interviewees to the questions related to the theme ‘Possible Solutions to address the 
Political and Legal Problems of Reorganisation’. 
3.4.5 Possible Solutions to Address the Political and Legal Problems of 
Reorganisation 
Some interviewees indicated that the political and legal problems surrounding 
reorganisation are related to the culture of law-making and that addressing these 
problems requires a mutual understanding and mutual commitment to reform between 
the executive and legislative: 
[W]e need to have a strong power to do this (negotiating the terms of the bill with 
DPR) ...428 
[T]he executive and the legislative should have the same frequency (the same 
commitment and same understanding to reform) …429 
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[T]here should be the same frequency between the legislative and executive; both 
should be aware that organisation is made as an engine for the government, not just 
to address a certain issue for a particular time.430 
I think commitment is the most important, between the legislative and the executive. 
The advantage of legislation-making powers belonging to the legislative is that if 
the executive disagrees, there are still ways to make it pass …431 
Interviewees agree that there is a need for new legislation to address the political and 
statutory challenges of reorganisation. Not only to serve the purpose of addressing the 
political and legislation challenges, but this new legislative framework is also needed 
to change the legal culture of reorganisation. Some of the answers related to this 
include: 
I think we need a new law that serves as an umbrella and a legal basis for so many 
administrative functions of the government. This new law should describe functions 
that need to be addressed by the central government. In the future, statutes should 
not specify the nomenclature of a responsible body for a particular function; let the 
president decide whether we need a ministry or something else to address it.432 
I hope that we have a new law that comprehensively regulates all institutional 
aspects we need to cover. I cannot describe the detail of the major clauses of this 
new law, but I hope that at least it contains guidance for the justification of the 
urgency of a new ministry or agency. For us, this law will be like a tool book, like 
if we want to repair a car—we need a manual. It should apply until the smallest unit 
of organisation, probably like defining what a bureau is, what is techno-structure 
and how to develop institutions that conform to our budgeting system.433 
We need a set of legal rules that provide criteria for the urgency of creating a new 
agency clearer. It help us to assess whether the issue is already addressed by the 
existing institutions or not; then, if it turns out that we need a new agency, it also 
helps us to decide the classification of a new body that we need.434 
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Yes, we need [a new law to support reform], so our guide is not only a letter from 
the secretary of the cabinet that conveys directives of the president. The parliament 
has the power to formulate the laws, but the government also has this power. In the 
process of law-making, the parliament might argue that we need to establish a new 
agency through the bill that was discussed; the government then might say no in that 
hearing, then I assume the parliament can reply … saying “constitutionally, we have 
the power to formulate the provisions to establish a new agency”. This kind of 
debate is unnecessary as the government also has the power to say no. Thereby, both 
the legislative and the government should have the same commitment and 
awareness that we are currently reforming our bureaucracy; we are struggling to 
make our bodies more efficient and effective; we do not want to spend a lot of our 
budget to maintain our vast organisations.435 
I can see we need legislation which governs our national government’s institutional 
problems. But to have this law, we need a consensus between our government and 
parliament, and this will require political processes. We cannot ignore that political 
influence will always influence reform. We probably need a statute similar to the 
Regional Governments Law that governs the institutional problems only for the 
provincial and local governments. For the central government, we do not have that 
kind of legislation, which [is] able to guide our organisational issue. For the central 
government, currently, we only have general provisions from Article 17 of the 1945 
Constitution, which says little about ministries, the organisation of the ministries, 
and their institutional aspects.436 
Indeed, we need such legal rule to regulate the organisation of executive bodies. 
This is important to guide us in deciding the type of agency for a particular issue. 
Currently, we do not have criteria to determine the type of organisation we need.437 
Findings related to the interview questions theme of this subsection are discussed in 
Chapter 7. The next section provides the overall summary of this chapter. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has detailed the interview processes for this thesis. It has further discussed 
the strategies for the interviews and their relation to the method chosen for this study, 
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as well as the criteria for the selection of interviewees. It also discussed the grouping 
of interview questions and presented some answers given by interviewees. However, 
these interview answers are not analysed and discussed further here. These answers 
are discussed and analysed in the subsequent chapters. The remaining chapters of this 
thesis are based on the grouping of interview questions. 
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Chapter 4: Overview of the Bureaucracy Reform in 
Indonesia 
4.1 Introduction 
The direction and future of bureaucratic reform in Indonesia depend on the ability of 
the government to establish reform goals that are able to tackle any bureaucratic 
problem. Strategic reform involves the development of goals that unify political 
leaders, bureaucrats and other stakeholders. In doing the reform, the government needs 
to have support from other centres of power, such as the parliament, political parties 
and the public. Collaboration between these actors to identify priorities for the reform 
is critical. 
Deciding the reform path necessitates the capability to anticipate public needs. 
However, most reforms are not developed in anticipation of needs, but rather in 
response to crises that arise when those needs are unmet. 438 The challenge for the 
government is to move away from opportunistic reform to strategic reform—and it is 
daunting. Establishing strategic reform involves developing a clear vision of the goals 
of reform at large.439 This chapter outlines bureaucratic reform in Indonesia. It begins 
with an examination of the goals of bureaucratic reform, followed by a discussion on 
the progress and achievement of reform. Then, this chapter identifies the major reform 
challenges and the legal culture of reform. A summary concludes this chapter. 
4.2 The Goals of Bureaucratic Reform in Indonesia 
In the literature surrounding public administration, being ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ are 
two crucial factors for the ideal organisation. Simeone defined ‘efficiency’ as ‘the use 
of resources in such way as to minimize waste and to ensure resources are put to their 
most valuable use’ and ‘effectivity’ as ‘the use of resources to accomplish what you 
set out to accomplish’.440 The economy, along with the principles of effectivity and 
                                                 
438 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Government of the Future (OECD 
Publishing, 2001) 12. 
439 Interview with Eko Prasodjo (n 351). 
440 Ann Elizabeth Simeone, ‘The Ideal of Public Service: The Reality of the Rhetoric’ (PhD Thesis, 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2004) 69 <https://search-proquest-
com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/docview/305105916?accountid=10382>. 
 102 
efficiency, has become the guiding principle on the operations of modern 
government.441 Increased pressure on the government to be as efficient, effective and 
economical as the private sector show this.442 
To some extent, the Indonesian style of reform was influenced by those of European 
countries,443 mostly by the ideas of New Public Management (NPM). It is not 
surprising that some of NPM’s jargon, such as ‘effectivity’ and ‘efficiency’, was 
prevalent in Indonesian reform campaign documents. The NPM-driven reforms were 
oriented both to reduce the cost of the public sector and to increase the quality of public 
services. 444 The expected result is to establish a better quality government with less 
public expenditure. The logic behind NPM is that the public sector should run in a way 
similar to the private sector. It is adopted to improve the famous ‘3 Es’, economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
The public wants its government to be more efficient, while at the same time able to 
deliver services in an egalitarian manner, like businesses. 445 Most participants in this 
study agreed that creating an effective and efficient bureaucracy that is able to provide 
better services to the public is the essential goal of bureaucracy reform. Hence, 
reforming the bureaucracy in Indonesia should aim to create a proportional 
bureaucracy that has the right size and the right function to serve its citizens better.446 
Through effective reform, the government can ensure that it can perform all of its 
functions, supported by organisations that are able to deliver their tasks accountably, 
effectively and efficiently. Interview answers show that there are three main goals of 
bureaucracy reform, namely, to establish an accountable and clean government, to 
form effective and efficient bureaucracy and to improve the quality of public services 
(see interview answers in Chapter 3). These goals are aligned with the goal of reform 
posited by Pollit and Bouckaert, that reform has the objective of getting the 
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government (in some sense) to run better.447 However, some interviewees in this study 
were sceptical about seeing Indonesia reach its reform goals. Prasodjo answered: 
Q (question): From your perspective, Professor, what are the goals of bureaucratic 
reform, particularly in institutional reform? 
A (answer): Yes, the truth is there is no specific design for our institutions, we often 
talk about the right size and reorganisation, or maybe about ‘fewer structures more 
functions,’ performance-based structures, and so forth, but the truth, they were only 
political rhetoric. There was no real seriousness in designing the architecture of the 
government. What we have been done were only reviewing, then establishing a plan 
to dissolve particular non-structural agencies. We also made some evaluations to 
merge some directorate generals, replacing them, or elaborate them to other 
ministries, but we never had the grand design of the administration architecture. If 
I asked what the goals of bureaucracy reform are, probably there is no goal of it. 448 
For Prasodjo, the reform agenda is merely political rhetoric; he does not see the real 
goal of reform as the government is not fully committed to reform itself. Arianti also 
thinks that the government is inconsistent in conducting reform: 
Q: What are the goals (of institutional reform), what progress has been made 
towards them’? 
A: A bit difficult to describe [the goals and progress], what is interesting to me is 
that yesterday the DPR raised a question of why the government persuaded them 
not to create a new agency (under the terms of legislation), while at the same time 
the government is also actively bloating itself. For example, the government 
recently created a new agency to manage our peatlands. It also created a new body 
for the implementation of Pancasila. Our president recently issued a directive to his 
administration, suggesting that terms enabling the creation of new agencies not be 
included in legislation. However, some top administrators did not comply with this 
directive and thought that it was just a suggestion; this has become a polemic.449 
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For a government that has limited resources and budget constraints, achieving 
efficiency is crucial. 450 Across most of the globe, governments are massive 
organisations with many layers and structural formations, resulting in massive 
bureaucratisation. 451 The bureaucracy has become fragmented and less consolidated, 
as the relationship between the elements of bureaucracy become more complex. 452 
This is why a lean government is often seen as ideal. There are growing trends of de-
bureaucratisation in pursuit of efficiency. However, focusing too much on efficiency 
perhaps will make other important aspects, such as flexibility and responsiveness, 
receive less attention. Certainly, any government is required to be flexible to change 
and responsive to any changes or new circumstances that require its attention. 453 The 
development of this flexible and responsive government is almost impossible without 
the development of bureaucracy that is flexible to change. 
In modern and complex governance, the government should be able to shift from 
fragmented functions to governance based on inter-organisational networks, which 
emphasise the elimination of cross-functional boundaries.454 Therefore, this section 
concludes that the goal of reform is not merely to make the government more efficient, 
but it also should include how to make it operate better for the benefit of its citizens. 
To understand whether the goals of bureaucracy reform in Indonesia have been 
achieved and whether they make the government function better, the next section of 
this chapter discusses the extent of progress and achievement in reform. 
4.3 Progress and Achievement of Reform 
Findings from the interviews show that there is still a long way to go for Indonesia to 
successfully reform the bureaucracy of its central government. Reform is still 
constrained by rent-seeking practices, transactional politics and other interests in the 
political arena, as a minister says: 
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Q: Minister, can you tell me about the reform in our country? 
A: I want to talk based on [a] political perspective, as my background is political. I 
saw two dominant aspects [influence the reform]. First is the political interest, this 
can be the interests of political parties that [are] represented by their members of 
parliament, along with their vested interests. Because of this, the product of our 
parliament is based on the ‘order’ of the parties. There are ten political parties in 
Indonesia; each of them has their agenda for this country. Their interests dominate 
our parliament. This can be seen in every hearing to discuss a bill; their vested 
interests are reflected in the bill being discussed. The problem is their interests are 
often incompatible with the government’s organisational needs. That is why we 
have so many agencies because their creation is embedded in the law. This is a 
consequence of interference by political parties through their members of 
parliament by using the process of law-making. It was hard to reform because of 
these. … 
Secondly, it seems to me that we have a mixed model of government, like now we 
follow a presidential system. On the other hand, we [are] still controlled and 
dominated by the decisions of [the] legislative. We do not purely apply a presidential 
system. This is the art, how to mix the nation’s interests with such political interests. 
The nation I mean here is the executive and the professional people in it that is not 
contaminated by politics, although it is hard for us to refer to the guidance of 
professionalism since the politics is always interfering. As an example, our 
government is currently putting much attention on developing infrastructures and it 
[is] constrained by the need to accommodate ‘the promises’ of our friends in the 
parliament to their supporters.455 
A prominent scholar of public policy in Indonesia, former Vice Minister of 
Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, Professor Eko Prasodjo, does not consider 
reform as a comprehensive measure to improve governance, because of its partiality 
and disintegration: 
[R]eform was fragmented and partial. It was just like extinguishing the fire when 
there is a fire. We did something without having a comprehensive picture of it, and 
our assessment was fragmented and partial, limited to what we can do just to 
examine non-structural agencies that may not be functioning properly. But we never 
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discussed the main design for the organisation of the government, how many 
ministries we need, how many non-ministerial agencies and independent agencies. 
Thus, the results [of reform] were partial and did not have long-term strategic 
value.456 
There is no clear direction for reform, largely because the Indonesian government has 
not developed a grand design for its organisations. Therefore, there is no sufficient 
reference for the government to assess how many executive bodies it needs. In spite of 
this, there have been some reform achievements. One of these is the passing of a 
landmark law that regulates civil service management, the Civil Service Act 5/2014. 
This law provides legal rules that cover issues of recruitment, appointment, placement 
and promotion of the state apparatus. It stipulates that public officials must be 
politically neutral—banned from being partisans of political parties or supporting 
particular political views.457 Nevertheless, politics remain a strong influence. For 
example, many top echelons of public officials were appointed because of their 
connection to the political elites of a party. It reflects the loophole in the Civil Service 
Act and does not render civil servants apolitical bureaucrats, as Khatarina answers: 
Q: How do you see the progress of our reform? 
A: If bureaucratic reform is seen from the development of legislation framework, 
the birth of Act 5/2014 is a significant milestone for our reform. The bill of this law 
was extensively discussed for two years [between the DPR and the government]. 
One of its important features is strengthening the neutrality of our bureaucrats. We 
know that the influence of politics on our bureaucracy is daunting; our bureaucrats 
are unprofessional because of this. However, after four years [since the enactment 
of the Civil Service Act], I still see that we have not achieved the goals of this law. 
The law itself is implemented in inconsistent manners. We still struggle to make our 
bureaucrats politically neutral.458 
The other reform achievement is the restructuration of 34 ministries during the first 
term of Joko Widodo’s presidency, the dissolution of 15 non-structural agencies and 
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restructuration of some non-ministerial agencies.459 However, executive bodies that 
were reformed here are those that were formed by the President using a Presidential 
Regulation (Perpres). A statute did not form them and the government has the authority 
to dissolve them without a consensus with the parliament, in the form of a law 
amendment. 
President Widodo has also issued a directive to all executive bodies to stop formulating 
bills that have provisions for the creation of new agencies.460 Unfortunately, ministries 
and agencies under his watch do not consistently implement this directive. Arianti 
revealed that some institutions of the government still try to push the creation of a new 
body in a bill that they have prepared: 
Political will, the truth is, it was just jargon, the Commission 2 of the DPR said that 
we need to re-evaluate the existing agencies, to merge or dissolve them, or to 
preserve what we need. But the fact is, almost all the bills initiated by the DPR were 
intended to create a new agency. While in the government, even there is a directive 
from the President, it was not fully implemented by the ministries with the reason 
that the bill initiated by the government are less in number compared to those from 
the DPR. 461 
The ministerial and non-ministerial organisations were the first crucial issue 
undertaken by the current administration under Widodo’s presidency.462 One of 
Widodo's priorities was to repair the organisational patterns of the central government. 
However, the extent of his commitment is being questioned and there are polemics 
about reducing or increasing the number of organisations that existed, when his 
government actually increased the number.463 For example, a non-structural agency, 
Office of the President, was created to become the president’s think tank. However, 
the Ministry of State Secretariat and the Cabinet Secretary already delivered this 
administrative function. Therefore, the involvement of the Office of the President was 
not necessary. If the government has too many ministries and agencies, it will be 
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expensive to maintain its large organisations and pay a large amount of money for the 
salary of its bureaucrats. 
Several other reforms that have been implemented include developing the e-
government mechanism, improving performance measurement instruments, 
reconfiguring remuneration and improving accountability in the public sector, as well 
as its oversight mechanism, which includes combatting corruption. However, reform 
is still far from achieving its goals. This is shown by the rank of the 2018 Indonesian 
Corruption Perception Index that ranks Indonesia 89th out of 180 countries.464 
Moreover, the ‘ease of doing business (EODB)’ ranking, released by the World Bank 
in 2019, shows that Indonesia’s EODB is 67.96, or 73rd out of 190 countries.465 This 
EODB score is far below its neighbours, Singapore, which obtained a score of 85.24, 
or 2nd out of 190 countries and Malaysia, which obtained a score of 80.60, or 15th. 
Indonesia’s EODB score is also below Australia, which scored 80.13, or 18th, but it 
still above the regional average score of 63.41 for East Asia and Pacific regions.466 
These figures show that there is still a lot of work to be done to improve governance 
in Indonesia. According to the Minister, more innovations and breakthroughs are 
needed to reform the bureaucracy.467 All parts of the bureaucracy should change their 
mindset and culture and avoid doing the ‘job as usual’, to tackle reform challenges.468 
In regards to the challenges of reform, the next section discusses the initial 
identification of major reform challenges. 
4.4 Major Reform Challenges 
Answers from the study participants show that politics, legislation and institutions’ 
sectoral egos are among the major challenges of reform. Indonesia follows the 
presidential system of government. However, the political forces outside the executive 
heavily influence the direction of reform. Decisions about reforming the government 
are the results of bargains and compromises between contending interests. For 
example, new agencies were created with the help of statutes, as a way to both preserve 
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the existence of the agency in question and to create available positions for high-rank 
bureaucrats who were affiliated with the interests of the elites: 
Q: Minister, what do you think about the current structure of our bureaucracy? 
A: Still too large, what we need is more functional staff with specific expertise, 
instead of administrators I often say that we need to be smarter than the private 
sector’. Many things [in the bureaucracy] are unreasonable, like we created certain 
positions just to accommodate [for] some people to have positions in the 
administration, which was wrong. … 
The DPR is really dominates; in deciding who will sit in certain top positions [in the 
administration], the government can only propose the candidates, it was them to 
decide, like in the Supreme Audit Council, there was a vested interest of doing it.469 
He also says: 
[R]eform is difficult to do because of that political interest. It is unavoidable in a 
democratic country like us.470 
[T]he biggest constraint is always the law. We always create a new law for every 
problem.471 
Similarly, one of the Minister’s special advisers answered: 
Q: Do you think there was a vested interest in the creation of a new institution under 
the new law? 
A: We always have that vested interest, first, to strengthen the position of an 
institution, it mostly happened to non-ministerial agencies. Since they wanted their 
existence to be acknowledged, they raced to have a provision of themselves in the 
legislations. Second, sometimes institutions were created because certain 
individuals or political groups wanted to have certain people affiliated with them, 
to have a top administrative position for their own gain. This will be worse for 
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institutions that the DPR has given the power to conduct the fit and proper test for 
the people who will lead them.472 
The appointment of high-ranking officials is sometimes based on their closeness with 
elites of political parties, rather than their competence.473 Politics can be influential in 
some top agencies with huge power and budgets, and the strong power of the DPR can 
be problematic for reformation. The dominance of the DPR also includes the decision 
to appoint the heads of certain agencies and ambassadors. In some agencies, the 
government can only propose candidates to the DPR, who then decides who will lead 
those agencies. To approve or reject the nominees, the DPR often applies a lengthy fit 
and proper test, which can be an object of bargaining.474 Instead of improving the 
bureaucracy and governance, reform is being used to make ways for rent-seeking and 
oligarchy. 
Moreover, since the fall of the authoritarian regime under Suharto in 1998, ministries 
and agencies have raced to pass laws in their respective areas to protect their existence. 
Many leaderships in executive bodies are afraid of the dismissal of their institution that 
could potentially harm their position. Hence, they seek protection by formulating a bill 
and passing it to the parliament.475 Clearly, legal rules have been used to mushroom 
the bureaucracy. 
March and Olsen describe political institutions as too interventionist and influential.476 
The legislation is certainly a political product, and this can be ‘interventionist’ too. 
Many laws passed by the DPR did not support reform, as they were too interventionist 
and were based on the perspectives of their own sectors. Widyantini answered: 
I think our laws and regulations did not provide significant support (to reform), each 
of them is still talking their own sector and the sectoral egos in our administrative 
organisations are still high. For the existing laws, there is not much that we can do 
… In my opinion, by having the terms in a statute that creates a new agency, it 
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means the law is interfering with how government should build its organisation and 
there are still interventions of the DPR in the government. 477 
The culture of the sectoral ego, manifested through the process of law-making, is a 
significant obstruction to reform. Indonesia must reverse this legal culture. The next 
section discusses the aspect of legal culture in Indonesia. 
4.5 Legal Culture of Reform 
The central issue linked to reform that is discussed in this study is reorganisation. The 
legal cultures of law-making discussed here are those that are relevant to 
reorganisation. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the law is the source of administrative 
power in Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution stipulates that Indonesia is a rechtsstaat 
(state law), meaning that the government can only exercise power based on the power 
given by the laws. Both sides of powers, executive and legislative, have almost equal 
power to initiate bills. This bill can only become law after a joint agreement on its 
terms has been reached between the DPR and the president. However, Khatarina 
observed that the DPR, as the legislative branch of power, dominates the initiatives to 
propose bills: 
Q: Based on your experience in assisting the DPR, how often do you see that there 
is an inclusion to create a new agency inside a bill? 
A: Almost every bill has the intention to create a new agency, although not all the 
final versions of the bill eventually [has the term to create a new agency]. However, 
I saw that, since the reformation, almost every bill has the term for a new agency.478 
Q: And most of the bills are initiated by the DPR? 
A: Yes, indeed.479 
Similarly, Arianti answered: 
Q: Since you have extensive experience getting involved in legislation-making, 
have you encountered the intention to create a new agency under a bill? 
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A: Many times, almost every bill wanted to establish a new institution. Before I held 
my current position, I was also involved in the bill of Cultural Law, also the Bill of 
Publishing Law, Architecture Law, National System of Science and Technology 
Law. In those laws, they, I mean the DPR, always proposes to create a new 
institution, including in the one that I [was] recently involved [in], the bill of 
Cultural law.480 
Q: Does it mean that such proposals often came from the DPR, through the bills that 
they proposed? 
A: Yes, from the bills I have mentioned, there is one that is initiated by the 
government, the National System of Science and Technology Law, we did not 
incorporate the idea to create a new institution in that bill, but the DPR, on one 
occasion, wanted to have a new institution in that bill, we told them that we already 
have the LIPI [Indonesian Agency on Science] and BPPT [the Agency for 
Technological Assessment and Application], we do not need another institution 
addressing the same issue.481 
Through the legislation it passes, the DPR significantly contributes to bloating the 
bureaucracy. Laws can either support or constrain reorganisation. The problems 
surrounding reform presented in this study have existed over the years and are partly 
the result of Indonesia’s legal culture in law-making. It has been commonly assumed 
that legislation often reflects the vested interests of political parties. These interests 
play a crucial role in managing the government.482 Unfortunately, those interests often 
contradict the need for efficiency. Findings from the interviews indicate that there are 
practices to form executive bodies to create top-echelon jobs for the potential 
affiliation of a particular political party, to return the favour for helping the party 
during the election, or to have someone as a puppet in the administration to benefit the 
party.483 
In contrast, the government is somewhat powerless when discussing bills with the 
DPR, rendering it difficult to filter the DPR’s intention to insert provisions for the 
establishment of a new agency in a statute. Although it is common for politics to 
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intervene in the administration of any democratic country, this has become a crucial 
problem, as it results in an increasing number of agencies. Since Indonesia reopened 
the doors for democracy in 1999, legislative processes have been used by political 
parties to intervene in the organisations of the government. 
According to the Constitution, which follows the presidential system, Indonesia 
separates the powers of executive and legislative. However, the DPR, with its 
legislative power, harnesses a greater power in law-making. The Minister of 
Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform argues that almost every new problem in 
Indonesia is addressed by establishing a new law,484 which necessitates the 
establishment of a new agency for the matter. Unfortunately, there are already 
ministries or agencies responsible for addressing the problems, or potentially able to 
work in that area, resulting in duplications. Legislatures in the DPR often urge for the 
establishment of a new agency through their bills to address specific problems, 
disregarding the fact that it is already the responsibility of existing institutions. Since 
legislation is the product of political processes, reorganising the government 
sometimes relies on political considerations, rather than holistically improving 
governance. Instead of solving problems, the laws create a new problem in 
governance. 
As mentioned above, a bill needs to be deliberated between the DPR and the president 
to reach a joint agreement to become law. In reality, the president himself never 
discusses a bill with the DPR, as he is always represented by his ministers and their 
high-ranking bureaucrats when discussing a bill with the legislative. This further 
weakens the government’s position in discussing legislation with the parliament. Many 
ministers are also representatives of political parties; they are selected from either the 
president’s affiliated parties or parties that form a coalition to support the president in 
his election campaign. Despite having a position in the coalition cabinet, some 
ministers are believed to remain attached to their party attributes. What further 
weakens the government’s bargaining power is the top-echelon bureaucrats fear of 
being deemed ‘unfit’ by the DPR, which may lead to the DPR recommending their 
disposal. This weak position renders the government reluctant to push its reform 
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agenda through the bill being discussed.485 These legal culture issues shaped the 
current bureaucratic posture. 
Moreover, the sectoral ego has caused disharmony of laws and fragmented reform, as 
each institution perceives the need to remain relevant by mentioning itself in its 
sectoral legislation. Many laws are passed based on their sectoral problems. As 
institutions are statutorily established, reorganisation may prove difficult, since it 
requires organisational provisions to amend the law. Hence, reorganisation is not 
simply an administrative measure, but also a political process. Statutes frequently 
mention the name and functions of a ministry or agency as a way to strengthen their 
power and preserve their existence, which complicates reorganisation. Since too many 
government organisations are ‘trapped’ by legislation, Widyantini mentioned that 
there are times the President felt frustrated with his administration when institutional 
problems were considered.486 
Yet, a Member of Parliament argued that distrust of existing institutions might lead 
the DPR to propose the establishment of a new agency to address a particular issue, 
although the government already established an agency to undertake that function: 
Q: Some bills contain the terms for establishing a new body, as you have affirmed, 
what is the political motive behind this? 
A: Maybe it [is] simply [that] the government needs to give a better explanation and 
argument to our legislators (in DPR) that such function [is] already addressed [by 
the existing institution] …487 
Q: So, if a proper explanation is given, do you think the DPR will accept the 
argument that we already have KL [a ministry or agency] for that issue? 
A: I am sorry to say that there is a perspective of distrust of our legislators to the 
government. Therefore, the government should be able to give a better explanation. 
The government should ensure that its existing institutions already performed their 
job. Hence, [there is] no need [for] a new agency.488 
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Similarly, Khatarina said: 
[P]olitically, there is a growing trend that shows the parliament is dissatisfied with 
the performance of the government. They assumed the existing ministry or agency 
did not do their job effectively. Hence, they [the parliament] came up with such 
solution [creating a new agency], it may [be] because [the parliament] is not satisfied 
[with the government].489 
The practice of creating a new agency (under the terms of legislation) when there is 
already an existing institution in that area potentially leads to duplications. Obviously, 
without changing the legal culture on how the law relevant to bureaucracy is made, 
reorganising the government can be challenging. Certainly, no government can 
succeed without a robust and effective administrative system, nor can an 
administrative system survive without the support of its bureaucracy.490 To some 
extent, restructuring may cause an unpleasant experience, as some might lose their 
comfortable position, or even their career. This also has become one of the main 
reasons why agencies have taken steps to prevent their organisation from being closed 
down, which they do with the help of the clauses in their sector’s legislation. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter concludes that the goals of bureaucratic reform in Indonesia are mainly 
to establish an effective and efficient bureaucracy, as well as to improve public 
services. Reform should not only be intended to make the government more efficient. 
Most importantly, the goal of reform is to make the government operate better, for the 
benefit of its citizens. However, bureaucratic reform in Indonesia is still far from 
succeeding. 
Various political interests influence bureaucracy reform. In addition to this, legislation 
and the institution’s sectoral egos are among major challenges facing reform. These 
aspects shape the legal culture, in regards to how the laws relevant to administrative 
institutions are made. Hence, the legal culture related to the process of law-making, 
which influences reform, needs to be changed. This is crucial as it affects the ability 
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to conduct reorganisation. The next chapter discusses further how reorganisation is 
conducted. 
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Chapter 5: Current Practice of Reorganisation 
5.1 Introduction 
Reorganisation is the essence of bureaucratic reform. It involves the improvement of 
government services and without such improvement, it would be meaningless.491 
Institutional change is the main focus of reform in Indonesia. It aims to create the right 
function, right sizing and proportional organisation.492 However, government 
organisations face numerous challenges and operate in a complex environment of 
conflicting political interests. These conflicting interests have shaped Indonesia’s 
bureaucratic structures. 
Peters believes that no national government would argue that their current public sector 
has worked orderly and that reform is unnecessary.493 Even after substantial changes 
in their administrative systems, governments will persistently encourage greater 
change towards a better, more cost-effective government. Each country has its own 
character and pattern of reform, but most governments would agree that structural 
change is the main feature of any reform.494 
This chapter discusses the current practices of reorganisation in Indonesia. Following 
this introduction, the next section outlines the Indonesian bureaucratic structures. 
Subsequent sections discuss the elements of effective and efficient organisation, 
business processes and the procedure and process for reorganisation. In addition, this 
chapter examines how reorganisation is conducted in other countries and lessons that 
can be learned from their experiences. Following discussions of these aspects, the 
chapter’s findings are summarised. 
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5.2 Overview of the Structure of Bureaucracy 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Indonesian central government has 34 ministries, 29 
non-ministerial/special agencies, and 103 non-structural agencies.495 Indonesia’s 
government is divided into ministries, which are subdivided into directorate generals. 
Although administrative reforms are occasionally designed to provide an alternative 
mechanism to bypass rigid hierarchies and boundaries, the presence of line ministries 
remains the major feature in the contemporary state apparatus in Indonesia.496 
Most participants in this research agreed that the structure of bureaucracy in Indonesia 
is still too large. The Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform also 
acknowledged this in an interview (See Section 4.4 of Chapter 4).497 Moreover, one of 
his deputies said that each institution in the administration has a different level of 
organisational ‘maturity’, with some tending to build a large organisation to increase 
their budget and control: 
[T]he maturity of each organisations is different, if we do not restrict, they will tend 
to create a large organisation. Why this has happened? Because in our republic, the 
system we had produced a mindset that in a large organisation, there will be new 
positions. They do not see organisation as a critical tool to achieve our national 
goals. Organisations were used only as their tool to obtain a position and power, and 
this is not right.498 
The large structure of the Indonesian administration is also complicated by a complex 
budgeting system. Yuwantari said: 
Q: Have you encountered a reorganisation proposal which has the sole purpose of 
enlarging the budget and number of officials? 
A: Many times. This is largely because there is a limitation set up by the Ministry 
of Finance of the maximum—how much budget can be utilised by an echelon four 
or echelon three structure. When an echelon four in a UPT [technical delivery unit] 
                                                 
495 Ministry of Administrative Reform of the Republic of Indonesia, ‘Policy Paper: Restructuring the 
Structures of Bureaucracy—Recommendation on the Structure of Central Government using the 
Concept of Machinery of Government’ (2014). 
496 Interview with Rini Widyantini (n 347). 
497 Interview with Asman Abnur (n 352).  
498 Interview with Rini Widyantini (n 347). 
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realises that its budget is insufficient to perform its tasks, it will then ask to be 
upgraded to echelon three in order to have more budget. Second, for LNS 
[independent agencies], initially, some of them actually just want to be “budget 
users” and do not want to manage their budgets independently. However, our 
financial system says that if they are a separate entity, they need to manage their 
budget independently and it requires them to create a satker [task force] for 
managing their budget. At the same time, if they are still an echelon two, three or 
four, they are not allowed to manage their budget. Thus, many of them ask to be 
upgraded to an echelon one. … 
It is wasteful for most agencies to have a large organisation. However, in our 
financial system, of the State Financial System Act 17/2007, if they do not build a 
large organisation in which at least an echelon one structure (similar to directorate 
generals), they are not allowed to manage their budget independently. Their budget 
should come from their parent agency. This is a reason why agencies want to build 
a large structure.499 
The Indonesian State Financial Law (Act17/2007) stipulates that to manage its budget 
independently, an agency must build a satuan kerja (satker),500 a structure that is 
equivalent to an echelon one structure, such as a directorate general. In the Indonesian 
administrative system, an echelon one is a large organisation with considerable power. 
Structures below echelon one have restrictions on managing their budgets 
independently. Because of this, executive bodies tend to enlarge their organisation to 
increase their power and budget and strengthen their administrative position. 
Similarly, an interviewee said that ministries tend to enlarge their directorate generals, 
as these are the operating elements that are able to utilise and manage a large budget.501 
Widyantini also postulates that this kind of unnecessary enlargement is wasteful for 
the budget.502 
Constitutionally, the government exercises its power based on the power given by the 
laws.503 Each type of institution used by the government to exercise power has its own 
organisational characters. In the central government, these institutions may include, 
                                                 
499 Interview with Vera Yuwantari (n 346). 
500 Undang-Undang 17/2003 tentang Keuangan Negara [Act 17/2003 on State Financial]. 
501 Interview with Bambang Supriyono (n 389). 
502 Interview with Rini Widyantini (n 347). 
503 See Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 
1945] art 3. 
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but are not limited to, ministries, non-ministerial agencies and non-structural agencies 
(LNS), as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 5-1 The Executive Structure of the Indonesian Government504 
As Article 17 of the 1945 Constitution stipulates, ministers assist the President/Vice 
President to govern the country, according to their respective areas.505 The State 
Ministries Act divided ministries into three clusters. The first cluster includes 
ministries whose nomenclatures are explicitly mentioned by the Constitution. These 
are exclusively for the ‘triumvirates’, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defence.506 The second cluster 
includes ministries according to the governance areas in the Constitution, and the third 
cluster includes ministries responsible for elaborating, coordinating and synchronising 
government programs.507 The first and second cluster ministries are often referred to 
                                                 
504 Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, ‘Restructuring Indonesian Government’ 
(2015). 
505 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945]. 
506 Ibid. 
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as the ‘portfolio ministries’ and the third cluster is the ‘non-portfolio ministries’.508 
Also, the current government has four coordinating ministries that are neither portfolio 
nor non-portfolio. There are 46 government affairs listed in the State Ministries Act. 
Below are the areas of responsibilities, according to the cluster of ministries and the 
46 functions. 
Table 5-1 Area of Responsibilities According to the Ministerial Clusters and the 
Administrative Affairs in the State Ministries Act509 
Area of Responsibilities 
First Cluster 
Ministries 
Second Cluster 
Ministries 
Third Cluster Ministries 
1. Home Affairs 
2. Foreign Affairs 
3. Defence 
4. Religion 
5. Law 
6. Finance 
7. Security 
8. Human Rights 
9. Education 
10. Culture 
11. Health 
12. Social Welfare 
13. Workforce 
14. Industry 
15. Trade 
16. Mining 
17. Energy 
18. Public Works 
19. Transmigration 
20. Transportation 
21. Information 
22. Communication 
23. Agriculture 
24. Plantation 
25. Forestry 
26. Farming 
27. Marine 
28. Fisheries 
29. National 
Development 
Planning 
30. Administrative 
Reform 
31. State Secretariat 
32. State-Owned 
Enterprises 
33. Land 
34. Population 
35. Environment 
36. Science 
37. Technology 
38. Investment 
39. Cooperatives 
40. Small and Medium 
Businesses  
41. Tourism 
42. Women’s 
Empowerment 
43. Youth 
44. Sport 
45. Housing 
46. Development of 
Rural Areas 
                                                 
508 Ibid. 
509 Ibid. 
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However, the State Ministries Act restricts the administration to, at most, 34 ministries. 
Since the enactment of this law in 2008, the number of ministries to date has always 
been 34. However, their structure, as well as the nomenclature, changed alongside the 
succession of national leadership resulting from the general election. For example, the 
previous government, of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, only had three coordinating 
ministries, focusing on three major issues, namely (a) economic, (b) political, legal, 
and security, and (c) public welfare. The current Cabinet of President Widodo has four 
coordinating ministries (a) economy, (b) political, legal and security, (c) human 
development and culture, and (d) maritime. The creation of these coordinating 
ministries shows that the administration sees the issue of coordination as an institution 
rather than as a mechanism. Ahmad argues that this has made coordination between 
executive bodies become inflexible: 
Conducting coordination in Indonesia is difficult because we never map the 
processes of our institutions. If I may say, we do not need to create an institution 
just to establish coordination between agencies, but now we have a number of 
coordinating ministries or coordinating agencies. This would make coordination not 
flexible, as it formed into institutions rather than as a mechanism.510 
During the second term of his government, from 2009 to 2014, Yudhoyono 
reconfigured his ministries several times. The Ministry of National Education became 
the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Tourism and Culture became 
the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Industry and the Ministry of State Apparatus 
became the MoABR. Following the 2014 general election, the elected President Joko 
Widodo maintained 34 ministries. Widodo, however, also conducted restructuring by 
creating new ministries, merging ministries or moving specific roles of a particular 
ministry into another ministry. 
After his instalment as president, Joko Widodo created four coordinating ministries, 
preserving two from the previous cabinet (the Coordinating Ministry of Political, 
Legal, and Security Affairs and the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs) and 
adding two (the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and the Coordinating 
                                                 
510 Interview with Yanuar Ahmad (n 365). 
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Ministry of Human Development and Culture). Further, 13 out of 34 ministries were 
restructured, two of which were new ministries, namely the Coordinating Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs and the Ministry of Land and Spatial Planning. One of the 
restructured ministries has new nomenclature—the Coordinating Ministry of Public 
Welfare Affairs changed its name and function to the Coordinating Ministry of Human 
Development and Culture. Ten ministries, their functions and their jobs were 
rearranged. They are the Coordinating Ministry of Economy Affairs; the Coordinating 
Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs; the Ministry of Home Affairs; the 
Ministry of Village, Underdeveloped Regions and Transmigration; the Ministry of 
Public Works and Public Housing; the Ministry of Tourism; the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry; the Ministry of Education and Culture; the Ministry of 
Research, Technology and Higher Education and the Ministry of Manpower. 
Restructuring ministries, as well as other institutions, necessitates precision and 
special care. Reorganisation can sometimes cause problems; it may trigger anxiety 
amongst bureaucrats and concerned individuals who are afraid of losing their 
positions. Reorganisation often requires the sectoral legal rules linked to such 
organisations to be altered or revoked. This has become a constraint to speeding up the 
process of reorganisation. Therefore, reorganisation at times requires an aptitude to 
find loopholes in such legislation to avoid contradictions. 
The president establishes non-ministerial agencies, or LPNKs, for a specific task. Their 
establishment supposedly comes from the president’s discretion and prerogative right. 
This is according to the Presidential Decree 103/2001 on the position, task, function, 
power, organisation and governance of non-ministerial agencies, which provides for 
LPNKs, as a central government institution established by the president, to conduct 
specific tasks, from the president, in accordance with the prevailing laws and 
regulations.511 The Indonesian Government has established 30 LPNKs using various 
legal bases, from statutes (UU) to executive order instruments, such as Government 
Regulation, Presidential Decree or Presidential Regulation. 
                                                 
511 Presidential Decree 103/2001 on the Position, Task, Function, Power, Organisation, and 
Governance of Non-Ministerial Agencies. 
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Legislations, however, are sometimes inconsistent with how they position LPNKs in 
the administrative structure. As an illustration, Article 25 of the State Ministries Act 
mentions that LPNKs are to be coordinated by ministries, according to their relevant 
governance area, in performing their responsibility.512 In other words, LPNKs are 
subordinates, or a proxies, of ministries to support or supplement the activities of 
ministries, or to undertake special tasks in certain areas as proxies of ministries. 
However, some LPNKs have rejected such ideas and elected to directly report to the 
president (instead of to a minister) in their sectoral legislation. This action allows 
LPNKs to have positions directly under the president (instead of a ministry) and it 
breaches Article 25 of the State Ministries Act. The table below provides further 
illustrations on how LPNK sectoral laws are inconsistent with the State Ministries Act. 
Table 5-2 Examples of LPNKs Stated to be Directly Under the President 
LPNK Statutes Establishing Terms (Translated to English) 
Badan 
Kependudukan dan 
Keluarga Berencana 
Nasional 
(BKKBN)—
National Population 
and Family 
Planning Board 
The 
Population 
and Family 
Growing 
Act 52/2009 
Article 53: 
(1) To control the growth of population and to 
conduct family empowerment, this law 
establishes the National Population and 
Family Planning Board, hereinafter referred 
to as BKKBN. 
(2) BKKN, as referred in the paragraph (1), is a 
non-ministerial agency, directly under and 
responsible to the President. 
Badan Koordinasi 
Penanaman Modal 
(BKPM)—the 
Investment 
Coordinating Board 
The 
Investment 
Act 25/2007 
Article 27: 
(1) The Government is responsible for 
coordinating investment policies, either in 
the form of intragovernmental institutions 
coordination, between the government and 
Bank of Indonesia, between the central and 
local governments, or between local 
governments. 
(2) The Investment Coordinating Board 
conducts the coordination of investment 
policies as referred to paragraph (1). 
(3) The Investment Coordinating Board, as 
referred in paragraph (2), is chaired by a 
Chairman and directly responsible to the 
President. 
                                                 
512 Undang-Undang 39/2008 tentang Kementerian Negara [Act 39/2008 on the State Ministries]. 
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LPNK Statutes Establishing Terms (Translated to English) 
(4) The Chairman of the Investment 
Coordinating Board, as referred in 
paragraph (3) is appointed and dismissed by 
the President. 
Badan Informasi 
Geospatial (BIG)—
Geospatial 
Information Agency 
The 
Geospatial 
Information 
Act 4/2011 
Article 22, para (2) and (3): 
(2) The management of geospatial information, 
as referred in paragraph (1) is conducted by 
an Agency named the Geospatial 
Information Agency and established to 
replace the Coordination Agency for 
National Survey and Mapping as mandated 
by this law. 
(3) Agency, as referred in the paragraph (2), is 
directly under and responsible to the 
President. 
Badan Narkotika 
Nasional (BNN)—
National Narcotic 
Agency  
The 
Narcotic 
Act 35/2009 
Article 64: 
(1) To prevent and eliminate illicit narcotics and 
its precursors, as well as their misuse, this 
law establishes the National Narcotic 
Agency, hereinafter referred to as BNN. 
(2) BNN, as referred in paragraph (1), is a non-
ministerial agency directly under and 
responsible to the President. 
 
Because many statutes gave LPNKs the right to have a direct responsibility to the 
president, many LPNKs have lost their initial characters as proxies of ministries. Thus, 
it can be difficult to distinguish between a ministry and an LPNK. Arguably, creating 
an LPNK using the terms in the Undang-undang has shifted the nature of LPNKs 
themselves. In the past (particularly during the era of President Soekarno and President 
Soeharto), LPNKs were established by presidential administrative power to manage 
administration. Since ‘the reformation’ (post-1998), legislations have produced new 
LPNKs and reinforced the existing LPNKs. Hence, their creation now mostly comes 
from consensus between the DPR and the president, through the process of law-
making. 
The existence of LPNKs and their position in the administration need to be redefined 
so the Indonesian government can have an efficient structure. Such redefinition is 
essential for the government to optimise the roles and contributions of LPNKs. 
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Eventually, it will lead to the development of a proportional structure with the right 
size or function for any institution. Moreover, reconsidering the position of LPNKs in 
the administration can help the government reduce duplications, thereby increasing 
effectivity and efficiency of governance. In this regard, the Minister of Administrative 
and Bureaucratic Reform argued that the position of LPNKs in the structure of the 
government needs to be ‘under the coordination of a related ministry’ because LPNKs 
are constitutionally created by presidential discretion.513 As such, the use of legislation 
to create an LPNK is better avoided. 
In addition to ministries and LPNKs, the central government also has non-structural 
agencies, or LNS’s; statutes establish at least 73 of these.514 The creation of LNS’s 
started to mushroom after the downfall of Suharto in 1998. The nomenclature, 
structure and position of LNS’s in the Indonesian machinery of government are so 
diverse; some LNS’s are directly responsible to the president, some to a ministry and 
others to an LPNK. An LNS itself is sometimes considered ‘independent’, that is, 
outside the structure of a ministry or LPNK. 
LNS’s are similar to the independent agencies in the US federal government. However, 
in Indonesia, LNS’s range from small boards, commissions and committees to larger 
independent agencies. Most of them are dealing with functions outside the area of the 
executive (Ministries and LPNKs). However, there are also some LNS’s addressing 
the operation of the government, economy and corruption investigators and conducting 
regulatory control. 
As legislation is a political product, the making of some executive bodies is the result 
of a political consensus. These institutions can only be reorganised as required and by 
the law. Since sectoral statutes protect many institutions, the spirit of efficiency is not 
evident in these statutes. These legislations have contributed to the development of a 
large and fragmented bureaucracy. 
There are too many pragmatic interests involved in institutional creation515 and 
bureaucracy, as the policy executor, often follows the direction of such pragmatic 
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514 Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of Indonesia (n 307). 
515 Interview with Eko Prasodjo (n 351). 
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ideology.516 Politicians still exploit the bureaucracy as if it is their servant, rather than 
the public’s servant. However, a bureaucracy that is clean from any political influence 
is impossible, because the bureaucracy itself was established to execute a wide range 
of political decisions and policies. Therefore, if temporary political interests distort the 
public sector, it becomes ineffective and inefficient.517 Nevertheless, the MoABR is 
still optimistic about the future shape of Indonesian administration, as long as the 
process of building agencies reflects the clauses of presidential power in managing 
government according to the Constitution. 
The Indonesian Government itself is fully aware that its current machinery of 
government is still too large.518 However, the Minister of Administrative Reform 
himself implies that he is unable to determine the exact formulation of the ideal figure 
of administration—what is too large, ideal or too small.519 There is no ideal number of 
how many ministries and agencies the Indonesian government should have. Instead, 
he argued that the government would have the ideal number of administrative bodies 
when no functions overlap and there is no duplication. Similarly, Widjinarko 
mentioned that the government would have the ideal structure when collaboration and 
coordination between departments could be done without any constraint, particularly 
from the problem of sectoral ego.520 
The administration transition from Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Joko Widodo in 
2014 led to some increases in ministries’ functions, despite there being the same 
number of ministries. Determining the ideal number of ministries or agencies is indeed 
relative and subject to prevailing challenges. As previously mentioned, there are 34 
ministries in the current government, similar to the previous government. However, in 
terms of workload, some ministries have additional functions. Therefore, their 
organisations have become larger, with many additional directorate generals under 
certain ministries. Institutional enlargement or reduction is common during ruler 
transition in Indonesia, depending on what the new government needs to deliver their 
goals. Institutional development in Widodo’s government has put more stress on the 
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challenges and priorities of the central government. This has led to the establishment 
of several new agencies (such as the Creative Economy Agency to support the new 
priority programs), the reinforcement of the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) and 
the separation of various tasks and functions.521 
These findings support the minister’s observation that the executive structure is still 
too large and that Indonesia still has too many ministries and agencies, mainly because 
of significant job duplications among them (these are discussed further in section 5.4). 
Since overlap and duplication remain the prominent factor, it is difficult for the 
government to have an effective and efficient organisation. Similarly, a member of 
parliament said: 
What I saw is, our government is not efficient. Not only oversize, but some works 
that can be done by a computer still done by a person. In this era of advance 
technology, we should be able to transfer some workload from people to machine. 
If we do this, we will be able to improve efficiency in our public sector 
significantly.522 
The other political forces outside the executive, such as parliament or political parties 
(and their elites), may have a different perspective than the government on how the 
government should build its organisations. To understand reorganisation is also to 
understand administration as a political process. Arnold states that ‘We will not 
understand public administration until we understand administration as a political 
process.’523 
Sims argues that politicians often have their own interests and do not always have the 
perfect knowledge of the issues under discussion.524 Similarly, Arianti observes that 
many members of the DPR do not have sufficient legal backgrounds, particularly in 
the area of administrative law and constitutional law.525 These problems influence 
reorganisation. To decide between conflicting goals and find the best organisational 
decision can be challenging. Decisions are the results of negotiation, bargains and 
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compromises, actualised in the legislation. Because of this, the government’s 
organisation becomes less effective and efficient. The next chapter of this thesis 
discusses what makes an effective and efficient organisation for the government. 
5.3 What Makes an Effective and Efficient Organisation 
Interview findings show that to be considered ‘ideal’, the government needs to be 
effective and efficient. However, as shown in Chapter 3, not all interviewees in this 
study agree that small and lean structures are effective and efficient. Even the Minister 
of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform does not know the ideal figure of how 
many executive bodies the Indonesian government should have. 
The public tend to assume that government bureaucracy is all bad because of its size 
and complexity. Brown states that ‘they provide ample opportunity for even the most 
uninspired to find something wrong with them.’526 Reorganising the government is 
often announced as aiming to modernise and streamline the government. However, the 
problem is not only how big it is, but the complex requirements that are also being 
placed on obsolete structures. Brown posits that there are practical limits on the size 
of government, as there are limits to the size and height of buildings.527 It can be both 
impractical and uneconomic to have agencies beyond such limit and Brown argues 
that an increasing number of organisations is not always a good remedy for the 
increasing workload of the government.528 
Osborne and Gaebler’s idea for ‘reinventing government’ is that the government 
should reinvent itself, by focusing on solving collective problems and doing more at 
less cost. 529 Downsizing the government is one of the central arguments of 
‘reinventing government’. The concept emphasises efficiency—having fewer agencies 
facilitates the government doing more for less cost, which is central for ‘reinventing 
government’. The main objective of most downsizings—particularly in developing 
countries—is the pursuit of effectivity and efficiency. Peters observed: 
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While downsizing, in the public sector of developing countries, is occasionally 
necessary in the framework of structural adjustment and fiscal austerity, those very 
factors that give cause for downsizing (unsustainable budget deficits, debt levels, 
etc.) can also be used to trigger a wide-ranging reform, including public sector 
financial management. Restructuring of the civil service can then be one of the 
results of an overall reform initiative, rather than representing an isolated effort, 
with perhaps few repercussions on management efficiency and effectiveness in the 
public sector.530 
The orthodox theory of public administration is associated with the design of the 
administrative structure and their procedures, which promote the effectivity and 
efficiency of the bureaucracy.531 It is related to which departments could be reduced, 
positions that could be eliminated and expenses that could be slashed, despite the fact 
that, over the years, assessments of public expenses have shown that restructuring may 
not result in major savings.532 Franklin Roosevelt argued that ‘we have to get over the 
notion that the purpose of reorganisation is economy.’533 
However, this thesis has not provided convincing evidence for the proposition that 
having too many agencies will result in inefficiencies. Instead, the assumption for this 
thesis is mostly based on interview sources. It is a challenge to find organisational 
theories in the public sector to enrich discussion in this section for several reasons. 
First, as Christensen et al. argue, organisational theories traditionally concentrate on 
private organisations.534 Second, not much organisation theory is sourced from 
political and legal science.535 There has been little contact between political science 
and organisational theories, as Christensen et al. state: 
Indeed, organisation theory is more frequently found in business schools than in 
departments of political science. As a result, organisational research has been 
criticized for being too preoccupied with general theories about formal 
organisations and for having neglected the important political-administrative 
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organisations and the connection between organisational design and the content of 
public policy.536 
Contrary to the idea of ‘reinventing government’, Muqowam asserted that, as long as 
the need to have a large bureaucracy can be justified, there should be no issue with the 
government building a large bureaucracy: 
The goal of institutional reform should not merely [be] to shrink organisations and 
reduce agencies. Instead, it should aim to improve public services, professionalism 
and administrative roles, regardless of the size of the bureaucracy. It should be fine 
to have a massive structure as long as it can be justified.537 
Davis et al. similarly argue that the real business of government is policy achievement, 
not departmental arrangements.538 Davis et al. emphasise that any change within the 
engine of government should have justifications to strengthen managerial leadership, 
build on the principles of better management, increase efficiency and reduce 
expenditure and duplication.539 
Nowadays, changes are fast and it will be hard for any government to handle new 
challenges if they are unable to adapt and adjust easily. Some scholars, such as Kettl 
and Fesler, disregard the importance of a streamlined organisation for efficient 
governance. They suggest that a continuous improvement to the organisation of 
government is necessary, and that it does not matter if the resulting administration will 
be big or small, as long as it was formed to improve the performance of the bureaucracy 
and advance public services.540 However, Davis et al. emphasise that expediency and 
political need, rather than organisational principle, are the strongest factors of 
conducting reorganisation. Government organisation is the arena in which political and 
administrative needs meet; this provides opportunities for political symbolism, policy 
innovation and administrative rationality.541 
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Another interviewee, Prasodjo, had a different view. For him, the Indonesian 
government must simplify its structures and reduce its agencies, since many functions 
of the central government have been taken over by the local governments, following 
the Local Government Act 23/2014. He stated: 
Of course this is a big problem [I saw] as I looked at the structure of our central 
government. Instead of getting leaner, it gets too big. Because we have decided to 
decentralise the government. According to the Local Government Act, our 
government should adjust its functions according to our nation’s decentralisation 
design. To me, there will be huge inefficiencies if the central government does not 
comply with our decentralisation principles, such as overlaps and higher operational 
costs, as each ministry may have to develop unnecessary programs. The impact of 
this problem is daunting, not only [in that] the expected performance of 
organisations become unachievable, because the organisations are unfit to achieve 
their targets, but also because of duplications in functions, programs and activities 
and allowances that need to be paid to the officials.542 
Therefore, the Indonesian government still needs to reduce the size of its bureaucracy 
to improve efficiency and establish a good linkage of business processes between the 
executive bodies. The next section discusses the business process in the bureaucracy 
of the Indonesian central government. 
5.4 Business Processes 
Widjinarko posited that sectoral egos among governmental institutions are the reason 
why many ministries and agencies have tried to pass legislation in their respective 
areas to protect their organisations.543 Many of them are already mentioned in the 
legislation and, as such, complicate the reformation. The bureaucracy becomes 
swollen because of pragmatic interests and each sector of administration insists on 
establishing an independent organisation.544 As the legislations were fragmented, so 
were the business processes of the government. 
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Erni Murniasih, a Project Manager of KOMPAK, articulated the extent of 
fragmentation inside the Indonesian bureaucracy. She gave an example of dealing with 
the rural issues. Murniasih said that too many ministries were involved in the 
implementation of the Villages Law/The Act 6/2014 on Villages (Undang-undang 
6/2014 tentang Desa): 
Q: So you mean too many ministries or agencies to handle one particular issue? 
A: Exactly; as an example, see how we handle the issue of our rural area, to 
implement the Rural Laws. From its financial aspect, the formulation of the rural 
fund is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The determination of the 
allocation of those funds is the Ministry of Rural Areas [responsibility], its 
assistance facility is held by the Kemendagri (Ministry of Home Affairs). We also 
had the Coordinating Ministry of Human and Culture Development as the orchestra 
leader of those activities. Hence, the field is too crowded. We have so many 
institutions working on a single issue and sometimes we also had an institution [that] 
didn’t do anything to solve the problem.545 
It is evidenced that it is too crowded for one issue to be handled by too many ministries. 
The government is expected to satisfy the public by delivering services. Therefore, the 
public should not be confused by an intricate process by multiple institutions for a 
single service. Abnur emphasises the importance of establishing a proper business 
process to reduce duplications.546 There should be a distinct function of each institution 
because, at the macro level, the organisations might no longer be flexible as the laws 
restrict reorganisation. Since legislation is a significant impediment to establishing a 
good business process, establishing an efficient process requires awareness from 
legislators on the importance of streamlining processes. 
Establishing business processes is establishing linkage and synergy of activities. 
Hence, reducing fragmentations of the government. For example, the National Search 
and Rescue Agency (Badan SAR Nasional, or BASARNAS), the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and the National Agency for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional 
Penanggulangan Bencana, or BNPB) are working in the same area of disaster 
management and are all responsible for providing emergency services in the event of 
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a natural disaster. Working in the same area of governance, they need a sufficient 
business process mechanism to coordinate and cooperate effectively. 
Fragmented administration is a disadvantage and creates difficulties for the 
bureaucracy. The other example here concerns environmental issues. The graphic 
below illustrates the fragmentation of the government in addressing the environmental 
problem. 
 
Figure 5-2 Ministries and Agencies Addressing Environmental Issues547 
Figure 5-1 shows that it takes ten ministries and agencies to address environmental 
issues. The crowded stakeholders may complicate the coordination, resulting in 
disharmony and an inefficient processes. A similar situation occurs in other areas of 
governance and potentially leads to red tape. Another example is the effort to eradicate 
poverty, which involves the National Planning Agency (Bappenas), the Ministry of 
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National Development Planning, the National Agency for Acceleration of Poverty 
Elimination, the Ministry of Social Welfare and others. 
Murniasih’s organisation (KOMPAK) is a joint program between the Australian and 
Indonesian governments for the issue of social developments in Indonesia, such as 
combatting poverty. Murniasih said that in working with the issue of poverty 
eradication, KOMPAK has to deal with too many ministries and agencies. She stated: 
[F]or poverty elimination, we had the Bappenas, the TNP2K (the National Team for 
Acceleration of Poverty Elimination). My organisation is working on development 
issues, we have so many doors only for one particular issue, like for planning of 
basic services we have to deal with Bappenas, for the Ministry of Finance if it is 
related to budget management, Ministry of Home Affairs for the regulations, and 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs for combating poverty activity that is related to 
inaccessibility of basic services.548 
Having too many institutions addressing the same issue will have significant 
implications for the budget and the performance of the government. Moreover, Adi 
Budiarso, the Chief of Transformation Office, Ministry of Finance (MoF), explained 
that reorganisation efforts were constrained by the interest to secure positions for top 
bureaucrats.549 Because of this interest, many unnecessary directorate generals were 
still preserved.550 
Budiarso stated that one of the main reasons for conducting reform, particularly in his 
institution (MoF), was to reduce ‘silo-mentality’—a mentality resulting from sectoral 
ego, or a belief that one organisation is superior to others and therefore being reluctant 
to share responsibilities.551 Silo-mentality has driven most directorate generals at the 
MoF to pass regulations to protect their power and organisation.552 It leads to a mindset 
that refuses teamwork with other units in policy-making, rejecting the idea that 
decision-making can be intercorrelated between departments. These situations lead to 
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difficulties in conducting reorganisation. The next section discusses the procedure and 
process required to conduct reorganisation. 
5.5 Procedures and Processes for Organisational Change 
On behalf of the President, the MoABR is currently deciding the restructuration of 
directorate generals, bureaus, directorates and other smaller units within a ministry or 
agency. The power for creating a ministry or an agency, as well as dismantling it, is 
held by the President. The President usually reorganises his machinery after receiving 
consideration from the MoABR. However, neither the president nor the MoABR is 
able to dictate reorganisation of a statutorily established body. 
Ideally, reorganising any agency should be free from any political intrusion. According 
to the 1945 Constitution, the president held the power of government. However, 
statutorily creating agencies has restricted the constitutional, prerogative right of the 
president in managing his government and has undermined the presidential system 
adopted by the 1945 Constitution. 
When a statute creates a structure within the government, reorganising it can be 
challenging. A small unit within a ministry can be worse if the nomenclature and the 
function of this unit are mentioned in a sectoral statute. This may prevent 
reorganisation measures for its relevant ministry, without amending the law related to 
this unit. Yuwantari postulated that such a ‘mother ministry’ cannot be restructured: 
[I]f a structure is statutorily established, it is difficult for us [to restructure]. As an 
example, in disbanding a ministry that has a small unit of UPT [technical service 
delivery unit], ideally, this UPT should also be disbanded as its mother ministry. 
However, this may not easy if such unit is mentioned in a statute. When a mandate 
of a ministry or its relevant elements is mentioned in a statute, the first thing that we 
need to in reorganising them is to amend the terms in legislation that relevant to 
their organisation.553 
Because legislations mentioned the nomenclature of a particular ministry or agency, 
the bureaucracy has become fragmented. Reorganisation must be directed to simplify 
business processes and make the government less fragmented. The fragmented 
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processes show that there is still a long way for the Indonesian government to go to 
reach a successful reform. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Indonesian score in the 
EODB shows this. The Indonesian EODB score and rank is far below its neighbouring 
countries, including Singapore, Malaysia and Australia. 
Moreover, the Indonesian competitiveness index in 2019 is sitting at a rank of 50th out 
of 140 countries—five spots lower than its 45th in the previous year. This result is far 
below Singapore (ranked 1st out of 140 countries) and Malaysia (ranked 7th).554 
Indonesia still needs to catch up and take lessons from other countries to improve its 
bureaucracy and increase its competitiveness. The next section of this thesis discusses 
reorganisation in other countries and the lessons learned, which could be used for 
Indonesia to reform its bureaucracy. 
5.6 Reorganisation in Other Countries: Lessons Learned for 
Indonesia 
Every country has its own characteristics of reform, problems and distinctive 
experiences. There is no one solution fits all across countries, but countries can learn 
from others’ experiences and use reform to build institutions that are adaptable to 
changes and new challenges. This section will examine the experiences of Singapore, 
Australia and the United States in building their government machinery. Singapore 
and Australia were selected for their proximity to Indonesia and their different 
governance characteristics. However, it is also important for this section to examine 
reform experience from a country that has similar democratic characteristics with 
Indonesia, which follows the presidential system; this is why this section also discusses 
the USA’s experience. As developed countries, public governance in these three 
countries are more advanced and, as such, it is beneficial to take their reform 
experience into account. 
5.6.1 Singapore 
The Economist Magazine views Singapore as an ‘exceptional’ country, as it is the 
world’s only fully functioning city-state and one of the world’s richest countries, 
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which maintains its status as a major global hub for commerce, finance, shipping and 
travel.555 One of the key elements of Singapore’s success is the monopoly of state 
power by the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has been ruling for more than 50 
years.556 Since the birth of Singapore as a country, right up to the present date, the PAP 
had a monopoly in parliament that reached its peak from the 1960s to the 1980s, where 
all seats of parliament went to PAP, leaving not even a single seat for the opposition.557 
For more than five decades, PAP held the power of government and was freed from 
any political demand and opposition. As such, they had a ‘freehand’ in policy-making, 
emphasising the concern for rationality in policy-making.558 The legislative 
dominance of PAP provided a solid base to rule and establish state autonomy for the 
government. The parliament has been more of an echo-chamber than a check and 
balance to the executive power and no opposition candidates were able to obtain a seat 
in Parliament until 1981.559 
An effective state apparatus and efficient bureaucracy are the essential and critical 
elements for the development of a nation. One of the unique characteristics under the 
PAP rule is that bureaucrats have obtained not only administrative support as 
professionals in their areas, but also political support, with many bureaucrats changing 
over to become members of parliament and PAP. Iwasaki argued that the solid power 
of the executive in Singapore had become the main driving factor in Singapore’s 
growth.560 The state autonomy provided by the PAP has enabled the bureaucrats to 
discharge their duties faithfully. Singapore has succeeded in building a system that 
virtually has no official corruption, and the government has remained clean and 
efficient for more than 50 years.561 
The organisation of administration in Singapore can be divided into two types 
according to their organisational characteristics, namely task and function. The first 
type is the ‘ministry’, which has the function to maintain an ordered economic and 
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social life.562 The second type is the ‘statutory board’, established by a special law to 
supplement the role of the ministries or to undertake a particular task as a proxy of the 
ministries.563 Unlike ministries, which come under the supervision of parliament by 
law, statutory boards have the special privilege of being free from the parliament’s 
supervision.564 The purpose of such privilege is to give them the flexibility to conduct 
their tasks efficiently.565 Statutory boards have been sharing tasks with the ministries 
and, in certain areas, ministries have left tasks completely to the statutory boards.566 
These statutory boards are similar to the LPNKs of the Indonesian government, except 
that LPNKs are subject to checks and balances from parliament. 
As of 2019, there were 15 ministries and 56 statutory boards in Singapore.567 Statutory 
boards are public institutions established under legislation, which have a focused 
mission.568 While statutory boards need to report to their parent ministries, they have 
more flexibility and are more independent than ministries in managing financial and 
human resources. Statutory boards generally have more freedom than their parent 
ministries to employ the necessary human expertise and use financial resources to 
implement projects and programs.569 Further, they are administered through 
autonomous boards that include representatives from the public and private sectors.570 
Over the years, many specialised statutory boards were established to implement vital 
national goals—from empowering small businesses to delivering special education for 
arts and environmental protection. The first statutory boards created were the Housing 
Development Board in 1960 and the Economic Development Board in 1961.571 
Structures and systems are sometimes seen as obstacles to reform. Hence, governments 
often opted to adopt only incremental changes that can be implemented within existing 
structures. However, Singapore’s experiences in reform show how innovations in 
organisational structures are important to implement policy initiatives. To improve its 
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public sector, Singapore established two types of structures, namely vertical and 
horizontal structures.572 The typical vertical structure includes organisational design, 
such as a ministry or a statutory board. Such type of organisation tends to be permanent 
for a long time and intended to complete its focused tasks within a single ministry or 
agency. Vertical structures are hierarchically organised for implementing policies and 
programs.573 In contrast, the horizontal structures involved representatives from 
various institutions, whose thoughts and expertise were needed for shared issues over 
a period, and were disbanded when the program was completed—as ad hoc or 
temporary institutions. The horizontal structure has been used for inter-ministry 
committees or cross-department teams for more complex issues, such as counter-
terrorism, strategic issues or security that requires close and constant coordination. 
The horizontal structure comprises a network of experts, with goals to develop 
comprehensive, effective solutions to coordinate the implementation of accepted 
policy recommendations by various institutions, if necessary. Conversely, the vertical 
structure would only handle problems within the framework of their domains. This 
structure is less effective for more complex problems. To give further comparison, 
Neo details the differences in structural characteristics between the vertical and 
horizontal structures in the Singapore Government below.574 
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Table 5-3 Structural Characteristics in the Singapore Government575 
Vertical Structure Horizontal Structure 
Permanent Temporary 
Fixed resources Configurable resources 
Focused on its mission Multi-dimensional perspectives on 
the issue 
Single agency Multiple agencies 
Hierarchical Network 
Implement policy directly Coordinate implementation across 
agencies 
Fast and efficient Comprehensive and effective 
 
Similar to Singapore, the Indonesian administration has seen recent developments of 
horizontal networks, with the formation of various cross-ministries/agencies and ad 
hoc committees. For the Singapore government, if such horizontal structures are no 
longer needed, they will be disbanded. This will be different for the case of Indonesia 
because many ad hoc institutions in Indonesia eventually seek permanent status in the 
administration by establishing a vertical structure within themselves. With the support 
of the legislation, many of those ad hoc committees become LNS’s in Indonesia, 
shifting from horizontal to vertical structures. 
Reforming the public sector in Singapore is less difficult than in Indonesia, as the PAP 
holds a majority of seats in the Parliament and the government. There is no political 
demand from the opposition and the government has the flexibility to implement its 
reform agenda. In Singapore, disruption to restructuring is minimal. Both Singapore 
and Indonesia saw many of their government agencies created by legislation. 
However, as the ruling power in Singapore has a monopoly in the parliament and 
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government, reversing the legislation that becomes the legal basis for the creation of 
an agency is easier than it is in Indonesia. 
Singapore can also have a stable government because of the leadership of former Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who held power for more than 30 years. As the Prime 
Minister from 1959 to 1990, Lee led the country into prosperity and his strong 
leadership helped to transform Singapore from British post-colonial chaos into one of 
the world’s most prosperous and orderly nations—turning the Southeast Asian city-
state into one of the ‘economic tigers’ of Asia.576 Retiring from the Prime Ministry, 
Lee became a senior advisor in the cabinets of two of his successors.577 He maintained 
his influence and advised the government on issues from sustaining political stability 
and economic growth to maintaining foreign affairs, until he resigned in 2011. Overall, 
he spent 52 years in the government leading Singapore to rise as a major global 
financial and trade hub, with the third-highest GDP per capita ranking in the world.578 
Its incorruptible government also underscores Singapore’s success story. Singapore’s 
national leadership is consistently aware that incorruptible government is the 
precondition for the establishment of a good government to encourage economic 
growth. Singapore is one of the cleanest top global bureaucracies. According to 
Transparency International, Singapore’s 2018 Corruption Perception Index is ranked 
3rd out of 180 countries, with a score of 85 out of 100.579 In 2019, Singapore was listed 
as the most competitive country in the world, ranked 1st out of 140 countries.580 
Singapore succeeded in preserving the integrity of its bureaucrats, which makes them 
among the cleanest public sector in the world. The Singapore government was widely 
regarded as honest and efficient and yet overbearing and patronising (particularly in 
the era of Lee Kuan Yew). With the help of the strictest laws on corruption, drugs, gun 
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control and various aspects of public life, Singapore has become a tidy and law-abiding 
country.581 
5.6.2 Australia 
The most common departmental changes in the Australian Westminster-style system 
are in the form of incremental adjustment—regular but minor changes to keep the 
machinery broadly consistent with the activities and policy priorities of the 
government.582 The only radical changes in the architecture of the national government 
in Australia were conducted during Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s government in 
1972–1975. Over three years of his government, the total number of departments rose 
sharply from 27 to 37 and then fell again to 28 at the end of his prime ministership 
and, out of the original 27 departments Whitlam inherited in 1972, only seven still 
operated at the end of his term.583 
During the Whitlam era, Australia also experienced a constitutional crisis that saw the 
government dismissed by the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr.584 After an 
appropriations crisis in Parliament in 1974 and 1975, the Governor-General invoked 
his power under Section 62 of the Australian Constitution and dismissed the Whitlam 
Government in 1975, marking the climax of probably the most significant political 
crisis in Australian history.585 The crisis also affirmed the fundamental position of the 
Senate in the legislative structure, following the reasons for which the Governor-
General decommissioned the Whitlam government.586 In October and November 
1975, Whitlam’s government did not have a majority in the Senate. On several 
occasions, the Senate passed a motion to defer Appropriation Bills, which had been 
passed by the House of Representatives ‘until the Government agrees to submit itself 
to the judgement of people’.587 The Governor-General Sir John Kerr withdrew the 
commission of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam following the rejection of the 
Appropriation Bills by the Senate. He then commissioned the opposition leader 
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(Malcolm Fraser) as the new Prime Minister to form a caretaker government on the 
guarantee that supply will be passed and that the dissolution of both houses would be 
recommended. After the Senate passed the Appropriation Bills, the new Prime 
Minister called for a double dissolution—the Governor-General then signed the 
proclamation of dissolution and elections were held.588 
The machinery of government changes in Australia was strongly influenced by the 
result of elections and its new prime ministers. The development of government 
machinery in Australia is heavily based on considerations made by prime ministers, 
Davis et al. state: 
For prime ministers, the machinery of government questions have both policy and 
political content. The architecture of ministries is an opportunity to express 
priorities and to meet policy challenges with new organisational arrangements. 
Important initiatives can be given dedicated resources, while administrative 
obstacles are removed. New agencies may be created, old ones scattered or 
reconfigured. Though government machinery is but a means to an end, machinery 
changes often reveal a hope that through better structures, the more successful 
policy might flow. 
In establishing administrative arrangements, prime ministers also make political 
choices. The distribution of assigned responsibilities among ministers rewards some 
and eclipses others. The quantum and significance of responsibilities help determine 
influence within the cabinet, public profile and the prospects for further 
advancement. Some prime ministers prefer a small, coherent group at the centre, 
and consolidate portfolios around a few individuals, investing each minister with 
significant span and discretion. Others favour a more compartmentalised 
government with many ministers, each responsible for a relatively narrow slice of 
government activity. In either case, apparently neutral administrative arrangements 
reflect a political judgment about the operation of the cabinet, the comparative 
importance of ministers and the preferred operating style of the prime ministers. 
Such machinery choices have consequences beyond the cabinet room. 
Administrative arrangements also determine the balance of bureaucratic power—
                                                 
588 Ibid 244. 
 145 
between ministers and officials, between central agencies and line departments, and 
among line departments.589 
The Australian government’s bodies are diverse and classification is not always 
straightforward.590 Its organisation is classified into several portfolios and 12 types of 
bodies. A portfolio is a minister's area of responsibility as a member of Cabinet. Within 
each portfolio there are one or more departments, agencies, government appointed 
boards and/or other boards and structures.591 Below are the organisations of the 
Australian Government, based on the Administrative Arrangement Order by Prime 
Minister Scott Morrison that commenced from 1 September 2019. 
Table 5-4 Australian Government Organisations Classified by Portfolios592 
No Portfolios/Departments Ministerial Posts/Responsible Ministers 
1 Agriculture 
(Department of 
Agriculture) 
Minister of Agriculture 
Minister for Water Resources, Drought, Rural 
Finance, Natural Disaster and Emergency 
Management 
Assistant Minister for Forestry and Fisheries 
2 Attorney General’s 
(Attorney General’s 
Department) 
Attorney General 
Minister for Industrial Relations 
3 Communications and the 
Arts (Department of 
Communications and the 
Arts) 
Minister for Communications, Cyber Safety, and 
the Arts 
Minister for Regional Services, Decentralisation 
and Local Government 
4 Defence (Department of 
Defence) 
Minister of Defence 
Assistant Defence Minister 
Minister for Veteran and Defence Personnel 
Minister for Defence Industry 
5 Education (Department 
of Education) 
Minister for Education 
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No Portfolios/Departments Ministerial Posts/Responsible Ministers 
6 Employment, Skills, 
Small and Family 
Business (Department of 
Employment, Skills, 
Small and Family 
Business) 
Minister for Employment, Skills, Small and 
Family Business 
Assistant Minister for Vocational Education, 
Training, and Apprenticeships 
7 Environment and 
Energy (Department of 
the Environment and 
Energy) 
Minister for Energy and Emissions Reduction 
Minister for the Environment 
Assistant Minister for Waste Reduction and 
Environmental Management 
8 Finance 
(Department of Finance) 
Minister for Finance 
Assistant Minister for Finance, Charities and 
Electoral Matters 
9 Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and 
Trade) 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for 
Women 
Minister for Trade, Tourism, and Investment 
Assistant Defence Minister and Minister for 
International Development and the Pacific 
10 Health (Department of 
Health) 
Minister for Health 
Minister for Aged Care and Senior Australians 
Minister for Youth and Sport 
Minister for Regional Services, Local 
Government and Decentralisation 
11 Minister for Home 
Affairs (Department of 
Home Affairs) 
Minister for Home Affairs 
Minister for Water Resources, Drought, Rural 
Finance, Natural Disaster and Emergency 
Management 
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant 
Services and Multicultural Affairs 
Assistant Minister for Customs, Community 
Safety and Multicultural Affairs 
12 Industry, Innovation and 
Science (Department of 
Industry, Innovation and 
Science) 
Minister for Industry, Science and Technology 
Minister for Resources and Northern Australia 
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No Portfolios/Departments Ministerial Posts/Responsible Ministers 
13 Infrastructure, 
Transport, Cities and 
Regional Development 
(Department of 
Infrastructure, 
Transport, Cities and 
Regional Development) 
Deputy PM and Minister for Infrastructure, 
Transport and Regional Development 
Minister for Water Resources, Drought, Rural 
Finance, Natural Disaster and Emergency 
Management 
Minister for Population, Cities and Urban 
Infrastructure 
Minister for Regional Services, Decentralisation 
and Local Government 
Assistant Minister for Road Safety and Freight 
Transport 
Assistant Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister 
Assistant Minister for Regional Development 
and Territories 
14 Parliamentary 
Departments 
Department of 
Parliamentary Services 
Department of the 
House of 
Representatives 
Department of the 
Senate 
Parliamentary Budget 
Office 
N/A 
15 Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (Department of 
the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet) 
Prime Minister 
Minister for the Public Service 
Minister for Women 
Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the 
Public Service and Cabinet 
Minister for Indigenous Australians 
Assistant Minister to the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 
16 Services Australia (Part 
of the Social Services 
Portfolio) 
Minister for Government Services 
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No Portfolios/Departments Ministerial Posts/Responsible Ministers 
17 Social Services 
(Department of Social 
Services) 
Minister for Families and Social Services 
Minister for the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme 
Minister for Government Services 
Assistant Minister for Children and Families 
Assistant Minister for Community Housing, 
Homelessness and Community Services 
18 Treasury (Department of 
the Treasury) 
Treasurer 
Minister for Population, Cities and Urban 
Infrastructure 
Assistant Treasurer 
Assistant Minister for Superannuation, Financial 
Services & Financial Technology 
Assistant Minister for Finance, Charities and 
Electoral Matters 
19 Veterans' Affairs (part 
of the Defence 
Portfolio)—Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs 
Minister for Veterans and Defence Personnel 
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Table 5-5 Australian Government Organisations—Types of Bodies593 
Principal Australian 
Government Entity 
Secondary Australian 
Government Entity 
Other Entities 
Non-Corporate 
Commonwealth Entity 
Corporate 
Commonwealth Entity 
Commonwealth 
Company 
Advisory Body – Policy 
and Stakeholder 
Consultation 
Statutory Office Holders, 
Offices and Committees 
Non-Statutory – Function 
with Separate Branding 
Ministerial Councils and 
related bodies, including 
those established by the 
Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) 
Inter-jurisdictional and 
international bodies 
Subsidiaries of Corporate 
Commonwealth Entities 
and Commonwealth 
Companies 
Joint Ventures, 
Partnerships and Other 
Companies 
National Law Bodies 
Bodies Linked to the 
Australian Government 
through Statutory 
Contracts, Agreements 
and Delegations 
 
Restructuring is a constant feature in the Australian administration. It is an attempt to 
establish priorities, names of departments and their key activities and to establish 
limitations of governance. However, there are core activities that likely enjoy fewer 
changes. For instance, the government consistently requires treasury and legal advice 
and they always have to deal with the issues of defence and foreign affairs.594 The 
departments with the responsibility of these functions are not immune from 
restructuring, but they have more sustainability and less disruptive change than other 
institutions.595 
The role of the prime minister in structural choices is important in Australia. Davis et 
al. state: 
Prime ministers move endlessly across politics, policy, and administration, shaping 
the core executive to suit their values and operating style. As a consequence it is 
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to accurately desegregate the motives which 
inspire any given machinery change. It is in the nature of the prime minister’s task 
                                                 
593 Australian Government, ‘Types of Bodies’ (n 590). 
594 Davis and et al. (n 538) 41. 
595 Ibid. 
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to think across categories rather than within the neat boxes necessary for a viable 
typology of machinery decisions.596 
Organisational structure is a point where the administrative and political systems meet. 
It provides a chance for the government to exercise political symbolism and rationality 
for both policy innovation and the administrative systems. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that political arguments for reform are so prominent. An elected prime 
minister may opt to chase policy objectives rather than deal with the inevitable delays 
and frustration in a major machinery modification.597 
In a parliamentary democracy like Australia, changing a statutorily established agency 
is less complicated than in Indonesia. The process of law-making in Australia is 
somewhat different from Indonesia, as the prime minister and ministers in Australia 
come from the ruling government and are Members of Parliament. There is no distinct 
separation of powers between those of the executive and the legislature like in the 
Indonesian presidential system. Since the ruling government also holds the majority 
of parliament, the separation of powers doctrine only applies in respect to the 
separation of judicial from legislative and executive power.598 Hence, passing 
legislation in Australia is generally easier than in Indonesia, as the executive in 
Australia is also part of its legislative power. This concept was inherited from the 
British Westminster tradition that does not separate the executive and legislative 
powers. Instead, it involves a fusion of these powers, with members of the government 
required to hold seats in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, with the 
primary responsibility to be accountable to the house that is elected by the people, the 
House of Representatives.599 
Often when departments are rearranged, the career of ministers and their bureaucrats’ 
career becomes uncertain, and therefore, prime ministers must be able to justify their 
action. However, Davis et al. argue that prime ministers worry more about the pressure 
outside the government itself, from state or provincial governments, industry, interest 
groups and community movements.600 As such, prime ministers have to respond 
                                                 
596 Ibid. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Moens, Trone and Lumb (n 585) 14.  
599 Ibid. 
600 Davis and et al. (n 538). 
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incrementally, by calibrating ministerial loads and their responsibilities, creating new 
agencies, installing key officials in new structural arrangements and negotiating new 
deals with the lower levels of government.601 Accordingly, the structural configuration 
of the government is most likely to change over time, as policies and programs have 
to adjust to their current political realism. 
Finding an organisational principle able to provide a sudden and permanent structural 
coherence can be a challenge. Hence, it is inevitable for the prime ministers to deal 
with political, policy and administrative interests manifested in the form of regular 
structural changes. The organisational arrangements conducted by a prime minister 
reflects political weight, priorities, administrative pressures and the policy goals of his 
or her time in office.602 The process of administrative arrangements in Australia is 
different from that in Indonesia. It is increasingly common in Indonesia for legislation 
to be used as a tool to build the structure of government. 
Legislation often contains the terms of establishing a new body to implement the law 
and addressing its particular issues. However, this may not be the case for Australia, 
as new legislation in Australia does not necessarily establish a body. Instead, Australia 
recognises the central role of the prime minister in administrative arrangements. The 
prime minister is responsible for issuing an ‘Administrative Arrangement Order’, 
which often includes the matters to be addressed by the departments or the legislation 
to be administered by the ministers. As the role of prime minister is central in such 
arrangements, he or she should be able to think across categories to decide the 
machinery of government. 
5.6.3 The United States of America 
March and Olson observe that reorganisation decisions in the United States 
administration had been a source of frustration for presidents.603 The US political 
system has persistently revived the idea of comprehensive administrative 
reorganisation and they are heavily influenced by short-term objectives to address the 
                                                 
601 Ibid. 
602 Ibid. 
603 March and Olson (n 282) 282. 
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problematic attention of the current government. Hence, many reorganisations have a 
short-term life as they are based on short-run political decisions.604 
Like any other modern government, the United States has experienced exceptional 
growth and changes to its administrative institutions. Many new departments or new 
agencies have been created; agencies have been merged and their responsibilities 
changed, as well as the relationship between departments and agencies, or between 
particular agencies with their customers. March and Olson posit that many of those 
changes have been produced either by legislation or executive decisions.605 Most 
changes in the government involved a significant amount of money, time and policy 
development, not only in the United States but also in other modern administrations. 
March and Olson state: 
Such more or less continual, but piecemeal, changes in administrative structures and 
procedures have been supplemented periodically by more grandiose, and more 
explicit, efforts to review and reorganise the administrative apparatus of 
government. These comprehensive reviews of administrative structure and practices 
have been undertaken by governments of all political persuasions and under a wide 
variety of political circumstances. They have often involved considerable 
investment of money, time, and political discussion. They are a characteristic 
feature of twentieth-century bureaucratic and political life.606 
The design and control of bureaucracy structure is the main concern of any 
administration and the effectiveness of policy implementation depends on the 
effectiveness of administrative organisations. Despite its frequent occurrence, 
reorganisation in the US federal government cannot be categorised as a routine 
activity, such as budgeting. Instead, March and Olson argue that reorganisation in the 
US is more like ‘governance experiments’—it frequently occurs to address similar 
issues under different conditions, but not frequently enough to be called a routine.607 
The Constitution of the United States separates powers into legislative, executive and 
judicial.608 Congress holds the legislative power—the Senate and the House of 
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Representatives—to make laws.609 The executive is responsible for carrying out and 
enforcing laws; it includes the president, vice president, the cabinet, executive 
departments, independent agencies and other boards, commissions and committees.610 
The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court and other federal courts; they are 
responsible for interpreting laws, applying laws to individual cases and deciding if 
laws violate the Constitution.611 To provide checks and balances between branches of 
power, the US Constitution stipulates that each branch of power can respond to, or 
change actions of other branches; for example, the president can veto the laws made 
by Congress and nominate the heads of executive departments.612 In contrast, Congress 
has the power to confirm or reject the president’s nominees and can remove the 
president from office under exceptional conditions.613 The Supreme Court has the 
power to reverse unconstitutional legislation made by Congress.614 
Similar to Indonesia as a presidential system country, the president in the US is the 
head of state and the leader of the government, as well as the Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces. His vice president and the cabinet members aid the president in 
managing the government. Cabinet members include the vice president, heads of 
departments and other high-ranking government officials, as the advisors to the 
president. The president nominates the Cabinet members and the senate’s simple 
majority must approve them. Federal agencies, departments and other groups conduct 
the work of the executive and these bodies include:615 
 Executive Office of the President of the United States. They are responsible for 
communicating the president’s message and dealing with the budgeting, 
security and other high priorities. 
 Executive departments. These are the main agencies in the US administration. 
Fifteen heads of these agencies are also the cabinet members. In addition, sub-
agencies are established to conduct specialised tasks in their parent 
departments. 
                                                 
609 Ibid. 
610 USA.gov, ‘Branches of the U.S. Government’ <https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government>. 
611 Ibid. 
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 Independent agencies. They are neither the members of the cabinet nor the 
president's office. Most of these agencies deal with the operation of the 
government, economy and regulatory control. 
 Boards, commissions and committees. These smaller organisations are often 
created by Congress or the president to play particular functions outside the 
area of executive departments. 
 Quasi-official agencies. These agencies are not officially part of the executive. 
However, legislation requires them to release certain information of their 
activities in the federal register—the daily journal of government activities. 
Arnold states that ‘when we speak of administration, politics stares us in the face’—it 
is almost impossible for any administration to avoid politics.616 Any administration 
should have a good relationship with politics in the sense that any administrative 
reform is intended to eliminate venality in politics and bureaucracy. The US 
president’s political efficacy depends on his ability to manage his administration, but 
in a system of governance and democracy that relies heavily on checks and balances, 
the executive is not the only significant decision-maker in government. The 
government frequently has to deal with Congress in policy-making. Arnold observes 
that Congress is turning into the enemy of good governance because of their 
uncertainty and undercuts order, which means that the administration finds it difficult 
to achieve its political and policy goals.617 This problem was also raised by the White 
House budget director during President Barack Obama’s administration—Jack Lew—
who said that, although many reorganisations aim to use taxpayers’ money efficiently, 
politics also play a significant role in reorganisation decisions.618 
Apparently, in reorganising the government, the important role of Congress and its 
interest group politics cannot be neglected—although reorganisations were conducted 
to eliminate redundancies and consolidate overlapping functions.619 In the past decade, 
reorganisation efforts were actively conducted by Obama’s administration. During the 
State Union Address in 2011, Obama noted that ‘we cannot win the future with a 
                                                 
616 Arnold (n 523). 
617 Ibid. 
618 ‘WSJ: Obama’s Call for Gov’t Reorganization to Focus on Trade’, Dow Jones Institutional News 
(online, 28 January 2011) <https://search.proquest.com/docview/2160023768?accountid=10382>. 
619 Alan P Balutis, ‘Is President Obama Thinking Outside the Box?’ (2011) 40(2) Public Manager 19. 
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government of the past’ and called ‘to merge, consolidate, and reorganise federal 
government in a way that will … meet the challenges of the twenty-first century’.620 
Balutis observes that, to increase its success rate, reorganisation necessitates new 
behaviours from both Congress and the executive.621 These behaviours include getting 
the enabling legislations right, eliminating corruption, re-engineering when necessary 
and paying attention to culture and values.622 
March and Olson posit that the rhetoric of reorganisation is dealing with the objective 
of designing administrative structures that promote the efficiency and effectiveness of 
bureaucratic hierarchies. It speaks of departments that could be abolished and expenses 
that can be reduced to make the government more efficient and effective through the 
application of simple organising principles. Similarly, March and Olson observe: 
[S]ince 1949, the reorganisation statute has specified explicitly that reorganisations 
should be presented and justified in terms of their contribution: (1) to promote the 
better execution of the laws, the more effective management of the executive branch 
and of its agencies and functions, and the expeditious administration of the public 
business; (2) to reduce expenditures and promote economy to the fullest extent 
consistent with the efficient operation of the Government; (3) to increase the 
efficiency of the operations of the Government to the fullest extent practicable; (4) 
to group, coordinate, and consolidate agencies and functions of the Government, as 
nearly as may be, according to major purposes; (5) to reduce the number of agencies 
by consolidating those having similar functions under a single head, and to abolish 
such agencies or advisory functions thereof as may not be necessary for the efficient 
conduct of the Government; and (6) to eliminate overlapping and duplication of 
effort.623 
Reorganisation, however, has to deal with the realpolitik of its time. Reorganisation 
can be an arena of political battle among contending interests. In the US, such conflicts 
can be found in many statutes and administrative decisions.624 Because administrative 
design in the US government is a major political issue, for the reorganisation to be 
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effective, it must reflect the heterogonous interests of the legislative processes.625 US 
history recorded occasional political confrontations over reorganisation. One of them 
was when more than 100 Democrat Congress members deserted the Democrat’s 
President (FD Roosevelt) to reject the 1938 Reorganisation Bill, despite an 
overwhelming majority of Democrats in Congress.626 Such conflict, however, was 
mostly avoided with political bargaining among parties involved and the president 
often avoided using his reorganising power in the face of opposition. Instead, the 
executive tends to give up its reorganisation agenda to obtain legislative supports for 
other things.627 
US presidents frequently speak of reorganising their administration. Brown noted that 
US history contains frequent occasions of passing laws as a solution for their societal 
problems.628 Government organisations were not created in a day and they cannot be 
reformed in a day, either. The US government has used statutes for reorganising its 
administration, either to make it more efficient or enlarge its bureaucracy. Brown 
argues that such action has not been productive for the improvement of the US 
bureaucratic performance.629 History shows that individual members of Congress and 
particular committees have the capability and willingness to harness forces to block 
reform and reject new ideas to improve the bureaucracy. In this regard, Brown states: 
This does not mean that Congress should be ignored, however. Quite on the 
contrary, as events have already shown. What it does suggest is that the basic 
changes that will undoubtedly be necessary in administrative forms and practices 
are first and foremost an executive concern, and initiatives should be undertaken at 
the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.630 
The powerful Congress can be a substantial bump for the administration and the US 
has seen the effect of a powerful Congress in the 2018–19 government shutdown. In 
contrast, the government is expected to execute their tasks with or without adequate 
resources; in fact, they often have to do the undoable tasks. Brown observes that when 
government organisations fail to meet expectations, it is easy for them to claim that 
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the other side of power (particularly Congress) has overloaded the system and made 
them fail.631 In this regard, Brown suggests that the executive must have a strong 
commitment to reform to tackle any stumbling blocks along the way.632 He states: 
[B]ureaucracy is not an ordinary or a simple system, simple remedies will not do. 
Bureaucratic change is a process, not an event. A President seriously committed to 
improving the performance of government can make substantial progress even with 
the roadblocks which both friend and foe are sure to place in his way.633 
Reflecting on this, it appears that the US and Indonesia share common difficulties in 
reform and reorganising their governments. The legislative branch can become a 
significant power, either to support or block reorganisation efforts. Statutes contribute 
significantly to bureaucracy enlargement in the two countries. It is no surprise that 
Indonesia and the US have the same challenges of reform, as both of them are 
following the presidential system. 
5.6.4 Lessons Learned 
In Singapore, reform is relatively easier than in Indonesia, as the ruling political party 
holds the majority of seats in parliament and the government. With almost no 
opposition in Singapore, disruption to reorganising the government and other policies 
is minimal. However, the most important lesson that can be taken from this city-state 
in conducting reform is probably not the overwhelming power of the executive. 
Singapore has succeeded in consistently preserving the integrity of its bureaucrats, 
which makes them among the cleanest government in the world. Singapore’s public 
sector is widely regarded as honest and efficient. Therefore, the most important lesson 
from Singapore for Indonesia is that reform requires a government and its bureaucracy 
that is free from any form of corruption. 
While, from Singapore, Indonesia can learn the importance of a clean bureaucracy and 
the ability to maintain its integrity, from Australia, Indonesia can learn the importance 
of strong leadership for building the government. Australia recognises the central role 
of the prime minister in administrative arrangements. In Indonesia, laws often contain 
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the terms of establishing a new body to implement the law. Conversely, in Australia, 
a new law does not necessarily establish a body. Instead, the prime minister is 
responsible for issuing an ‘Administrative Arrangement Order’, which often includes 
the matters to be addressed by the departments. It also describes legislation to be 
administered by the ministers. As the role of prime minister is central, he must have 
the capacity to think across categories to build the government’s machinery. 
Reflecting on the US experiences in managing the government, it appears that the US 
and Indonesia share common difficulties in reorganising their governments. The 
legislative branch can become a significant power either to support or block reform 
efforts. Statutes significantly contribute to bureaucracy enlargement in the two 
countries. It is no surprise that Indonesia and the US have the same challenges of 
reform, as both of them are following the presidential system. Therefore, learning from 
the US, Indonesia should build legislation that enables reform, eliminating corruption 
and paying attention to culture and values within its bureaucracy, so it would be able 
to change any culture and value that does not support reform. However, simply 
borrowing the models of other countries to improve the administration system may not 
necessarily produce the desired outcomes, as reforms must be sensitive to the local 
context. 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
Most participants of this study asserted that the size of the government organisation in 
Indonesia is too large and far from ideal. Some ministries tend to enlarge their 
directorate generals to expand their power and enable them to utilise a larger budget. 
Some statutes form a legal base for the creation of new agencies. As legislation is a 
product of a political process, the shape of bureaucracy is heavily influenced by 
politics. 
However, an efficient and effective organisation cannot be determined by quantity. 
Even the Indonesian government does not have a formula on how many agencies it 
should have to run the administration. In spite of this, ‘downsizing the government’ 
has been used as reform rhetoric in many countries, including in Indonesia. Some 
answers from the interviews show that the ideal structure is characterised by minimum 
duplications, less sectoral egos and less fragmented business processes. To align with 
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these ideas, reorganisation should aim to make the government run better and easily 
adapt to changes and new challenges. 
The Indonesian corruption perception index, the EODB’s score and its 
competitiveness ranking show that Indonesia still needs to improve its bureaucracy. 
Despite the fact that every county has its own distinctive features of reform, it is still 
relevant for Indonesia to learn from the experiences of other countries that have 
reorganised the engines of their governments. Combining lessons from Singapore, 
Australia and the United States examined in this chapter, successful reform relies on a 
corruption-free bureaucracy, leadership capacity and support from political framework 
and legislation. The next chapter of this thesis discusses the political and statutory 
challenges of reorganisation in Indonesia. 
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Chapter 6: Political and Statutory Challenges of 
Reorganisation in Indonesia 
6.1 Introduction  
Politics and legislation are two essential factors that shape the bureaucracy. Legislation 
may either support or constrain reorganisation. Statutes itself often reflect the vested 
interest of relevant political forces that can be contradicted with the need to establish 
efficient governance.634 If the government does not have sufficient bargaining power 
to negotiate with surrounding interests in law-making, it may not be able to stop the 
DPR from including terms to establish new agencies within statutes.635 
Reorganisation is constrained by the laws that preserve some ministries and agencies. 
Executive bodies often rely on legislation to strengthen their power and preserve their 
existence, by mentioning themselves in their sectoral law.636 Without first amending 
the law, it is difficult for an institution to be dismantled or to merge with other 
institutions. Because of these constraints, the president, as the apex of administration, 
does not have full discretion to manage the administration. 
This chapter discusses the political and statutory challenges of reorganisation in 
Indonesia. The central problems of this thesis are discussed in this chapter. The 
following section examines the political will on bureaucratic reform. Also discussed 
in this section is the support of public leaders for reform and the support from both the 
legislative and the executive. The third section of this chapter discusses the political 
and legal aspects that shape the governance structure of reform; these include the 
political motives for reform and legal aspects that shape governance. The fourth 
section examines the current legal framework for reform in Indonesia. The fifth section 
examines disharmony between the laws and their implications for policies. This 
chapter is concluded with a section that summarises its findings. 
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6.2 The Political Will on Bureaucracy Reform 
The 1945 Constitution bestows the President with the power to govern the 
administration, appoint ministers and both create and dismantle ministries and 
agencies. However, many ministries and agencies are mentioned in their sectoral 
legislation and statutorily established. Conducting reorganisation for a ministry or 
agency can be complicated—it may require an amendment of their statutory 
organisational terms. Reorganisation is not simply a change in administrative 
measures, but a political process that involves political consensus between the 
legislative and executive powers. The examination of literature in Chapter 2 indicates 
that reorganisation will only succeed if all stakeholders support it politically. This 
section discusses the political will to reform. Specifically, it will consider public 
leaders’ support of reorganisation and the support of both the executive and legislative 
powers. 
6.2.1 The Public Leader’s Support 
On 14 July 2019, the re-elected President Widodo delivered his speech on ‘Visions of 
Indonesia’ to celebrate the confirmation of his second presidential term (2019–2024). 
In his speech, he said that comprehensive bureaucratic reform is one of the main 
focuses of his government. It shows that the government is committed and has a ‘will’ 
to reform. The president also promises improvement and cultural change to his 
bureaucracy. He said (translated to English): 
We must leave behind our old ways, manners, and customs in managing 
organisations of the government, either managing institutions or running the 
government. That which is not effective, we will make it more effective. That which 
is no efficient, we will make it more efficient.637 
Obtaining a commitment to reform from top leadership is a promising start to reform. 
Similarly, in an interview, Supriyono stated: 
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Political will should start from the leaders; either at [a] policy, managerial, or 
operational level.638 
Supriyono postulated that reform should start with leadership. He also said that leaders 
in developing countries, such as Indonesia, have more central positions, compared with 
those in developed countries: 
Q: Professor, in what manner do you think reorganisation should be conducted? 
A: In public administration, we need to understand what administration is—how we 
see the administration from both the organisational and managerial perspectives. 
Leadership with sufficient managerial skills is important for any decision-making 
in the administration. This is why, in my opinion, ideally, reform should start from 
the leadership, and the right leader in the bureaucracy will produce the right 
subordinates. 
Q: You mean reorganisation is secondary to leadership? 
A: Yes, but it may be different for developed countries, as their governance is more 
advanced, any change of leadership will not have a significant impact [on the 
bureaucracy]. In a developing country like us, the leadership role is critical.639 
It will be easier to obtain reform commitment from all elements and layers of the 
bureaucracy if the top executive leaders have demonstrated sufficient political will to 
reform.640 The minister claims that the Indonesian government is fully committed to 
refurbishing its bureaucracy.641 Even President Widodo himself consistently monitors 
the progress of reform and asks ministries to submit their reform progress every 
month.642 The president also issued a directive to his government, to prevent the use 
of legislation terms for creating new agencies (see Chapter 4). However, these actions 
may not be enough to demonstrate a sufficient political will for bureaucracy reform. 
Commitment from leadership is an essential requirement for successful reform and the 
extent of the commitment seen up until now has been questioned. For example, 
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Murniasih saw the support from the leaders of every branch of power as plain ‘lip 
service’: 
[F]rom leadership, they said they support bureaucracy reform. However, mostly, it 
was just lip service or only on paper, without real implementation.643 
This ‘lip service’ is demonstrated by the fact that the administration has maintained 
the creation of unideal administrative postures. Some organisations are still given a 
large structure for only small roles and functions. Supriyono stated: 
[T]he institutions of the public sector in Indonesia tend to build a large structure that 
has a small function. This is not ideal. Well, to some extent, it may be OK to have 
a big structure with a small function if it is what we need. As an example, in 
secretariat units or organisations, they can have a large structure despite [the fact 
that] their function may not significant for the core activities of a ministry. However, 
there are ministries that should have more operating cores are not given sufficient 
operational units. This shows that sometimes the creation of an organisation is not 
based on the comprehensive assessment of workload and function. The analysis to 
decide whether we need a new organisation or not should be based on an assessment 
of the role, function and position. What I see in our country, we tend to establish a 
big structure with small functions. I can fully understand the reason behind this; in 
Indonesia, reducing structures is unpopular.644 
Similarly, the minister implied that public leaders often create an organisation without 
a proper assessment of the workload and national priorities to justify it: 
[W]e often create an organisation without prioritising the work that needs to be 
done. There is no sufficient planning on workload. Hence, many organisations have 
no work to do. The workload should come first; this needs to be derived from our 
national priorities in our president’s visions and missions.645 
Arianti criticised the lack of support from both the government and parliament and 
said that their political will to reform was only jargon.646 For instance, Commission 2, 
of the DPR, has called for a re-evaluation of the existence of all executive bodies, to 
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determine which agencies need to be disbanded, merged with other institutions or 
preserved. However, Arianti asserted that most legislation initiated by the DPR 
contains terms to create new agencies.647 Similarly, on the government’s side, the 
President issued a directive to his Cabinet to not enlarge ministerial structures, but not 
all of his ministries comply with this.648 Muqowam also expressed his concern about 
the political will to reform: 
Q: What about the political will from both the executive and legislative power to 
conduct reform? 
A: I do not see sufficient commitment from them. Reform was merely procedural—
to fulfil what the President wants and to maintain the popularity of the elites. We 
still not see the reform [used] as a tool to improve public service. This is why we 
are not considered a developed country. Our public sector is doing their job only at 
the level of ‘business as usual’. I still [do] not see any strategic innovation to reform 
our bureaucracy.649 
All public leaders, in both the executive and legislative, should have the same reform 
awareness. The government should be able to communicate its reform agenda 
effectively with the DPR and argue that the creation of a new agency by legislation is 
a disadvantage for the flexibility of governance. Prasodjo argued that, over the years, 
bureaucracy reform has gained insufficient political will and that it was just political 
rhetoric.650 He said that the absence of a reform roadmap that has the purpose of 
streamlining the administration shows the low commitment to reform; the result is that 
reform is not integrated, but rather, it is fragmented.651 
In a newspaper article, Prasodjo claims that the structure of the Indonesian bureaucracy 
is ‘too hierarchical’ and has made the processes required for decision-making and 
administrative actions too slow and complicated.652 Processes are tightened with 
structural constraints and formal rules. These problems affect the competitiveness of 
the country. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the government is still struggling 
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to improve the Indonesian competitiveness index. Instead of improving, Indonesia 
dropped five positions in 2019, from 45th out of 140 countries in 2018 to 50th in 
2019.653 To improve its competitiveness, Indonesia needs to have a dynamic 
bureaucracy that is highly flexible—in the sense that it easily adapts to societal 
changes—and highly capable. This highly flexible bureaucracy would be characterised 
by a simplified business process, a slim organisational structure and a performance-
oriented approach. This would mean not only doing the job as usual. 
The current, oversized structure requires a large budget. Indonesia needs to slim its 
administration to reduce the unnecessary budget that is used to manage large 
organisations, provide facilities to top administrators and run programs and activities 
that are irrelevant to the needs of the nation.654 Even the minister implied that some 
executive bodies were not needed by the government and that they needed to be 
dismantled: 
I cannot deny that we have several ministries and agencies that we do not need. But 
again, the politics are playing in here. I do not have to specifically mention [the 
names of ministries and agencies that need to abolished].655 
Organisations are the engine of the government and streamlining the bureaucracy is 
critical to establishing efficiency, which will eventually lead to the improved 
effectiveness of the government.656 Establishing efficiency would require political will 
and support from both the executive and legislative branches of power. The next part 
of this section discusses reform support from both the executive and legislative. 
6.2.2 Support from Both Executive and Legislative Powers 
Indonesia, with its presidential system, makes a distinct separation between the powers 
of the executive and the legislature. The DPR, as the Parliament, holds the legislative 
power and has greater power than the government in creating legislation. The 
government is not a Member of Parliament. Therefore, although the President’s 
affiliated party and its coalition hold the majority of seats in the DPR, the President 
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may not receive major support from the DPR. In contrast, the parliamentary 
democracy, or parliamentary systems of government, such as those of the United 
Kingdom and Australia, follow a different path. In these Westminster system 
countries, the prime minister and the ministers are both the ruling government and the 
majority of parliament. Hence, the government’s power for law-making in 
Westminster countries is greater. 
To obtain support from the majority of the DPR, the government should take into 
account how the DPR operates internally, or how the legislators behave within the 
organs. Individual committees in the DPR make the most decisions on legislation and 
investigate policy issues and each of the committees has its own internal balance of 
power among the party caucuses (fraksi). However, the coalition’s party leader may 
be incapable of supporting the government consistently because of his weak and 
incoherent authority over the fraksi members in DPR. 
It is not surprising, then, that parties of the government’s coalition and the party of the 
President itself are the prominent opposition to the government over legislation. The 
most glaring examples include in 2014, when the majority of the DPR was against the 
government regarding a bill that eliminated the direct election of provincial and local 
government heads,657 and in 2017, when the DPR differed with the government over 
the MD3 bill to revise the structure and role of the MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD 
(MD3).658 The government’s weak bargaining power against the DPR means that it is 
powerless to filter the DPR’s proposals, in their bills, to establish new agencies.659 
What might appear as the absence of political will to reform the administration might 
just as well be the absence of bargaining power. 
Reflecting on the fact that many laws passed by the DPR contain the establishment of 
a new agency, Widyantini postulated that the DPR did not support the efforts to slim 
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the government and establish efficiency.660 Although Commission 2 of the DPR fully 
supports bureaucracy reform, other commissions in the parliament do not. Widyantini 
stated: 
[T]he hearing processes in the parliament is divided into sectors and each 
commission handles different sectors. Unfortunately, [there is] no linkage of 
activities between commissions. When the commission 2 is already of the same 
view as the government to prevent creating a new agency under a new law, other 
commissions are still doing it. In my view, there is a major political issue here that 
requires the government and the legislature to sit together to solve the problem.661 
Without gaining support from all elements of parliament, it is difficult for the 
government as the executive to reorganise. Reform needs the same level of support 
from these two branches of power. 
In contrast, Kharis suggested that stronger support to reform should come from the 
government itself, since the government has control over the administration.662 He 
insisted that if the DPR wants to include the terms for the creation of a new institution 
in a statute, it is because the DPR thinks there is a specific issue that needs to be 
addressed by a specific new agency.663 In reality, the government may already have 
the institution to handle the issue and a new agency is often unnecessary. The 
imbalance of power between the legislature and the executive prevents the government 
from imposing a filter on establishing new agencies, as proposed by the DPR in their 
bills. However, Khatarina said that the DPR may agree to not propose a new agency 
when the government is firm and has a strong argument—mainly if the government 
can provide evidence that the budget cannot afford more agencies.664 
The bureaucracy can also contribute to making reform difficult. Top bureaucrats 
sometimes carry hidden agendas to enlarge their institutions. Khatarina and Prasodjo 
suspected that many bureaucrats became ‘players’ in the making of new agencies and 
involved in structural enlargement for their personal or group benefits.665 The 
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establishment of the Civil Service Commission under the Act 5/2014 on Civil Service 
is an example of how top bureaucrats engaged in bloating the bureaucracy by using 
new legislation. Khatarina expressed that, during the discussion on the bill of this law, 
representatives of the government directed the DPR to propose the establishment of 
the Civil Service Commission under this law.666 In fact, there was a group of people 
among the top bureaucrats who wanted the Civil Service Commission to be established 
so that they could have new positions and power in that agency. However, those 
bureaucrats did not want to be seen as the initiators for the establishment of that new 
agency, so they used the hands of the DPR. 
The current structure of the Indonesian bureaucracy is still built on the justification of 
role and function and bureaucrats frequently manipulate these justifications to create 
new agencies. Reform necessitates bureaucrats who have a sincere commitment to 
carrying it out. This commitment should start from leadership, because the success of 
reform is arguably subject to the commitment from the apex of administration and the 
bureaucracy, such as the president, ministers and top-echelon bureaucrats.667 
Equalising reform between the DPR and the government is also a significant factor for 
successful reform. Law that constrains reform should be changed under consensus 
between the DPR and the government. As stated before, the government has weak 
powers of negotiation, compared with the persuasive power and influence of the 
political parties in the DPR.668 The majority of respondents interviewed believed that 
the government’s position was inferior to the DPR’s in legislation-making, and that 
this began with the four constitutional amendments in 1999–2002. The amendments 
infused the DPR with new, democratic legitimacy, gave it new power and changed its 
relationship with the executive power. 
After the amendments, the DPR played an assertive role in appointments to key state 
institutions, criticised government initiatives and often differed with the government 
over legislation. Some analysts perceive a much darker political script in the rocky 
government–DPR relationship, concluding that the government’s program was often 
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systematically stymied by an ‘obstructionist parliament.’669 The most common 
explanations for that alleged obstructionism were that DPR members were corrupt, 
lazy and unproductive, represented their parties rather than the people and were tools 
of vested interest, opposed to reform.670 Another common claim is the parliament was 
exceeding its constitutional power by interfering with executive decision-making.671 
However, Kharis argued that the position of the executive and the legislative for law-
making was equal. Every bill, either from the DPR or the government, is discussed 
between the DPR and the government, who must reach a joint agreement to make it 
law. Kharis stated that, in the case of a law that contained instructions for the 
establishment of a new agency, both the DPR and the government would have had to 
come to a consensus to establish that particular new agency, through their enactment 
of that particular law.672 Therefore, Kharis claimed, the DPR should not be the only 
one to blame for the bloating of the bureaucracy.673 
If there is a statute instructing the creation of a new agency, the new agency will not 
be established unless the government has issued the implementing regulation of that 
law.674 Since the execution of legislative products is in the hands of executive power, 
the government first decides on the creation of a new agency through its instruments 
of regulations. Therefore, the government has full discretion to establish or to reject 
the creation of a new agency.675 
Kharis further articulated that, despite the fact that many laws contained instructions 
for the creation of new agencies, the government had not issued implementing 
regulation for those laws and their establishment was still on hold.676 For instance, the 
Law of MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD (the MD3 Law) carried instructions for the 
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establishment of the Expertise Council—an executive body to provide expertise and 
advice for the members of the DPR. However, to date, that council has not been 
established, since the President has not issued the Presidential Regulation for the 
organisation and the establishment of the council. Without the implementing 
regulation issued by the government, any agency stipulated by the law will not be 
created. However, it is unethical for the government to stall the creation of an agency 
if the law has instructed it to do so.677 If the new agency is considered unnecessary, 
the government should have pointed that out during the discussion of the bill with the 
DPR, before the bill became law. 
Public leaders should know how to consult with all stakeholders and bring together 
diverse visions, as well as collaborate to identify priorities, determine objectives, 
develop strategies and measure results. A clear vision for reform will guide the reform 
process and help the stakeholders—the bureaucracy, in particular—to have a better 
understanding of their role in ongoing reform. As the OECD argued, not all change in 
the process of reform is comfortable, but it can be made acceptable if the goals of 
reform are clear and widely accepted by the stakeholders.678 
While reform commitment from the two branches of power is essential, reform 
commitment should first come from the executive, as they know better the needs of 
the government.679 This is also the reason why bureaucracy reform needs bureaucrats 
that support reform and it also needs to be supported politically and legally. The next 
section of this thesis discusses the political and legal aspects that shape the governance 
structure within the Indonesian bureaucracy. 
6.3 Political and Legal Aspects that Shape Governance Structure 
6.3.1 Political Motives for Reform 
Reorganisation is the essence of bureaucratic reform. Widyantini stated that it could 
also drive reform in other areas of governance, such as human resource management 
and budgeting: 
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The institution is the locomotive of change. If we have good policies on how to 
manage institutions, improvement to other areas—such as human resources and 
budgeting—will follow.680 
However, politics determines the direction of reform. Political parties use their 
parliamentary representation to build their oligarchy—reform has the background of 
rent-seeking behaviours. Political bargaining and its ‘transactions’ often encapsulate 
the establishment of new agencies under new laws. Sometimes agencies are formed to 
provide positions for bureaucrats, in return for their helping parties win seats in 
parliament.681 
Despite its presidential system, the parliament has a strong influence in shaping 
government organisations. It is almost impossible for politics not to interfere with the 
administration; most decisions in the executive are controlled or dominated by the 
influence of legislative power. In the early months of Widodo’s presidency, in 2014, 
it was difficult for the government to make a move, since it lacked significant support 
from the majority of the political parties in the DPR. The President had to bargain with 
the political processes, regardless of his disposition. 
The DPR’s interference in administration, in the form of enacting legislation that 
entails the creation of new agencies, significantly contributes to inflating the 
bureaucracy. The constitution gave the power to run the government to the president. 
Therefore, the power to create a new agency should be subject to the president’s 
discretion. This is why the DPR’s use of legislation to create new agencies under the 
law is seen as a form of intrusion into executive decision-making. 
Many pieces of legislation have made the organisation of particular ministries very 
large and some legislation even provides for the establishment of small divisions of 
Unit Pelayanan Teknis (UPTs) within a ministry to perform particular tasks, as 
mentioned in the statute.682 The government must increase the DPR’s awareness of the 
capacity of the existing institution to address the issues and disapprove of the 
wastefulness of forming new agencies. Yet, Yuwantari argued that new agencies 
                                                 
680 Interview with Rini Widyantini (n 347). 
681 Interview with Riris Khatarina (n 458). 
682 Interview with Vera Yuwantari (n 346). 
 172 
would still unnecessarily emerge, because the government conforms to the DPR’s 
initiatives to create them: 
[I]n every hearing with the Parliament, I am sorry to say that often we accept what 
they want, then a new agency will be established despite the fact that we do not need 
it.683 
Similarly, the minister’s statement below gives a glimpse into why the government 
does not have strong bargaining power in addressing the DPR: 
The government is relatively weak in making negotiations [with the DPR], maybe 
because some ministers or even the President himself is from a political party, they 
are indebted to their political party for their position. Let say if the President is from 
PDIP [currently the largest political party in Indonesia] and Senayan [the 
parliament] is also dominated by PDIP, it will be easy for the PDIP elites to tell the 
government: “You became a president because of us”. Everything we do will be 
dictated [by the parliament].684 
Ideally, politics and administration should be two different and separate aspects. 
However, there is a considerable grey area in running the government. Supriyono 
argued that politics sometimes comes with costly consequences and the government 
has to be smart to juggle them.685 Any political interference in the administration 
should be well-managed. If necessary, the government needs to negotiate with political 
processes in conducting reorganisation, although the ideal condition is that politics 
should not address the managerial aspect of administration.686 
Abnur postulated that politics influences every stage of policy-making. For instance, 
the current government is giving significant attention to infrastructure, but there are 
politicians in parliament actively asking the government to develop programs for their 
electoral regions.687 Those programs are intended as a means for the politicians in the 
parliament to fulfil promises to their voters. Since there are so many political interests 
to be accommodated, the government’s focus on developing infrastructure can be 
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disrupted. These kind of interests also constrain reorganisation and other reform 
agendas. 
Fukuoka stated that political motivations were often behind the creation of new 
agencies in Indonesia and that the growth of these new agencies seems unstoppable.688 
Often, bills from parliament contain terms to establish new agencies, despite the fact 
that existing government organisations perform the same roles and responsibilities.689 
This situation reveals that the commissions within the DPR are not in unison in support 
of reform, despite the limited national budget for managing the administration.690 
However, a member of parliament rejected the notion that the establishment of a new 
agency under a particular law is a form of intervention by the DPR.691 Kharis argued 
that it could take months for the DPR to discuss a bill with the government and reach 
a joint agreement.692 The government is already aware of the spirit and the content of 
that bill. Thus, the establishment of a new agency under a new law should be seen as 
a mutual desire between the legislative and the executive, although the initial idea to 
create the new agency came from the DPR.693 He further expressed that discussion of 
the provisions that create new agencies under particular bills rarely become an intense 
debate between the DPR and the government.694 Often, he said, these provisions were 
concluded between the DPR and the government without the need for voting—a joint 
agreement was promptly reached.695 
Yet, the final decision as to whether a new agency should be created (when the law 
instructs) is to be decided by the law’s implementing regulation that is made and issued 
by the government. Kharis said that when the DPR insists that a particular agency 
should address a particular issue, it is not necessarily a new agency.696 However, if it 
is decided that a new agency will be established, he asserts, the DPR may not intend 
to create a large organisation that will potentially lead to inefficiency.697 Therefore, 
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although politics is an essential factor in shaping the bureaucracy, the intention to 
reform should start from within the government itself. This action should be started 
from the government rather than the legislative as it has a thorough comprehension of 
its structures. The government itself should be able to assess and calculate the size of 
the agencies needed to complete a particular task efficiently. 
In her experience assisting the DPR to conduct lobbies with the government, Khatarina 
observed that, since the reformation era, almost all bills initiated by the DPR contained 
the idea to create a new agency, for two main reasons. First, unawareness—the 
members of the DPR could be unaware of the overlapping consequences of creating a 
new agency when a current ministry or an agency handles the same issue.698 Second, 
the political factors—the creation of new agencies is misused by parties for political 
bargaining and to provide top positions for people who helped the party gain the vote 
during the election.699 
These practices will continue unless the government firmly rejects the DPR’s 
suggestions to create new agencies when there is no urgency to form them. To do this, 
the boundaries between politics and bureaucracy need to be clear. However, Abnur 
argued that the DPR often rejects the idea of separating the bureaucracy from politics 
and have, in fact, increased their influence in administrative structures, further blurring 
the boundaries between politics and the bureaucracy.700 
Reform decisions should not rely on the motive of accommodating rent-seeking, which 
will make the government less effective and less efficient. Similarly, Supriyono 
claimed that reform has two sides—good and bad.701 It can be directed to improve 
effectivity and efficiency, or be used to accommodate rent-seeking and political 
bargaining. How legislation is made and applied reflects the real motive of both the 
executive and legislative to reform. The next section further discusses the legal aspects 
that shape governance. 
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6.3.2 Legal Aspects that Shape Governance 
Many agencies in Indonesia are established by legislation and the government cannot 
dissolve these agencies if it would breach the terms of the enabling legislation. If such 
agencies were dissolved, questions would arise as to how the law would be 
implemented in the institution’s absence. As previously stated, sometimes 
reorganisation would require a law amendment. For example, the Act 5/2014 on Civil 
Service provides particular power for the National Civil Service Agency (Badan 
Kepegawaian Negara [BKN]). Article 1 para 21 of the Act 5/2014 mentions that 
(translated to English) ‘The National Civil Service Agency, hereinafter referred to as 
BKN is a non-ministerial government agency given the power to nationally develop 
and manage civil servants as set out by this Act’.702 
Generally, the Act 5/2014 set norms and rules for managing the Indonesian civil 
service. Article 25 (2) of this statute provides that the BKN receives the delegation of 
power from the President to conduct civil service management and to oversee and 
control the implementation of relevant norms, standards and procedures.703 The role, 
functions and structure of the BKN are extensively set out and detailed in other articles 
of this statute. For example, Article 26 sets out the role of the BKN in policy-making, 
while Articles 47, 49, 70, 73 and 127 detail the functions, jobs and power of the BKN 
in managing civil service in Indonesia.704 
If the government abolishes the BKN without approval from the DPR (by amending 
the Act 5.2014), questions will arise as to how the Civil Service Act will be enforced 
in the institution’s absence. Such a decision would also contravene the terms of 
legislation. Hence, the decision to abolish the BKN would require the Civil Service Act 
to be either amended or revoked. The process of a law amendment and revocation is 
equal to passing a new law and as such, it requires another political consensus between 
the government and the DPR and its process is generally lengthy and complicated. 
Another example is the Investment Act (Act 25/2007), which sets norms and rules for 
investments in Indonesia. Article 28 (1) of this statute gives the Investment 
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Coordinating Board/Agency (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal [BKPM]) the 
power to manage the investment sector in Indonesia. It states that (translated to 
English): 
In order to coordinate the implementation of the policy and investment services, the 
Investment Coordinating Board/Agency has the duties and functions as follows: 
a. carry out tasks and coordinate the implementation of policies in the field of 
investment; 
b. review and propose policies of investments; 
c. set out norms, standards and procedures for investments;  
d. develop opportunities and potential investments in regions by empowering 
business entities; 
e. establish Indonesian investments map; 
f. promote investments; 
g. increase investment businesses through assistance, such as by encouraging 
partnership, improving competitiveness, creating a fair competition, and 
disseminating information of investments; 
h. resolve blockade of investments and provide consultations for investors 
with regards to the issues of investment; 
i. coordinate domestic investors to invest abroad outside the territory of 
Indonesia; and 
j. coordinate and conduct integrated one door investment services.705 
The Investment Act sets out the role of the BKPM to manage and provide licensing of 
investment in Indonesia. Other provisions related to the role and power of the BKPM 
are to oversee and manage investments stipulated in Articles 15, 23 (2), 23 (4), 27 and 
29 of the Investment Act. Similar to the BKN, the government cannot dissolve the 
BKPM without changing the Investment Act with the DPR. Dissolution of the BKPM 
without amending the Investment Act would contravene the terms of that statute. This 
dissolution requires approval from the parliament in the form of law changes or 
revocation. 
This condition may apply to hundreds of ministries/agencies that are established or 
mentioned in statutes. This section will not go into detail of each article and piece of 
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legislation, nor the role and function of each ministry and agency in each piece of 
legislation. The majority of the 34 ministries are mentioned in their sectoral statutes. 
Additionally, 15 out of 29 non-ministerial agencies (LPNK) are statutorily established 
and 76 out of 103 independent agencies (LNS) are statutorily established. The list 
below provides an overview of each ministry and agency and the laws related to their 
organisation and establishment: 
Table 6-1 Ministries and Agencies Mentioned in Sectoral Statutes 
No.  Name of Institution Relevant Statutes 
Ministries 
1  Ministry of Defence Civil Reserve Act 56/1999, Defence 
Act 3/2002, and Defence Industry Act 
16/2012 
2  Ministry of Foreign Affairs  International Relations Act 37/1999 
and International Agreements Act 
24/2000 
3  Ministry of Home Affairs Local Governments Act 23/2014, 
Regional Elections Act 8/2015 
4  Ministry of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform 
Public Service Act 25/2009, Civil 
Service Act 5/2014, Administrative 
Procedures Act 30/2014 
5  Ministry of Health Public Health Act 36/2009 and 
Hospital Act 44/2009 
6  Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources 
Oil and Gas Act 22/2001, Electricity 
Act 30/2009, Geothermal Act 
27/2003, Energy Act 30/2007, and 
Minerals and Coal Act 4/2009 
7  Ministry of Science, Research, 
and Higher Education 
National System on the Research, 
Development, and Implementation of 
Science and Technology Act 18/2002, 
Industry Design Act 31/2000, Higher 
Education Act 12/2012 
8  Ministry of Women 
Empowerment and Child 
Protection 
Child Protection Act 23/2012 and 
35/2014, Domestic Violence Abolition 
Act 23/2004 
9  Ministry of Cooperation and 
Small to Medium Enterprises 
Small and Medium Enterprise Act 
20/2008 and Micro Financial 
Institutions Act 01/2013 
10  Ministry of Laws and Human 
Rights 
Immigration Act 6/2011, Law Making 
Procedures Act 12/2011, Patent Act 
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No.  Name of Institution Relevant Statutes 
14/2001, Copyright Act 28/2014, and 
other laws 
11  Ministry of Forestry and 
Environment 
Environmental Protection and 
Management Act 32/2009, Forestry 
Act 41/1999 
12  Ministry of Workforce Labour Act 13/2003, Industrial 
Relation Resolution Act 2/2004, and 
Unions Act 21/2000 
13  Ministry of Youth and Sports National Sports System Act 3/2005, 
Youth Act 40/2009, Scouts Act 
12/2010 
14  Ministry of Trade Trade Act 7/2014 
15  Ministry of Transport Aviation Act 1/2009, Shipping Act 
17/2008, Road Traffic and Transport 
Act 22/2009, and Railways Act 
13/1992 
16  Ministry of Industry Industry Act 3/2014 
17  Ministry of Public Works and 
Housing 
Road Traffic and Transport Act 
22/2009, Housing and Residential Act 
1/2011, Irrigation Act 11/1974, and 
Public Roads Act 38/2004 
18  Ministry of Social Welfare Poverty Management Act 13/2012, 
Social Conflict Resolution Act 
7/2012, and Social Welfare Act 
11/2009 
19  Ministry of Agriculture Food Stock Management Act 
18/2012, Agriculture Land Protection 
Act 41/2009, Horticulture Act 
13/2010, Plant’s Varieties Protection 
Act 29/2000, Farming and Livestock 
Health Act 18/2009, Quarantine Act 
16/1992 
20  Ministry of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries 
Coastal Areas and Small Islands 
Management Act 27/2007, 
Quarantine Act 16/1992, and 
Shipping Act 17/2008 
Non-ministerial Agencies 
1  Civil Service Agency Civil Servants Act 5/2014 
2  National Population and 
Family Planning Board 
Population and Family Development 
Act 52/2009 
3  Investment Coordinating 
Board 
Investment Act 25/2007 
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4  Geospatial Information 
Agency 
Geospatial Information Act 4/2011 
5  National Narcotic Agency Narcotic Act 35/2009 
6  National Disaster Management 
Agency 
Disaster Management Act 24/2007 
7  Nuclear Energy Regulatory 
Agency  
Nuclear Energy Act 10/1997 
8  Nuclear Energy Agency Nuclear Energy Act 10/1997 
9  Agency for the Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers 
Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workers Act 39/2004 
10  National Disaster Management 
Agency 
Disaster Management Act 24/2007) 
11  National Development 
Planning Agency 
National Development Planning 
System Act 25/2004 
12  Statistics Agency Statistics Act 16/1997 
13  National Standardisation 
Agency 
Standardisation Act 20/2014 
14  National Archive Agency Archive Act 43/2009 
15  National Institute of Public 
Administration 
Civil Servants Act 5/2014 
16  National Library Library Act 43/2007 
Non-structural Agencies 
1  Komisi Kepolisian Nasional—
National Police Commission 
Act 2/2002 on the National Police of 
the Republic of Indonesia 
2  Komisi Pengawas Persaingan 
Usaha (KPPU)—The 
Commission for the 
Supervision of Business 
Competition 
Act 5/1999 on the Prohibition of 
Monopoly Practices and Unhealthy 
Business Competitions 
3  Komisi Perlindungan Anak 
Indonesia—The Indonesian 
Child Protection Commission 
Act 23/2002 on Child’s Protection, 
and its Amendments (Act 35/2014) 
4  Komisi Kejaksaan—Attorney 
Commission 
Act 16/2014 on the General Attorney 
5  Komisi Nasional Lanjut Usia – 
National Commission for 
Elderly People 
Act 13/1998 on the Wellbeing of 
Elderly People 
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6  Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia—
Indonesian Broadcast 
Commission 
Act32/2002 on Broadcasting 
7  Komisi Banding Merek—
Trademark Appeal 
Commission 
Act 19/2002 on Trademark 
8  Komisi Banding Paten—
Patent Appeal Commission 
Act 13/2016 on Patent 
9  Komisi Informasi—Public 
Information Commission  
Act 14/2008 on the Public 
Information Disclosure 
10  Komisi Pengawas Haji 
Indonesia—The Indonesian 
Commission for Oversight of 
the Hajj 
Act 13/2008 on Hajj 
11  Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi 
Manusia (Komnas HAM)—
National Commission for 
Human Rights 
Act 39 on Human Rights and Act 
40/2008 on the Eradication of Racial 
and Ethnics Discrimination 
12  Komisi Pemilihan Umum—
General Election Commission  
Act 7/2017 on General Elections (and 
its Subsequent Laws) 
13  Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi—Corruption 
Eradication Commission 
Act 30/2002 on the Corruption 
Eradication Commission 
14  Komite Nasional Keselamatan 
Transportasi—National 
Committee for Transport 
Safety 
Act 23/2007 on Railways, Act 
17/2008 on Shipping, Act 1/2009 on 
Aviation, and Act 22/2009 on the 
Road Traffic and Transport 
15  Komite Nasional Keamanan 
Penerbangan—National 
Committee for Aviation Safety 
Act 1/2009 on Aviation 
16  Lembaga Produktivitas 
Nasional—National 
Productivity Agency  
Act 13/2003 on Workforce 
17  Lembaga Sensor Film—
Censor Agency 
Act 33/2009 on Motion Picture 
18  Lembaga Kerja Sama 
Tripartit—Tripartite 
Cooperation Agency 
Act 13/2003 on Manpower 
19  Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi 
dan Korban (LPSK)—
Criminal Witnesses and 
Victim Protection Agency 
Act 13/2006 on Criminal Witnesses 
and Victim Protection 
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20  Dewan Riset Nasional—
National Research Council 
Act 18/2002 on the National System 
of Research, Development, and 
Application of Science and 
Technology 
21  Dewan Pertimbangan 
Otonomi Daerah—
Subsidiarity Council 
Act 23/2014 on Regional Autonomy 
22  Dewan Pengupahan 
Nasional—National Wage 
Council  
Act 21/200 on the Unions and the Act 
13/2003 on Workforce) 
23  Dewan Energi Nasional—
National Energy Council 
Act 30/2007 on Energy 
24  Dewan Pers—Press Council Act 40/1999 on Press 
25  Dewan Pertimbangan 
Presiden—President’s 
Advisory Council 
Act 19/2006 on the Presidential 
Advisory Council 
26  Dewan Sumber Daya Air 
Nasional—National Water 
Resources Council 
Act 7/2004 on Water Resources 
27  Dewan Kawasan 
Perdagangan Bebas dan 
Pelabuhan Bebas Batam—
Council for Batam Harbor and 
Free Trade Zone 
Act 36/2000 as Amended by Act 
44/2007 on the Free Trade and Free 
Harbour Zones 
28  Dewan Kawasan 
Perdagangan Bebas dan 
Pelabuhan Bebas 
BintanCouncil for Bintan 
Harbor and Free Trade Zone 
Act 36/2000 as Amended by Act 
44/2007 on the Free Trade and Free 
Harbour Zones 
29  Dewan Kawasan 
Perdagangan Bebas dan 
Pelabuhan Bebas Karimun—
Council for Karimun Harbor 
and Free Trade Zone 
Act 36/2000 as Amended by Act 
44/2007 on the Free Trade and Free 
Harbour Zones 
30  Dewan Jaminan Sosial 
Nasional—National Social 
Security Council 
Act 40/2004 on the National Social 
Security System 
31  Dewan Nasional Kawasan 
Ekonomi Khusus—National 
Council for Special Economic 
Zone  
Act 39/2009 on Special Economic 
Zones 
32  Badan Pendukung 
Pengembangan Sistem 
Act 11/1974 on Waters 
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Penyediaan Air Minum—
Agency to Support the 
Development and Supply of 
Drinking Water 
33  Badan Pengatur Hilir Minyak 
dan Gas—Oil and Gas 
Downstream Regulatory 
Agency 
Act 22/2011 on Oil and Gas 
34  Badan Nasional Sertifikasi 
Profesi—National Profession 
Certification Agency  
Act 13/2003 on Workforce 
35  Badan Perlindungan 
Konsumen Nasional—
National Consumers 
Protection Agency 
Act 8/1999 on Consumers’ Protection 
36  Badan Nasional Pengelola 
Perbatasan—National Outer 
Territory Management Agency 
Act 43/2008 on the National Territory 
37  Badan Pengelola (Perbatasan) 
di Tingkat Daerah—Regional 
Outer Territory Management 
Agency 
Act 43/2008 on the National Territory 
38  Badan Pengusahaan Kawasan 
Perdagangan Bebas dan 
Pelabuhan Sabang—Agency 
for the Management of Sabang 
Harbor and Free Trade Zone 
Act 36/2000 as Amended by Act 
44/2007 on the Free Trade and Free 
Harbour Zones 
39  Badan Pengusahaan Kawasan 
Perdagangan Bebas dan 
Pelabuhan Bebas Batam—
Agency for Batam’s Free 
Trade Zone and Harbor 
Act 36/2000 as Amended by Act 
44/2007 on the Free Trade and Free 
Harbour Zones 
40  Badan Pengusahaan Kawasan 
Perdagangan Bebas dan 
Pelabuhan Bebas Karimun—
Agency for Karimun’s Free 
Trade Zone and Harbor 
Act 36/2000 as Amended by the Act 
44/2007 on the Free Trade and Free 
Harbour Zones 
41  Badan Pengusahaan Kawasan 
Perdagangan Bebas dan 
Pelabuhan Bebas Bintan—
Agency for Bintan’s Free 
Trade Zone and Harbor 
Act 36/2000 as Amended by the Act 
44/2007 on the Free Trade and Free 
Harbour Zones 
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42  Ombudsman Republik 
Indonesia—Ombudsman of 
the Republic of Indonesia 
Act 37/2008 on the Ombudsman of 
the Republic of Indonesia 
43  Konsil Kedokteran 
Indonesia—Indonesian 
Medical Council 
Act 29/2004 on Medicare 
44  Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan 
Indonesia—Indonesian 
Academy of Science 
Act 8/1990 on the Indonesian 
Academy of Science 
45  Badan Pertimbangan 
Telekomunikasi—
Telecommunication Advisory 
Board 
Act 3/1989 and Act 36/1999 on 
Telecommunication 
46  Badan Regulasi 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia—
Indonesian 
Telecommunication 
Regulatory Agency 
Act 36/1999 on Telecommunication 
47  Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis 
Transaksi Keuangan—the 
Indonesian Financial 
Transactions Reports and 
Analysis Centre 
Act 15/2002 on Money Laundering 
and Act 9/2013 on the Prevention and 
Eradication of Terrorism 
48  Komisi Aparatur Sipil 
Negara—Civil Service 
Commission 
Act 5/2014 on Civil Service 
49  Komite Perdagangan 
Nasional—National Trade 
Commission 
Act 7/2014 on Trade 
50  Komite Industri Nasional—
National Industry Commission  
Act 3/2014 on Industries 
51  Badan Koordinasi Nasional 
Penyuluhan Pertanian, 
Perikanan dan Kehutanan—
National Coordinating Agency 
for Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Forestry Counselling 
Act 16/2006 on the Counselling 
System for Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Forestry 
52  Komisi Penyuluhan 
Nasional—National 
Agricultural Counselling 
Commission 
Act 16/2006 on the Counselling 
System for Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Forestry 
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53  Badan Koordinasi 
Penyuluhan—Agricultural 
Counselling Coordinating 
Agency 
Act 16/2006 on the Counselling 
System for Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Forestry 
54  Badan Pelaksana 
Penyuluhan—Agricultural 
Extension Agency 
Act 16/2006 on the Counselling 
System for Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Forestry 
55  Badan Amil Zakat Nasional—
National Zakat (Alms) Agency 
Act 23/2011 on Zakat (Alms) 
Management 
56  Badan Pertimbangan 
Aparatur Sipil Negara—
Advisory Agency on Civil 
Service 
Act 5/2014 on Civil Service 
57  Lembaga Pencegahan dan 
Pemberantasan Kerusakan 
Hutan—Agency for 
Preventing and Eradication of 
Deforestation 
Act 18/2013 on the Prevention and 
Eradication of Deforestation 
58  Badan Pengawas Pasar 
Tenaga Listrik—Electricity 
Market Oversight Agency 
Act 20/2003 on Electricity 
59  Badan Koordinasi 
Pemberantasan Rupiah 
Palsu—Agency of Counterfeit 
Coordination 
Act 7/2012 on the National Currency 
60  Komite Profesi Akuntan 
Publik—Committee on Public 
Accountant Professions 
Act 5/2011 on Public Accountant 
61  Dewan Gelar, Tanda Jasa, 
dan Tanda Kehormatan—
Council for Tittle, 
Decorations, and Honours 
Act 20/2009 on Tittle, Decorations, 
and Honours 
62  Majelis Pertimbangan Tenaga 
Nuklir—Nuclear Energy 
Advisory Council 
Act 10/1997 on Nuclear Energy 
63  Komite Kebijakan Industri 
Pertahanan—Defence 
Industry Policy Committee 
Act 16/2012 on Defence Industries 
64  Badan Promosi Pariwisata 
Indonesia—The Indonesian 
Tourism Promotion Agency 
Act 10/2009 on Tourism 
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65  Badan Pengawas Rumah Sakit 
Indonesia—Hospitals 
Oversees Agency 
Act 44/2009 on Hospitals 
66  Lembaga Sertifikasi Industri 
Hijau (LSIH)—Green Industry 
Certification Agency 
Act 3/2014 on Industries 
67  Komite Pengelola Lembaga 
Sertifikasi Industri Hijau—
Committee for the 
Management of the Green 
Industry Certification Agency 
Act 3/2014 on Industries 
68  Badan Perfilman Indonesia—
Indonesian Movies Agency 
Act 33/2009 on Motion Pictures 
69  Komite Akreditasi Nasional—
National Accreditation 
Committee 
Act 20/2014 on Standardisation and 
Compliance Assessment 
70  Konsil Tenaga Kesehatan—
Council for Health Workers 
Act 36/2014 on Health Workers 
71  Konsil Tenaga 
Keperawatan—Council for 
Nursery Workers 
Act 38/2014 on Nursery 
72  Dewan Insinyur Indonesia—
Indonesian Engineers Council 
Act 11/2011 on Engineers 
73  Dewan Pertahanan 
Nasional—National Defence 
Council 
Act 3/2002 on the National Defence 
74  Majelis Disiplin Tenaga 
Kesehatan—Health Workers 
Disciplinary Council 
Act 36/2014 on Health Workers 
75  Badan Pertimbangan 
Kesehatan Nasional—National 
Health Advisory Agency 
Act 36/2009 on Health 
76  Komisi Penilai Amdal—
Environmental Assessment 
Commission 
Act 32/2009 on Environment 
 
The list above demonstrates that numerous sectoral legislations provide for the 
establishment of ministries and agencies. Laws and regulations are the major 
impediments to reorganisation; they tend to curtail the flexibility of managing the 
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government.706 Societies are rapidly changing and becoming more complex. 
Technological advances and more knowledgable citizens create new challenges for the 
government—it is required to keep up. The current legislation framework has 
prevented the creation of the flexible organisation needed to keep pace with changes 
and new challenges. 
Abnur also confirmed that the most significant constraint to reform is the law, because 
Indonesia often tries to solve each new problem by passing a new law and, along with 
it, forming a new public institution.707 Legal rules substantially influence the creation 
of a swollen bureaucracy, resulting in an oversized and fragmented administration with 
overlaps of purposes and powers.708 According to Peters, the use of legislation for the 
creation of new institutions is common in many governments, as legislation is 
frequently involved in administrative structural formation.709 Many ministries and 
agencies are mentioned in their sectoral legislation; their nomenclatures and purposes 
have been stated in statutes. In this way, they preserve their existence. Often the names 
of the ministries are quite similar to the list of administrative functions provided by 
the State Ministries Act.710 The President, as the head of administration, does not have 
the flexibility to determine and establish ministries according to his needs. It will also 
be difficult for the President to make decisions to abolish, merge or reconfigure his 
ministries. 
It is essential to examine the legislation that forms the legal basis to conduct the 
activities of the relevant institutions in conducting reorganisation. The administrative 
decision to dissolve an agency that is protected by legislation may become a measure 
that contravenes the law, if the law related to the organisation is not amended 
beforehand. As such, the terms to dismantle such agencies should be provided in the 
amended version of that particular law. The next section discusses the current legal 
framework to reform. 
                                                 
706 Interview with Asman Abnur (n 352). 
707 Ibid. 
708 Interview with Rini Widyantini (n 347). 
709 Lucien Peters (n 37). 
710 See Undang-Undang 39/2008 tentang Kementerian Negara [Act 39/2008 on the State Ministries]. 
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6.4 Current Legal Framework to Reform 
Legislation in Indonesia is mostly passed to address a particular issue. There is very 
little consideration of governance and bureaucracy reform in the process of law-
making. Laws in Indonesia mostly originate from bills initiated by the DPR. To be 
promulgated as the law, a bill should be deliberated and discussed with the President 
to obtain a joint agreement. In reality, the President himself never discusses a bill with 
the DPR; he is represented by the ministers or their top-echelon bureaucrats to reach a 
joint agreement on the bill with the DPR. 
In the event that the DPR and the government (ministers and bureaucrats) reach a joint 
agreement on a bill, but the president refuses to sign it, the Constitution provides 
concerning instructions for resolving the disagreement. In 2018, the Indonesian media 
was replete with the news of President Joko Widodo’s refusal to sign the draft of the 
MD3 bill initiated by the DPR, despite a joint agreement between the DPR and the 
ministers representing the President. The President refused to sign the MD3 bill for 
fear that the law would decrease the quality of democracy in Indonesia.711 However, it 
still became the law, despite the President’s refusal to sign.712 The same situation 
happened again in 2019 when the President refused to sign the bill on the Corruption 
Eradication Commission, despite a joint agreement between parliament and the 
government. Eventually, these two bills still became laws. This is because Article 20 
paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution says that if the President fails to sign a jointly 
approved bill within 30 days of its approval, that bill shall legally become law and 
must be promulgated.713 
Because of their ability to have a bill legalised, with or without the president’s 
legalisation, the DPR holds more significant power in law-making. The DPR can insist 
on the establishment of a new statute and the president’s refusal to sign it means 
nothing—it will become the law regardless. If the bill also contains a provision to 
                                                 
711 Michael Walsh and Nurina Savitri, ‘Indonesian Parliament Passes Controversial Law Targeting Its 
Critics, Anti-Corruption Commission’, ABC News (Online, 28 February 2018) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-28/indonesian-politicians-pass-law-targeting-their-
critics/9489336>; Marguerite Sapiie, ‘Jokowi Refuses to Sign MD3 Law’, The Jakarta Post (Online, 
15 March 2018) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/03/14/jokowi-refuses-to-sign-md3-
law.html>. 
712 Sukmana (n 658). 
713 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945]. 
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establish a new agency, the government would have to create a new agency, as the law 
stipulates. In terms of preventing the mushrooming of new agencies by legislation, the 
government is in a weaker position than the DPR. 
Legislation is the political product of many compromised, vested political interests. 
Those interests belong to various groups—mainly political parties with members of 
parliament in the DPR and government, or bureaucrats. Their interests are then 
embedded in the legislation. The minister and one of his deputies said: 
I saw two dominant aspects [influence the reform]. First is the political interest, this 
can be the interest of political parties that represented by their members of 
parliament, along with their vested interest. Because of this, the product of our 
parliament is based on the ‘order’ of the parties. There are ten political parties in 
Indonesia; each of them has their agenda for this country. Their interests dominate 
our parliament. This can be seen in every hearing to discuss a bill; their vested 
interests are reflected in the bill being discussed.714 
However, some people in our administration are greedy. To strengthen the existence 
of their institution, they do not want other institutions to share the role. Instead, they 
tried to make their institution to be mentioned in the statutes. Since the law is the 
second strongest legislation after the constitution, it will make them stronger.715 
We always have that vested interest, first, to strengthen the position of an institution, 
it mostly happened to non-ministerial agencies. Since they wanted their existence 
to be acknowledged, they raced to have a provision of themselves in the 
legislations.716 
March and Olsen say that bureaucracy often turns into a political arena of conflicting 
interests.717 To address these interests, the government should have a stronger 
bargaining position, relevant to other political sources. The vested interests in 
government organisation are a logical consequence of democracy and an inevitable 
                                                 
714 Interview with Asman Abnur (n 352). 
715 Interview with Rini Widyantini (n 347).  
716 Interview with Teguh Widjinarko (n 348). 
717 March and Olsen (n 35). 
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issue.718 Therefore, the government should opt to incorporate its objectives with the 
surrounding interests. 
Constitutionally, the executive would not be able to change the legislation without the 
approval of the parliament. Hence, if possible, reorganisation should be conducted 
beyond the limits of legislation.719 Ideally, a structure within the government should 
be built according to the nation’s strategic needs. However, ministries and agencies 
often use and manipulate legislations to enlarge their organisations and power, to 
preserve their existence, increase their budget and increase the number of available 
positions.720 
Supriyono argued that legislation should not address the managerial aspect of 
administration, to maintain the flexibility of bureaucratic management. However, 
since the foundation of administrative need is political demand, the decision to create 
a structure often involves ‘politically-heavy considerations.’ 721 As such, it can be 
difficult for a country such as Indonesia to create legislation that does not address the 
managerial aspect. 
Many ministries and agencies have tried to insert themselves in their sectoral laws 
despite the fact that agencies do not necessarily have to be established by a statute. 
Regulations such as PP (or Perpres) are sufficient to provide a legal base for the 
establishment of an agency. However, PPs have limitations, and, in the interest of 
securing a stronger position in the administration and guaranteed existence, many 
agencies request to be mentioned in the statutes. Arianti stated: 
Agencies tend to request to be stated in the legislation to have a stronger position. 
There is an interest in doing this since the creation of a new agency only with a 
presidential regulation is already sufficient. But still, they want to use the law, even 
just for a small agency. There are ministries established only with presidential 
regulations, but agencies sometimes request to be established by statute. The main 
reason is that it is harder to change the law than regulations.722 
                                                 
718 Interview with Asman Abnur (n 352). 
719 Ibid. 
720 Interview with Rini Widyantini (n 347). 
721 Interview with Bambang Supriyono (n 389). 
722 Interview with Diah Arianti (n 382). 
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Laws do not provide the necessary support for reorganisation—many are passed based 
on their sectoral problems, resulting in sectoral egos and curbing the government. The 
minister and his deputy said: 
Today, I met with the head of Basarnas [National Search and Rescue Agency]; I 
tested him and asked what the job of his agency is. He replied that the job of his 
agency is to conduct search and rescue. I was then asked whether Basarnas had a 
program for the prevention of any incident. He said that the laws and regulations 
related to Basarnas do not mandate them to do that. It shows that when we perform 
our duties, it always overshadowed by legal rules. Thing like this is curbing our 
bureaucracy.723 
I think our laws and regulations did not support [the reform]; each of them is still 
talking in the eye of their sector. The sectoral ego in our public organisations is still 
high. We cannot rely on existing laws for doing the reform.724 
To reduce bloating, the government should have the capacity to maintain efficiency by 
safeguarding the process of law-making. It does not necessarily mean the executive 
should reject any consideration to create a new agency. A new agency can be 
established with sufficient justification of its necessity. However, the prerogative 
rights of the president in managing the administration, according to the 1945 
Constitution, should be the main consideration in the creation of a new agency and 
when formulating the law. The use of statutes to create a new agency should be avoided 
and any decision of whether to create or not to create a new agency should be given to 
the president. Similarly, a special advisor for the Minister of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform stated: 
Theoretically, any organisation [of government] should be dynamic, it should be 
able to adapt to its surrounding changes. This is why it is unwise to mention it in a 
statute, because when there are changes that require us to change or dismantle such 
organisations, it will require us to amend the law first. I think we should stop this, 
give this power to the president, let the president decide whether we need a new 
agency or not.725 
                                                 
723 Interview with Asman Abnur (n 352). 
724 Interview with Rini Widyantini (n 347). 
725 Interview with Teguh Widjinarko (n 348). 
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Constitutionally, the president holds the power to decide whether a certain issue needs 
to be addressed by an existing institution or by creating a new ministry or agency for 
that specific issue. Sectoral statutes should not reduce the constitutional power of the 
President. Yet, many of these are passed based on their sectoral-perspective. As such, 
laws become fragmented, resulting in disharmony of laws and policies issued by 
different sectors. The next section discusses further disharmony of laws and policies 
that constrain reorganisation. 
6.5 Disharmony of Laws and Policies 
Disharmony of laws in Indonesia has resulted in disharmony of functions, producing 
sectoral egos and causing duplication and inefficiency. Widjinarko stated: 
The major challenge of reform is the culture of sectoral ego. Since the beginning of 
the reformation era [1998—the year Soeharto resigned from power], each ministry 
and agency has tried to pass their own legislation, which mentions the nomenclature 
of its own institution. This has happened because the leadership of these institutions 
is afraid their institutions will no longer exist because of reform. They formulate the 
laws to give protection to their agency. Since then, we have so many ministries and 
agencies that are mentioned in statutes. This will make it hard for us to make rapid 
changes to our organisations.726 
Because of their large size, duplications and overlaps occur with some executive 
bodies addressing the same issues. It has become a potential source of red tape and the 
disharmony of laws has prolonged the problem, resulting in poor processes. 
The focus of administrative reform is implementing policy, laws and regulations, but 
the bureaucrats responsible for implementing these policies and legislations face 
difficulties because of incoherency between them.727 After Suharto resigned from the 
presidency in the 1998 Velvet Revolution, ministries and agencies raced to pass their 
sectoral legislation and tried to include themselves in the statutes. The culture of the 
sectoral ego is arguably the root of this phenomenon. Many agencies’ leaders are afraid 
of the dismissal of their institutions and seek protection by formulating legislation. It 
                                                 
726 Ibid. 
727 Kasim (n 15) 19. 
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became a challenge for the government to conduct timely adjustments, to conform to 
rapid changes in society, because institutions are statutorily established. 
Laws play an essential role in shaping the bureaucracy. Ideally, the law should not 
restrict reorganisation being conducted to respond to changes in society. However, 
sometimes further statutes are required to provide the justification and legal basis to 
exercise power. To prevent legislation for constraining reform, the law should not 
explicitly mention specific institutions in connection with current issues. For 
flexibility, statutes should only mention that the government is responsible for specific 
issues, without rigidly specifying the nomenclature of a particular ministry or agency 
for that particular task. The statute should not elect to establish a new agency for that 
particular task; instead, the decision should be given to the government, using its 
regulation instrument. 
To establish efficiency and improve effectivity, the government needs to be slim. 
Murniasih stated that a streamlined bureaucracy is a prerequisite for effective and 
efficient government.728 However, streamlining the machinery of government is not 
easy, because there is no real commitment from the parliament to support reform. 
Murniasih stated: 
I can see the DPR does not concern [itself] with the issue of institutional reform. In 
fact, they threaten to amend the Civil Service Law and use it as a bargaining power 
if the Civil Service Commissions are dissolved. Instead of helping to achieve 
successful reform, they broke their commitment to reform.729 
Muqowam argued that the mushrooming of bureaucracy by legislation is a normal 
result of political processes.730 Clearly, reform needs support from both sides of power. 
It is difficult to conduct reform with support from only one side of power—from either 
the executive or the legislative. Both the executive and legislative have their own 
critical roles in shaping the bureaucracy. Yet, the commitment from within the 
government and its bureaucracy itself is of the utmost importance, as they perfectly 
understand the internal problems that need to be fixed. Brown argued that if the 
executive was seriously committed to improving its bureaucracy, it ccould make 
                                                 
728 Interview with Erni Murniasih (n 349). 
729 Ibid. 
730 Interview with Ahmad Muqowam (n 350). 
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considerable progress despite any obstructions it may face along the way.731 The 
bureaucracy’s strong commitment is a determining factor for dealing with any 
pragmatic interest in the development of the administrative structure. 
The vast majority of institutions insist that they need to establish an independent 
organisation and preserve their existence through legislation, rather than considering 
administration an interconnected system. There is no instrument to filter the proposals 
to create new institutions by using laws or regulations, even from within the executive 
itself. If the Indonesian government wants to solve its organisational problems, it 
should first address the laws and regulations as the key to reform.732 If legislations are 
in disharmony, so are the business processes and policies produced by so many 
different institutions. 
Prasodjo argued that all regulations linked to government organisations need to be 
reviewed in a ‘comprehensive restructuring package’.733 Given the massive laws and 
regulations in Indonesia, it may take many years to review them all.734 Any 
administrative organisation should be flexible with changes and such flexibility 
potentially benefits budget-saving and reducing expenditure. Hence, organisations 
need to be established or dismissed whenever required, without any obstruction, 
including obstruction from legislation.735 
Having too many agencies addressing the same issue means that there are excessive 
channels to implement policy and public service delivery. It may lead to problematic 
efforts to achieve policy goals.736 Many organisations are created based on desire, 
rather than real necessity, which has caused unnecessary enlargement of the 
organisation of many ministries and agencies.737 Legal rules have contributed to the 
creation of outsized and fragmented administration. The spirit of efficiency is not 
evident in the current legal framework.738 The sectoral ego and disharmony of laws 
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have made for fragmented organisations. Unless there are systematic efforts to reform 
and harmonise legislation, the government will continue to bloat without control. 
Effective reform requires a harmony of laws, regulations and policies. Yet, pragmatic 
interest among bureaucrats to preserve their own agencies has fostered competition to 
produce legislation to protect them. Consequently, legislations have become 
fragmented and overlapping. As a result, organisations have become too rigid and 
difficult to include in the change strategies of the country.739 Ahmad argued that either 
the executive or the legislative refuses to be labelled as constraining the reform.740 As 
argued many times throughout this thesis, both branches of power have a significant 
influence in determining the shape of government organisations through legislation 
and regulation. As such, their mutual commitment to reform is important. 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
Findings from the interviews show that the political will and commitment to reform 
should start at the apex of administration. Although the President has shown his 
support for bureaucratic reform, the political will of his administration to reform has 
often been lacking. Bureaucracy reform requires stronger commitment from public 
leaders, both from the executive and legislative branches of powers. 
In parliament, bureaucratic reform only gained support from one of its 11 
commissions.741 This showed that the DPR does not unequivocally support reform, 
despite the wastefulness associated with maintaining the budget to manage the large 
government, providing facilities for top administrators and the use of programs that 
are irrelevant to the needs of the country. Reform is also constrained by rent-seeking, 
political bargaining and other vested interests. Still, reform commitment should first 
come from the executive, as they hold control over the bureaucracy. In this regard, 
Muqowam argued that as long as the bureaucrats are transparent and possess high 
integrity, political parties will not politicise the bureaucracy.742 
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Reorganisation can drive reform in other areas of governance. However, laws and 
regulations have constrained reorganisation. Many executive bodies are statutorily 
established, posing difficulties to restructuration of these agencies. This prevents the 
flexibility needed for organisational changes. Because of this, the government was 
unable to conduct a timely organisational adjustment to cope and adapt to new 
circumstances. As such, law and regulation frameworks have curbed the bureaucracy 
and did not support the reorganisation. Moreover, statutes are in disharmony because 
of sectoral egos, resulting in duplications and fragmented policies. To explore the best 
potential solutions to overcome the problems above, the next chapter discusses 
possible solutions to address the political and legal problems of reorganisation.  
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Chapter 7: Possible Solution to Address the Political and 
Legal Problems of Reorganisation in Indonesia  
7.1 Introduction 
Findings from the interviews discussed in previous chapters show that the problems 
surrounding reorganisation are generated by the political environment and the 
country’s legislative framework. The political framework influences the culture of 
legislation-making, as well as how the law addresses reorganisation. It can be difficult 
to overcome the political and legal problems of reorganisation without changing the 
culture of law-making, specifically in regards to statutes linked to the organisations of 
the government. 
The 350-year Dutch administration in Indonesia influenced Indonesian legal culture. 
Indonesia follows the civil law legal system inherited from the Dutch, intermixed with 
customary law and Roman-Dutch law.743 Reorganisation and the political system are 
interrelated. How the bureaucracy works is affected by the political environment. 
Ideally, politics should not manipulate reorganisation. Yet, reorganisation implies 
more than a plain administrative measure—various political interests and statutory 
impediments (discussed in previous chapters) influence and constrain reorganisation. 
The interviews also found that the Indonesian government has too many organisations. 
Ministries and agencies tend to enlarge their units or organisations to expand their 
power and increase their budgets.744 The Indonesian bureaucracy bloated significantly 
after the downfall of Suharto in 1998. Since then, government bodies have raced to 
pass laws in their respective areas to protect their existence. They are afraid of the 
dismissal of their institutions and seek protection from legislation. Many of these laws 
are passed based on the perspective of their sector and are not in harmony with laws 
in other sectors. As such, disharmony of laws and overlap of functions occur.745 
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This chapter explores possible solutions to address the political and legal problems 
facing reorganisation. It serves to commence debate on the best possible solution for 
the problems presented in the previous chapters. In the future, this thesis will be useful 
for developing a white paper addressing the political and statutory problems 
surrounding reorganisation. Following this introduction, Section 2 discusses the initial 
identification of a possible solution and Section 3 discusses why reorganisation needs 
a robust new law. Section 4 discusses the key points for the bill proposed by this thesis. 
A chapter summary concludes this chapter. 
7.2 Initial Identification of Solution 
Institutional reform has been an attractive commodity of political rhetoric. 
Unfortunately, commitment from the government to design an efficient administration 
is not evident.746 Systematic and comprehensive solutions are needed to prevent 
institutions from being statutorily established, which will provide flexibility for future 
reorganisations. Improving public services through bureaucratic reform is one of the 
main programs intended to achieve Indonesian development goals.747 Although the 
bureaucratic structure is an important tool to achieve national goals, the legal culture 
in Indonesia does not facilitate the measures for establishing efficiency and improving 
the effectivity of the bureaucracy. 
The DPR initiates most legislation and when this legislation contains provisions to 
establish a new agency, the government must do so. Prasodjo stated that ‘instead of 
getting leaner, the organisational structure of our central government is getting bigger, 
and it is too big.’748 The Indonesian bureaucracy has grown so massive because 
legislations create structures. Reversing this legal culture is challenging, as 
organisations were made and expanded because of pragmatic interests: 
There was increasing demand from members of our parliament, and from new 
sectors of development, to create new agencies, councils, commissions or other 
forms of institutions using legislation. On the other hand, the government [is] also 
establishing new agencies using the presidential regulations, government 
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748 Interview with Eko Prasodjo (n 351). 
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regulations and cabinet meetings. The organisation has become swollen because of 
so many pragmatic interests. We often try to solve our problems by creating a new 
organisation.749 
Reform requires a legal culture that promotes the integrity of the lawmakers. 
Politicians should avoid using legislation for their gain or for promoting the vested 
interests of their groups. This is why Indonesia needs a robust legal instrument in the 
form of a new law able to support reform, reverse the legal culture and establish a 
clearer and more comprehensive requirement for the creation of new organisations. 
This new law should serve to compensate for the current, insufficient legal guidance 
and unsystematic reform. 
Insufficient legal guidance means that the best government can do was only to review 
the dysfunctional LNS.750 However, this review has been conducted without clear 
vision, steps or guidance. Review of agencies was only partial and was not conducted 
periodically. Because of this, Prasodjo argued that reform has no value and no clear 
goal, as it is just ‘business as usual’.751 
To be robust, the aforementioned new law should be designed in a way that enables it 
to reduce the interference of politics in the bureaucracy and strengthen administrative 
discretion in managing organisations. It should need to define the classification of 
executive bodies. This can be done by plainly describing what constitutes an ad hoc or 
permanent institution, a structural or non-structural institution and a ministry or 
agency.’752 The next section further explores the debate and urgency of this new legal 
instrument. 
7.3 Why Reorganisation Needs a Robust New Law and What is its 
Obstacle? 
It is necessary to commence the debate on how reform should stop the bloating of the 
government. Arguably, the willingness to change should start from the bureaucracy 
itself, as they perfectly understand the internal problems that need to be fixed and have 
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a thorough comprehension of the structures.753 However, as examined in previous 
chapters, politics is an essential determinant in shaping the bureaucracy. 
Reorganisation is constrained by various interests within the political battleground and 
hindered by legislation that restricts reorganisation measures. This is why this thesis 
argues that reform could be commenced by introducing the new legislation proposed 
here. Widyantini and Arianti expressed the urgent necessity of this new law to stop the 
bloating: 
There was a time when the President wanted to dissolve some ministries and 
agencies. It took years because we do not have a grand design for our administrative 
structure. There was no guidance on how we should streamline the administration.754 
We need a new law in the institutional matter to solve the structural problems of the 
administration. So far, our guidance was only the circulation of a letter from the 
Cabinet Secretary, which says that the representative of government should not 
propose the establishment of a new agency when discussing a bill with the DPR and 
if possible, to prevent the DPR from inserting clauses for the establishment of a new 
agency in legislation. Both the executive and legislative should have the same 
commitment and aware that we are currently reforming our bureaucracy. We are 
currently struggling to make our public sector more efficient and effective. 
Certainly, we do not want to spend a lot of our budget on expenditures to maintain 
our vast and massive bureaucracy.755 
Similarly, Prasodjo suggested that the Indonesian administration develop the basic 
norms for institutional reform in a statute, for a stronger implementation power.756 
However, passing this bill may face some obstacles. The parliament might oppose this 
bill if they thought it would restrict their ability to formulate legislation that includes 
the terms for establishing a new body.757 Assuming that the government should take 
charge in introducing this legislation, the government needs to be able to convince the 
DPR that the main idea of this proposed bill is not to restrict the DPR’s role in 
legislation-making. Instead, this new law aims to create more effective, efficient and 
accountable government structures that are able to deliver better public service and 
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achieve the national goals. It would do this by redefining the classification of 
government bodies and establishing terms and requirements for the creation of new 
agencies. 
Yet, changing a legal culture—or any culture—can be challenging. It requires 
behaviour modification of society. Changing a legal culture often meets with rejection 
and hostility.758 Pushing law reform to change the legal culture of reorganisation as 
proposed in this chapter may be met with rejection and hostility from those who are 
opposed to reform. Even a member of parliament implied that it would face this kind 
of rejection: 
The DPR is the legislative branch of power. We are independent of the executive 
and only subject to the Constitution. We cannot be controlled by the executive or 
any legislation that will restrict our function according to the Constitution. I even 
doubt a bill of this kind of law can even pass the process of the preliminary 
hearing.759 
Reform is a battle and it requires strategies and tactics to win. Passing this law to the 
DPR may involve a huge challenge, as it may seem controlling to the DPR. Over the 
years, the DPR has always attempted to accommodate their vested interests in the 
machinery of government. 
Why does reorganisation need a robust new law? How will it be different and not 
create the same problem as any other legislation? To answer these questions, we need 
to look back on all the problems presented in this study. The root is the legislation, 
which is essentially a political product. How it is made and what legislation says is 
affected by the political setting. If the legislation is the root of the problem, then it is 
the legislation that needs to be addressed. As Nelken observes, the law can be a means 
for resolving current problems by transforming society.760 As such, the law is an 
important tool to solve problems and change social attitudes towards how 
reorganisation is conducted. If the Indonesian government wants to solve its 
organisational problems, it should first address the laws linked to bureaucratic reform. 
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However, addressing each legislation that has provisions of establishing agencies can 
be difficult and take time—there are hundreds of these and amending each of these 
requires a lengthy political process. Therefore, safeguarding future legislation against 
being used to bloat the government is possibly the best and most realistic solution. 
This can be done by introducing the new legislation suggested by this thesis. For this 
suggested new law not to suffer the same problem as to the previous laws, its terms 
need to be designed so as not to create a new structure. The government, through the 
MoABR (which is responsible for managing reform and conducting reorganisation), 
should take the initiative to develop the bill of this law. If this bill is passed into law, 
its implementation can also be administered by the MoABR, as its scope falls under 
the governance area of this ministry. 
The proposed bill should not opt for an expanded role of the MoABR. This thesis 
suggests the government should initiate the formulation of this bill. It is common in 
Indonesia that a ministry in that relevant area is responsible in formulating a bill on 
behalf of the President. Subject to his approval, the President will then submit the bill 
to the DPR (House of Representative). Since the topic of the proposed bill is within 
the area of work of the MoABR, it should take action to initiate the discussion of this 
bill. Drafting of the bill by the MoABR is not to expand its power and size, but, to only 
initiate the reform required.  
Introducing a new law that minimises the interference of politics in the bureaucracy 
can help to change the legal culture of reform. Allowing more authority for the 
government to manage its structure will provide more structural flexibility, as 
restructuration may not need a law amendment. This new law ensures that agencies 
are created to improve the efficiency and effectivity of the government in delivering 
services to the public. It will serve as a legal basis that regulates the formation of 
agencies, as well as providing classifications of government bodies and guiding 
legislatures in deciding whether a new institution should be created for a specific 
problem and its proper institution’s type. 
As resources are limited, the government needs to minimise and prevent any 
duplication. Any terms in legislation related to administration structure should be able 
to justify the responsibility of the government for the issues involved. For example, it 
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should answer the question of why the function needs to be conducted by the 
government instead of the private sector. 
In the past, the naskah akademik (see Chapter 2) that accompanied bills initiated by 
the DPR rarely provided a comprehensive analysis of the effect of forming a new 
agency on the state’s budget. However, Katharina argued that the government is also 
reluctant to question or conduct budget impact analysis when discussing bills with the 
DPR.761 Nevertheless, the current administration is overwhelmed with the strong 
power and influence of the DPR.762 As ministers mostly came from the politics instead 
of technocrats, negotiations between the government led by ministers and the DPR are 
frequently surrounded by a political atmosphere.763 Accordingly, responses between 
them, in most cases, are not straightforward. This situation is worsened by the 
bureaucracy culture of fearing dismissal by external political influence and 
consequently having to accommodate for the vested interests of politicians. 
Hence, the establishment of a new legal framework that provides comprehensive 
requirements and conditions on how to build institutions for the Indonesian 
administration is essential. Specifically, it will help the government and the DPR to 
examine whether an existing ministry or agency has addressed a particular issue and 
assess the effect of creating a new agency on the state’s budget and governance 
framework. The bill for the suggested new law can be referred to as Bill on Institutional 
System of the Central Government Law (RUU Kelembagaan Pemerintah Pusat). With 
this new law, Indonesia will have a legal framework to decide—theoretically and 
philosophically—the paradigm for designing administrative organisations. The next 
section discusses key points for this suggested new law. 
7.4 Bill on Institutional System of the Central Government Law 
(Rancangan Undang-undang Kelembagaan Pemerintah Pusat) 
This section provides suggestions on the structure and major themes for the bill. The 
structure of the bill proposed here is heavily dependent on the Indonesian context and 
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its custom of law-making. Specifically, this chapter suggests that the bill at least 
contain the terms for the following: 
a. General Terms–Definitions; 
b. Goals and Basic Principles; 
c. Administrative functions; 
d. Grand Design and Organisational Mapping; 
e. Classification of Central Government Organisations; 
f. Reasons for Organising; 
g. Procedures and Organising Process; 
h. The Executive’s Role; 
i. The Legislative’s Role; 
j. The Public’s Role; 
k. Transitional Provisions; 
l. Closing Provisions. 
The next part of this section elaborates on the terms for each section of the bill 
according to the above structure. 
7.4.1 General Terms–Definitions 
According to Law 12/2011, there must be sufficient philosophical, sociological and 
legal reasons for why a law is needed. It is common in Indonesia that every legislation 
should contain general terms at the beginning of the body of law or the first few 
articles. In this regard, there are few aspects of clarity in the definition section of this 
bill: 
a. Definition of Urusan Pemerintahan (Administrative Function) 
There is no firm definition of ‘administrative function’ from the current 
legislation. Even the definition of ‘administrative function’ in the State 
Ministries Act 39/2008 is very narrow and confusing. It says that 
‘administrative function’ is ‘administrative function defined by the 1945 
 204 
Constitution’.764 However, the Constitution itself is silent on the definition of 
‘administrative function’. Hence, it needs to be clarified here. 
Administrative function refers to the responsibilities of the administration that 
need to be stipulated by the law or regulation. Legislation needs to describe the 
function of administration as a guarantee that the government will not neglect 
their responsibility to serve the public. In describing the term ‘administrative 
function’, it is important to have a definition that it will not create a monopoly 
of a particular function by a ministry or agency. Instead, it should be able to 
support collaboration between agencies in conducting such function. The 
below clauses could define the meaning of ‘administrative function’: 
Administrative function, for this law, is a function for any ministry or 
agency of the central government for a particular area of governance, 
according to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 and/or 
prevailing laws and regulations which mandate the central government 
to function in that particular area. 
b. Definition of Organisasi/Kelembagaan Pemerintah (Administrative 
Organisation/Institution) 
Generally, an organisation is a social unity where the members interact and 
play distinct roles. A clear line of structures puts each member in a 
specialisation. The terms of organisation and institution that perform an 
administrative function should be clearly defined by this bill to show that they 
would be different from non-administrative institutions. It should describe the 
distinct characteristics of a government body. 
In public management, ‘organisation’ can be described as a place where public 
management is held and a process wherein any organisation’s components 
interact under the framework of a social and functional system. Therefore, a 
definition of ‘organisation’ should help avoid functional overlaps and support 
more integrated structures. Within the term of ‘institution’ is the relationship 
between norms, values, actions and beliefs, which centre on a number of social 
needs. It is difficult to separate the use of ‘institutional’ from the use of 
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‘organisational’, as they are complementary. For this bill, the suggested 
definition is as follows: 
‘Administrative organisation’ describes the specific characteristics of 
an organisation that is responsible for administrative function, either 
independently or in collaboration with other administrative 
organisations, in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations. 
c. Kementerian (Ministry) 
A ‘ministry’ is not defined by the Constitution. The State Ministries Act 
describes a ministry (Kementerian Negara, or State Ministry) as a government 
instrument responsible for conducting specific functions within the 
government. This definition is too narrow and does not describe the position of 
a ministry within the machinery of government. The definition of ‘ministry’ 
needs to be clarified to describe the position, role and function of a ministry. 
Although each ministry may have its own sectoral law, which specifically 
describes its administrative role and function, this bill still needs to define the 
term ‘ministry’ to clarify its specific characteristics. Below is an example 
clause to define ‘ministry’: 
A ‘ministry’ is an administrative institution led by a minister, who is a 
member of the cabinet. It is responsible for conducting specific 
administration tasks mandated by the president, in accordance with 
prevailing laws and regulations. 
d. Lembaga Seitngkat Menteri (Institutions at the same level as ministries) 
There are at least five institutions operating at the same level as ministries, 
namely the Central Bank (Bank of Indonesia), the National Police of the 
Republic of Indonesia (POLRI), the State Secretariat, the Attorney General and 
the National Armed Forces (TNI). However, the term ‘institutions at the same 
level as ministries’ has not clearly defined in any laws and regulations. Below 
is a recommendation for its definition: 
‘Institutions at the same level as ministries’ are non-ministerial 
institutions, which have earned an equal level and position to ministries 
in the central government administrative structure. These institutions 
 206 
are answerable to the president and directly responsible for specific 
tasks, in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations. 
However, these institutions are not cabinet members. 
e. Lembaga Pemerintah Non-Kementerian (Non-Ministerial Agencies or LPNK) 
Every statute that serves as the legal basis for establishing an LPNK only 
mentions the term ‘LPNK’, and does not give the general definition and 
characteristics of LPNKs. Instead, the definition of LPNK was given by a lower 
hierarchy legal framework—Presidential Regulation (Perpres). The Perpres 
103/2001 states that a LPNK is a central government institution created, 
directly under the president, to perform a specific task, provided by the 
president. 
According to the definition in Perpes 103/2001, the power to establish an 
LPNK is in the hands of the president. In reality, most LPNKs were statutorily 
established. Therefore, the decision to create an LPNK is, in reality, not solely 
the power of the executive. This bill needs to reaffirm executive’s discretion in 
the creation of LPNKs in the definition of LPNK. This would be important to 
minimise the growth of LPNKs by returning the power of establishing LPNKs 
to the president, as opposed to DPR-made legislation. This chapter suggests a 
definition as follows: 
‘Lembaga Pemerintah Non-Kementerian’ (Non-ministerial agencies), 
hereafter referred to as ‘LPNKs’ are agencies of central government 
established by the president to conduct specific tasks outside the 
function of a ministry. In performing its function, an LPNK is 
answerable to the president and coordinated by a ministry in its 
relevant area. 
f. Lembaga Non-Struktural (Non-structural Agencies) 
Statutes have established at least 73 LNS’s.765 In terms of nomenclature, 
structure and their positions in the government, LNS’s are greatly diverse. This 
is largely because of the non-existent guidance from legislation regarding LNS 
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establishment, the scope of their work and their exact administrative positions. 
To date, LNS’s are independent agencies, ranging from small boards, 
commissions and committees to larger, independent agencies. They mostly 
function outside the area of ministries and LPNKs, few of which deal with 
executive operations, national economy management, corruption investigation 
and regulatory control. The legislation never clarifies the limitations on the 
scope of work and functions of LNS’s. This chapter suggests the following 
definition: 
‘Lembaga Non-Struktural’ (Non-structural Agencies), hereafter 
referred to as ‘LNS’s’ can be either independent or semi-independent 
agencies. They are responsible for conducting particular functions 
outside the governance area of a ministry or an LPNK, in accordance 
with the prevailing laws and regulations. 
g. Lembaga Penyiaran Publik (Public Broadcasting Agency) 
There are two public broadcasting agencies under the executive arm of 
government, namely the Television of the Republic of Indonesia (TVRI) and 
the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia (RRI). These two bodies are considered 
government agencies and are owned and funded by the national government. 
Therefore, the law needs to establish the definition of ‘Public Broadcasting 
Agency’ to describe their nature, function and administrative position. 
h. Pembentukan (Establishment) 
This bill needs to address some aspects, including the requirements and 
procedures for establishing executive bodies at the national level. Article 17 of 
the 1945 Constitution instructs that provisions related to the establishment, 
restructuring and merging of ministries, in particular, are to be stipulated in the 
relevant Undang-undang (statute). The State Ministries Act 39/2008 contains 
articles addressing the establishment of ministries but they are mostly too 
general and lacking in detail.Further, there is no guidance from legislation for 
the establishment of executive bodies other than ministries (such as LPNKs 
and LNS’s). This bill needs to produce requirements for the establishment of 
executive bodies for both ministries and non-ministerial bodies. More 
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importantly, the meaning of ‘establishment’ itself needs to be defined and 
clarified. This chapter suggests that ‘establishment’ be defined as follows: 
‘Establishment’ is the process of creating or establishing a ministry, 
agency or other executive body, by the president or with legislation, 
according to prevailing laws and regulations. 
i. Pengubahan (Restructuring) 
Similarly, this law needs to define pengubahan (restructuring). The current 
definition of restructuring in the legislation only applies to ministries, as 
provided by article 1 of the State Ministries Act. The article states that 
ministerial restructuring is an alteration to the nomenclature of the existing 
ministry by merging, separating or replacing it with other nomenclature. This 
definition emphasises restructuring as the alteration of nomenclature instead of 
as structural changes. Since the definition only applies to ministries, this law 
needs to establish a definition for ‘restructuring’ that encompasses all executive 
bodies. The essence of any restructure is organisational changes, so the 
definition of ‘restructuring’ should reflect the element of change. For example: 
‘Restructuring’ is a process of restructuring or reorganising executive 
bodies and/or their units. It is an alteration to the structure and 
organisation of executive bodies in accordance with the terms of this 
law. 
j. Pembubaran (Dissolution) 
The State Ministries Act contains a few articles about the provisions for a 
dissolution of a ministry, but they are not applicable to non-ministerial bodies. 
Hence, the law needs to provide a legal definition of ‘dissolution’ that 
encompasses all types of bodies. For example: 
‘Dissolution’ is a process of abolishing or liquidating a ministry and/or 
agency in accordance with the terms of this law. 
k. Penggabungan (Merger) 
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Guidance on how to merge institutions is not provided in existing legislation. 
To establish an effective and efficient government, this law should establish 
rules for merging executive bodies. Hence, it is important to provide the 
definition of ‘merger’ itself. The suggested definition is as follows: 
‘Merger’ is a process of merging institutions of government, namely 
ministries, agencies or units within ministries or agencies, in 
accordance with the terms of this law. 
l. Pemerintah (National Government) 
The 1945 Constitution and most statutes denote the term ‘pemerintah’ 
(government) as the central government. Many statutes defined ‘the central 
government’ or ‘government’ as ‘the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia.’ This law needs to restate this definition for coherence with other 
statutes. For example: 
The ‘central government’, hereafter referred to as the ‘government’, is 
the Government of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. 
m. Pemerintah Daerah (Local Government) 
The Regional Government Act 23/2014 has handed over some functions to 
either Provincial or City/Regency Governments. This law stipulates that the 
Regional Government consists of the Provincial Government, Municipality of 
City Government and their Regional House of Representatives. Since some 
authorities and functions of the central government have been decentralised to 
the Regional Government, it is also important for this bill to restate the 
definition of the Regional Government from the Regional Government Act. 
n. Menteri (Minister) 
Every piece of legislation in Indonesia states which ministers are responsible 
for administering that law. This bill falls within the scope of the Ministry of 
Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Therefore, the minister for this law is the Minister of Administrative and 
Bureaucratic Reform. 
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The next part of this section elaborates on the terms for the goals and basic principles 
(azas) in institutional structuring. 
7.4.2 Goals and Basic Principles (Azas) in Institutional Structuring 
Any activities related to institutional establishment and reform should aim to develop 
a more effective, efficient and accountable governance structure that is able to deliver 
better services, as well as support the achievement of national goals. Pieces of 
legislations in Indonesia frequently establish their own azas (basic principles) to guide 
their enforcement. This thesis suggests the following azas for this bill: 
a. Effective and efficient 
A lean and streamlined structure is often viewed as the ideal. The executive 
bodies in Indonesia are diverse and have grown very large. As resources are 
limited, achieving effectivity and efficiency is important. Moreover, the public 
expects the government to be as efficient as the private sector, while 
maintaining public accountability. Efficiency is the use of resources (budget, 
personnel, etc.) in a way which minimises waste and optimises resources for 
their most valuable use, while effectivity is related to the extent of the use of 
resources to accomplish goals. Therefore, effectivity and efficiency are the 
basic principles of this bill and need to be acknowledged in the clauses of azas. 
b. Neutral 
The political system has a significant influence on policy-making and it can 
either drive or constrain reform. The government and the political system are 
interconnected; the effectiveness of any political system depends on that of 
administrative organisations. As such, the control system and design of 
executive bodies are major concerns for political entities. 
The process of politics produces political decisions. Eventually, these decisions 
reflect the will of the government. Bureaucracy, In contrast, is responsible for 
developing and implementing the policies aligned with political decisions. 
However, the ideal bureaucracy should be politically neutral, assuring 
detachment from the vested interests of political influences. 
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Nevertheless, reorganisation is notorious for being an object of a political battle 
between contending interests. Therefore, achieving neutrality in bureaucracy 
could be challenging. The Civil Service Act 5/2014 stipulates that public 
officials must be politically neutral—they are banned from being partisan to a 
political party or supporting a particular political view. Yet, politics retain a 
strong influence in bureaucracy. As such, this section suggests neutrality as one 
of the azas for this bill. 
c. Coherence 
Organisations are created to establish an integrated problem-solving 
mechanism. The government’s organisational chart should reflect institutional 
coherence; it should display a clear relationship and network between 
organisations. Coherence is an important principle for this law to adopt; it 
supports efforts to reduce duplication and simplify structures. 
The current methods of organisational development produce fragmented 
organisations. Given the complexity of modern governance, executive bodies 
need to establish a governance system that eliminates cross-functional 
boundaries and relies on collaboration between institutions. The fragmented 
and large organisations of the Indonesian government exist largely because of 
incoherent legal frameworks, institutions’ sectoral egos and the silo-mindset. 
Therefore, ‘coherence’ needs to be one of the principles of this bill. 
d. Proportional 
Maintaining a lean structure for efficiency is essential, but the administrative 
structure has to be proportional. The government should have the right 
posture—not too big or too small—with the right function. However, the main 
concern of any administration should encompass the departmental 
arrangement.766 The focus should be on policy achievement; any organisational 
change should focus on improving the performance, rather than the size, of 
organisations. 
                                                 
766 Davis and et al (n 538) 37. 
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Having too many institutions may result in inefficiency and become a potential 
source of red tape. In contrast, the government may find it difficult to achieve 
its objectives without sufficient agencies. This is why reorganisation is not only 
about simplifying organisations. Rather, any departmental arrangements 
should aim to improve the public service delivery mechanism, as well as 
improve the performance, professionalism and accountability of public 
officials.767 Sufficient justification should be provided as to why a new agency 
needs to be established. A lean and efficient organisation is important, but 
supporting the executive with the right organisational size and function is more 
important for the government to achieve its goals effectively. Therefore, 
‘proportional’ is also an important azas for this bill. 
e. Professional 
Improving the administration is now seen as a continuous activity. One of the 
goals of any administrative reform is to improve professionalism amongst 
agencies and public officials to meet the heightened pressure of providing 
better services to citizens. Hence, professionalism is also an azas for this bill. 
f. Adaptive, dynamic and innovative 
The typical government institution is often regarded as not dynamic, inefficient 
and slow; the bureaucracy consistently enforces outdated rules and 
complicated procedures. Neo argued that it is essential to implant the spirit of 
‘dynamism’ in the public sector.768 Dynamism is characterised by the rise of 
new ideas and fresh perceptions, sustainable improvement, reactiveness, 
adaptability to new challenges and flourishing of creative innovations.769 The 
adaptive, dynamic and innovative administration will encourage the 
bureaucracy to execute effective, timely policies and to exercise self-
improvement. 
Reform can be challenging if the existing system is rigid against changes. It 
would be difficult for the government to keep up with social changes if their 
                                                 
767 Interview with Ahmad Muqowam (n 350). 
768 Neo (n 169). 
769 Ibid. 
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organisations were not flexible. When an agency is established under 
legislation, it potentially restricts the capability of the government to be 
dynamic, flexible and adaptable. Therefore, this bill should be able to guarantee 
flexibility in managing organisations by allowing the administration more 
discretion to manage their structures. Hence, ‘adaptive’, ‘dynamic’ and 
‘innovative’ are also essential azas for this bill. 
g. Accountable and transparent 
Most reforms aim to make the government more accountable and transparent. 
Many governments around the world have conducted administrative reform 
according to their own contexts, each with different results and distinct 
processes. However, most governments shared the common goals for 
establishing a more efficient and responsive government that is held 
accountable for its work. ‘Good governance’, ‘participatory’, ‘transparent’ and 
‘accountable’ define the process that guides the political and socio-economic 
relationship. Any reorganisation activity should be conducted in an 
accountable and transparent manner without any hidden agenda or vested 
interest. Hence, these two aspects are essential principles to adopt here. 
h. Autonomy and decentralisation 
According to its constitution, Indonesia is a unitary state in the form of a 
republic. The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is divided into layers 
of government, namely central, provinces, municipalities and cities. The local 
governments (pemerintah daerah), which consist of provinces, municipalities 
and cities, govern their respective areas according to the principle of ‘wider 
autonomy’ as stipulated by the 1945 Constitution. Local governments are 
responsible for all administrative functions, except for those stated by the law 
as the authority of the central government. At this time, the power of the central 
government is limited to six broad governance areas, namely foreign affairs, 
monetary and national fiscal, defence, national security, religious matters and 
justice.770 
                                                 
770 Undang-Undang 23/2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah [Act 23/2014 on the Local Governments]. 
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The Local Government Act 23/2014 stipulates that local autonomy is the 
authority of the autonomous regions to exercise and conduct administrative 
functions for the interest of their local society, within the framework of the 
Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.771 The Constitution and the Local 
Governments Act acknowledges that local governments gain ‘autonomy 
power’ after the bestowal from the central government, based on 
decentralisation. The Act 23/2014 defines decentralisation as the handover of 
administrative functions by the central government to autonomous regions 
based on ‘autonomy principles’.772 It shows that there are administrative 
functions of the central government delegated to local governments based on 
autonomy and decentralisation. Therefore, this bill also needs to acknowledge 
the autonomy and decentralisation principles. 
In contrast, Article 26 of the State Ministries Act first acknowledged the 
autonomy for governing principle in relation to the relationship between 
ministries and local governments, as follows (English translation): 
The relationships between ministries and local governments are governed 
within the framework of a Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia’s system 
of government by referring to the principles for the implementation of local 
autonomy, in accordance with prevailing legislations. 773 
However, the above clauses only apply to the relationships between ministries 
and local governments, not to other bodies of the central government, such as 
LPNKs, LNS’s and other executive bodies. Hence, the bill needs to establish 
clauses that encompass all of the institutions of the central government and 
acknowledge the principle of ‘autonomy and decentralisation’. 
i. Delegation 
The Indonesian constitution stipulates that the president is the head of state 
who holds the power of government. The president holds the apex of 
administrative power and the ultimate responsibility of running the 
government. Article 17 of the 1945 Constitution states that, in running the 
                                                 
771 Ibid. 
772 Ibid. 
773 Undang-Undang 39/2008 tentang Kementerian Negara [Act 39/2008 on the State Ministries]. 
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government, the president is to be helped by ministers. In other words, the 
ministers, and other executive bodies, perform their function based on the 
power delegated by the president. Hence, ‘delegation’ is one of the basic 
principles for this bill. 
j. Better public services 
Any institutional reorganisation would be meaningless without a goal to 
improve public service delivery. The government is under continuous pressure 
to do more for citizens by providing better public services. Conducting 
organisational improvement to improve performance and services is necessary 
for any administration. 
7.4.3 Administrative Function 
Formulating ideal clauses to address ‘administrative function’ can be difficult because 
of the entrenchment of current legislation and governance culture. Article 4 of the State 
Ministries Act says that each minister is responsible for a specific function(s), meaning 
that each ministry already has its own specific area of responsibility. However, 
duplication still exists; for example, environmental issues are addressed by more than 
ten ministries and other executive bodies.774 In modern and complex governance, 
collaboration between institutions is obligatory. This bill should be able to facilitate 
such collaboration. Crosscutting issues that involve many agencies such as terrorism, 
mitigation of natural disasters and poverty eradication often require horizontal 
collaboration. This bill should establish clauses for ‘administrative function’ that are 
able to reduce duplication and ease collaboration by preventing executive bodies from 
monopolising a particular administrative function. As such, the institutional sectoral 
ego will be reduced. 
7.4.4 Grand Design and Organisational Mapping 
The Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform argued that important 
resources are often wasted because of poor organisational planning.775 This bill can 
serve as the first logical step for Indonesia to establish a grand administration design. 
                                                 
774 See Chapter 5. 
775 Interview with Asman Abnur (n 352). 
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The formulation of this design can begin with the identification of executive mandates 
according to legislation, especially the constitution. Subsequently, the functional 
relationship and structure of all executive bodies also need to be elaborated on here. 
7.4.5 Classification of Organisations within the Central Government 
This bill needs to reaffirm the classification of organisations in the central government. 
This can be drawn and classified as follows: 
 
Figure 7-1 Recommendation on the Classification of Organisations 
Regarding the classification and position of each type of body, the above figure can be 
explained as follows: 
1. President/Vice President: 
The apex of the administration, head of government and head of state, as stated 
in the 1945 Constitution. 
2. Ministries: 
There are three types of ministries: (i) coordinating ministries (formed 
according to certain areas of national priorities), (ii) Portfolio ministries and 
(iii) non-portfolio ministries. There is also a ministry of state secretariat that 
manages the president’s offices and supports the president’s daily activities. 
The role, function, and power of the portfolio and non-portfolio ministries are 
provided by the State Ministries Act 39/2008. The Act divides ministries into 
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three clusters according to their governance area;776 clusters one and two are 
portfolio ministries and cluster three is the non-portfolio ministries.777 
However, this bill still needs to reaffirm the existence of both portfolio and 
non-portfolio ministries, as well as clarify the position of coordinating 
ministries in executive structure. 
3. Public Broadcasting Agencies: 
These are the Television of the Republic of Indonesia (TVRI) and the RRI. 
4. Institutions at the same level as ministries: 
These institutions include the TNI, the National Police, the National 
Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General. All are directly under and 
reporting to the president, as stipulated in their sectoral statutes. Hence, they 
are part of the executive power, and reorganising these institutions is also 
subject to this bill. 
5. LNS: 
There are 73 statutorily established LNS’s with different administrative 
positions, according to the statutes.778 They can be either directly answerable 
to the president, under the president but coordinated by a relevant ministry, 
under a Ministry or truly independent from the executive. Hence, this bill 
should decide and provide guidance on how to position LNS’s in the 
administrative structure. This will serve as a reference for deciding the scope 
of work of LNS’s, to avoid overlappin with the work of a ministry or LPNK. 
6. LPNK: 
Historically, during Soekarno and Soeharto's administrations, it was the 
president’s prerogative right to establish LPNKs to help with a specific 
function, outside the area of ministerial work but within the proxy of a ministry. 
Therefore, LPNKs received power from the President. Initially, a relevant 
ministry coordinated LPNKs. After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, many LPNKs 
                                                 
776 Undang-Undang 39/2008 tentang Kementerian Negara [Act 39/2008 on the State Ministries]. 
777 Ibid. 
778 See Chapter 6. 
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became statutorily established. Bearing a constitutional status as ‘directly 
under the president’, LPNKs rejected coordination from ministries.779 This bill 
will clarify and reaffirm the position of LPNKs as under the president and 
coordinated by ministries in their relevant areas. This will return the power to 
establish LPNKs to the president.780 As a result, it could prevent the creation 
of LPNKs by statutes in the future, reduce LPNK growth and provide 
flexibility for the president in managing executive agencies. 
7. Secretariats of the MPR, DPR, DPD, MA, MK and BPK: 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the MPR, DPR and DPD held legislative 
power, while the MA (Supreme Court) and MK (Constitutional Court) held the 
power of the judiciary. In addition, the Audit Board of the Republic of 
Indonesia or Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) is given the power to audit 
the use of public finances, in all levels of government and other public 
institutions, by the constitution. The BPK is the highest body responsible for 
the evaluation of financial management and accountability and it is 
independent of other branches of power. These high state bodies have their 
secretariats, who are civil servants subject to the Civil Service Act. Apart from 
the ‘mother institution’, the secretariats of the MPR, DPR, DPD, MA, MK and 
BPK are considered part of the executive structure. Therefore, reforming these 
secretariats should also follow the rule set out by this bill. 
7.4.6 Reasons for Reorganising 
This bill needs to describe the rationales for reorganisation. The following are 
rationales that can be used to justify reorganisation: 
a. No existing institution or unit addressing the issue: 
A new agency can be created if no existing body functions in that particular area 
and the public is demanding that the government provide services in that area. The 
                                                 
779 See Section 5.2. 
780 Ibid. 
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government must be able to deliver to its citizens, faster and better than before, 
and the public may not accept an institutional absence.781 
b. Eliminating or reducing duplications: 
Reorganising by conducting structural simplification is necessary when overlaps 
occur. To date, most ministries and agencies tend to maximise the number of units 
they can have to provide as many possible positions for their top bureaucrats. It 
can be problematic as it potentially duplicates the units. Eliminating unnecessary 
departments and merging them into one department is important to reduce 
duplications. 
c. Delivering faster and better services, as well as adapting to social changes: 
Society always changes, particularly in the current era of information and social 
media, and the government is always required to keep pace with changes in 
society. The public consistently demands better services from the government. 
Establishing more responsive administration should be a goal of reorganisation. 
Government organisations need to be dynamic. As such, reorganisation is 
necessary to improve governance and meet the public needs for better and faster 
government services. 
d. Complying with the international treaty or agreement: 
Creating a new agency or conducting restructuring is occasionally necessary to 
comply with international agreements or treaties, in which Indonesia is taking part 
and bound to abide. For example, Indonesia is a party to the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety, in which, Article 8 (Regulatory Body) states: 
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body 
entrusted with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework 
referred to Article 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence and 
financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned responsibilities. 
2. Each contracting party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective 
separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other 
                                                 
781 Interview with Ahmad Muqowam (n 350). 
 220 
body or organisation concerned with the promotion or utilisation of nuclear 
energy.782 
To comply with the above provisions, particularly Paragraph 2, the Indonesian 
government separated the agencies performing regulatory function and the 
promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy. Before 1997, these functions were 
conducted by a single agency, the Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN). In 1997, 
the implementing law of this convention in Indonesia, the Nuclear Energy Act 
10/1997, split the two functions by establishing two agencies.783 One is the 
Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN), which functions as a regulatory 
body in the uses of nuclear energy, and the other is BATAN, which plays a role 
in the promotion and utilisation of nuclear energy. 
e. Changes to the vision and mission of the national government: 
When facing new challenges, a country must readjust its vision and mission, and 
with it, the government organisation. 
f. Accelerating the accomplishment of national goals: 
Reorganisation is conducted to accelerate the completion of national development 
plans and policies. After winning the election, the elected government needs to 
decide their one term (5 year) national development plan, known as the National 
Medium-term Development Plan (RPJMN). the RPJMN is derived from the 20-
year National Long-term Development Plan (RPJPN) and the vision and mission 
of the current government. National goals often change periodically, along with 
the establishment of the RPJMN, which is modified to the machinery of 
government to achieve those goals. A new agency may be required to address a 
particular issue or abolish existing institutions for a more effective and efficient 
government. 
Reorganisation decisions should not rely on a motive of accommodating vested 
interests that will make the government less effective and less efficient. 
                                                 
782 Vienna Convention on Nuclear Safety, opened for signature 20 September 1994,  IAEA – 
INFCIRC/449 (entered into force 24 October 1996). 
783 Undang-Undang 10/1997 tentang Energi Nuklir [Act 10/1997 on Nuclear Energy]. 
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7.4.7 Reorganisation Procedures 
The ideal reorganisation should be free from any vested interests. In this regard, the 
president is entrusted by the 1945 Constitution with the flexibility to manage the 
organisations of the executive bodies. Therefore, statutorily establishing agencies may 
contravene the presidential system adopted by the constitution. As such, a measure to 
prevent the future establishment of new agencies under statutes—unless there is a 
strong reason for establishing an agency under the law—must be in place. 
The authority to create, merge and abolish ministries and agencies should be held only 
by the president. On behalf of the president, the MoABR is responsible for assessing 
administration structure, conducting administrative reform and deciding on the 
restructuration of directorate generals, bureaus, directorates and other, smaller units. 
However, to ensure a smooth reorganisation process, the process must be actuated in 
this bill. 
This bill should affirm the constitutional power of the president to create, merge and 
abolish ministries and agencies. Any proposal of machinery restructuring should be 
subject to the president’s approval, after receiving considerations from MoABR and 
relevant ministries and agencies for the particular issue. For directorate generals and 
smaller units within a ministry or agency, the president may delegate his power to 
reorganise a ministry to MoABR. 
The president should solely decide on the establishment of a ministry or agency. 
However, for establishing a new unit within a ministry or agency (directorate general, 
directorate, division, bureau, technical service units, etc.), this bill can state that the 
president delegates the power to restructure to the MoABR. This will simplify the 
procedure for establishing a new unit, as the president does not need to bother with 
smaller activities in reorganising and may entrust a ministry with the responsibility for 
administrative reform. The MoABR can only decide that the establishment of such 
new unit is necessary if the reasons can be justified and its financial implications, 
potential duplications and other potential harms have been considered. 
This bill provides general steps to restructure the organisation of a ministry or agency. 
First, a ministry that intends to perform a restructure should propose it to the MoABR 
and describe its justifications, the problems to address and the current conditions of 
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the units, including the function or responsibilities, personnel, assets, intra-units’ 
process of business, procedures and other relevant matters. Additionally, it is important 
to mention possible alternatives other than reorganisation, and the reason to choose 
reorganisation over such alternatives. The examples of such alternatives can be 
capacity building, additional personnel, improvement to assets and other facilities, 
improvement to procedures, etc. Second, after receiving the proposal, the MoABR 
need to discuss with relevant ministries and agencies such as MoF for financial 
implications, Ministry of Laws and Human Rights for legal implications, Ministry of 
National Development Planning for its consistency with national goals and plans, the 
Civil Service Agency on the issue of human resources, the proposing ministry or 
agency and other relevant bodies. Finally, upon reflecting on institutional assessments 
and considerations from those relevant stakeholders, the MoABR may decide whether 
reorganisation is necessary. 
The arrangements for mergers and liquidations should not be too different from those 
for establishment. Merging and abolishing a ministry or agency should be decided by 
the president, and by the MoABR for units within a ministry or agency. However, a 
comprehensive plan on human resources arrangements should accompany the plan to 
manage the affected bodies. This bill should also require an institutional assessment 
before the merger to describe the transferred function and reasoning for abolishment. 
The reasons to conduct abolishment include that the government is no longer 
responsible for the issue, the private sector could deliver a more effective and efficient 
function, an existing or potential duplication and that the statutes require abolishment. 
7.4.8 The Executive’s Role 
The executive is responsible for executing most legislative products and has a thorough 
comprehension of the problems that need to be fixed in its organisation. This legal 
framework must reaffirm the power of the president and the relevant ministry—the 
MoABR in conducting institutional reorganisation. The government, through the 
MoABR, should be allowed to assess and calculate the size of the executive bodies the 
government needs to complete tasks efficiently and effectively. 
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7.4.9 The Legislative’s Role 
Although managing the administration is the executive’s domain, the role of 
legislatures in shaping the administration is significant. Article 20 of the 1945 
Constitution gave parliament the power to conduct budgeting and supervisory 
functions. 784 Its role in shaping the bureaucracy cannot be undermined. To prevent the 
government from abusing power and other misconduct, the legislative should conduct 
an effective supervisory function, or checks and balances, on the government.785 
There are over ten political parties in the DPR, each with its own agenda, and it is no 
surprise that bureaucracy is an object of these contending interests.786 Accordingly, 
any check and balance role of the parliament must not involve any vested interests for 
political or personal gain.787 The legislative power should not interfere with the 
managerial aspect of the government,788 except for a greater interest, such as if the 
government is corrupt and abusing its power. This bill should establish terms that 
affirm the power of parliament to conduct checks and balances while also preventing 
the use of this power to interfere in the details of reorganisation. This should prevent 
the DPR from interfering with the managerial aspect of managing administration and 
reduces vested interests in reorganisation. 
7.4.10 The Public’s Role 
There is an increasing demand for transparency, accountability and public 
participation in the making of public policy. Therefore, the public should be given a 
greater opportunity to express their concerns and opinions in any reorganisation 
decision, especially if such reorganisation will affect basic public services. The public 
is the heart of any governance and any good government is built upon the consent of 
its citizens. As such, the government must strengthen its relationship with citizens. 
OECD describes the reasons the government must strengthen its relationship with the 
public as to improve the quality of public policy, to meet the challenges of the 
emerging information society, to integrate public input into policy-making, to respond 
                                                 
784 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945 [Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945]. 
785 Interview with Ahmad Muqowam (n 350). 
786 Interview with Asman Abnur (n 352). 
787 Interview with Abdul Kharis (n 401). 
788 Interview with Bambang Supriyono (n 389). 
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for transparency and accountability and to improve public trust in the government.789 
In this regard, the general public, universities, academics and non-governmental 
organisations may participate in the reform decision processes. This bill should 
guarantee that the public is allowed to express their suggestions, concerns and even 
criticisms or objections regarding any reorganisation plan. 
7.4.11 Transitional and Closing Provisions 
Some provisions of this bill may conflict with some existing statutes, particularly the 
State Ministries Act and sectoral laws of respective institutions. The bill should have 
transitional provisions that state articles in the State Ministries Act inconsistent with 
this law are revoked by this law. For example, it may state: 
Any provisions in the State Ministries Act 39/2008 that are inconsistent with this 
law are revoked and deemed no longer valid. 
For laws other than the State Ministries Act, the bill should state that it would prevail 
if the matter concerned the organisation of central government. Examples are as 
follows: 
At the time of this law entering into force, any legislation related to the institutional 
system of the central government is deemed still valid as long as it has not been 
revoked by, and not contradict, this law. 
At the time of this law entering into force, any law and regulation directly related to 
the issue of organisation of the central government should refer to this law and be 
amended accordingly. 
In addition to transitional provisions, it is also common for any legislation in Indonesia 
to have a ‘closing provision’ which indicates when the law is entering into force, for 
example, ‘This law is entering into force on the date of its enactment’. The next section 
discusses the potential changes that will happen if this bill is passed to become law. 
                                                 
789 Joanne Caddy and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Evaluating Public 
Participation in Policy Making (OECD, 2005) 19. 
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7.5 New Direction for Reorganisation: Expected Changes in Legal 
Culture 
If it is enacted to become the law, the bill may bring a new direction for institutional 
reform and ways of managing organisations. The terms of this bill should limit the 
ability of the DPR to intervene in how agencies are made. In contrast, the executive 
can freely develop its organisations without any interference from the DPR. This, of 
course, will raise some questions, such as what if the government abuses its power and 
engages in enlarging the bureaucracy and how to prevent and control this issue. 
Those issues can be addressed by optimising checks and balances, which is the role of 
the DPR, guaranteed in the 1945 Constitution and affirmed by this bill. The DPR holds 
the power to conduct checks and balances by conducting budgeting and supervisory 
functions on the government. It has a strong power to ensure that resources are used 
efficiently and effectively by the government. If the DPR discovered that the 
government was using too much taxpayer money on maintaining a large number of 
government organisations and government programs were executed ineffectively 
because of duplications, the DPR could instruct the government to use resources 
efficiently and simplify its organisations. The DPR can even hold and freeze the 
government’s budget, as stipulated in the Constitution and the National Financial Act. 
In contrast, with its checks and balances power, the DPR can still recommend that the 
government create an agency for a particular issue if the legislatures find that the 
government has not addressed the issue. To date, the creation of an agency through 
statutes is the root of inefficiency and the cause of the mushrooming bureaucracy in 
Indonesia. This bill should stipulate that the DPR must refrain from including the terms 
for establishing new agencies in laws that they initiate. Instead, the management of 
organisations of administration should be entrusted to the executive power itself. If 
anything goes wrong with how the government manages its organisations, the DPR, 
as a legislative power, still has the power to correct it with its power to conduct checks 
and balances. Hence, it will return the institutional management of government to the 
presidential system principles of the constitution. 
The new law can serves as a starting point to conduct reform. It may seem unnecessary 
if all political stakeholders—both in executive and legislative—have reached maturity 
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in governing and have implemented the principles of democracy. Such democracy 
maturity, if achieved, can make stakeholders fully aware of the importance of 
effectivity and efficiency in managing administration. Administrative reform certainly 
needs strong commitment and support from those stakeholders. A reform may fail to 
achieve its goals if the reform stakeholders do not understand the necessity of building 
an efficient and effective government. The executive and the legislative in Indonesia 
have not reached such democracy maturity as explored in this thesis and hence the new 
law is necessary. 
Every government is required to be responsive, efficient and effective in delivering its 
programs and policies. Therefore, the government should have an effective 
organisational configuration. Successful reorganisation will depend on the capability 
to overcome political and legal issues in reorganisation. The organisations of the 
Indonesian central government have grown large over the years. This large 
administration has resulted in duplications and inefficiencies in the use of the state’s 
budget. The Indonesian government should start to consider downsizing to fix current 
malaise in its bureaucracy. Accordingly, the legal framework discussed in this thesis 
is designed to pave the way for better institutional reform to develop the most efficient 
and effective government. 
Efficient organisation will help the government to simplify processes and eliminate 
useless processes. The right institutional configuration enables cooperation and 
interoperability of processes between institutions. These are possible to achieve by 
changing the current legal framework. Legal changes to support the reform are 
important to change the culture, mindset and customs of how organisations are made. 
This new law is also essential to increase commitment from all reform stakeholders. 
As such, this new framework will put the progress of reform back on track for 
achieving national development goals. 
Although civil servants should be neutral, top bureaucrats are often engaged with 
politics and political processes. The oligarchic structure of political elites in Indonesia 
can be a significant hurdle for governance. The government may find itself helpless to 
make decisions that are free from the vested interests of elites. As such, attempts to 
establish a workable government are also constrained by the influences and interests 
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of political elites.790 Politicians and top bureaucrats may fear that reform threatens their 
position, power and popularity. It is no surprise that their support of reform is often 
insincere and they exercise caution to conduct reform without sacrificing their own 
‘comfort.’ Many of them hide their agencies under the protection of legislation. Many 
agencies have a statute that protects their organisation. These are the issues that need 
to be addressed by the bill suggested here. Without changing the current legal 
framework, it may become difficult to modify the current mindset and legal culture 
related to institutional reorganisation. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
Indonesian administrative reform needs the support of a legal change—a new 
framework to change the existing legal culture of law-making related to government 
organisations. This measure is important to close the gap of silo-minded laws and the 
urgency to have the most efficient and effective organisations. Sectoral statutes protect 
many executive bodies. A new legal framework in reform will change the culture, 
mindset and customs of how organisations should be built. To provide a consolidated 
reorganisation, legislation should not mention the terms of establishing new agencies. 
The solution of developing a new legal framework for reform, as proposed in this 
chapter can serve as a starting point to commence reform. The purpose of this new law 
is to set up principles and requirements in conducting reorganisation and hence the 
effect the suggested law is to act as the first step to change legal culture related to 
reorganisation.  This law can serves as a bridge to build reform commitment from all 
reform stakeholders.  
  
                                                 
790 Mietzner (n 225). 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes this thesis by summarising the key findings according to each 
research question. It also provides some recommendations in light of the findings and 
aligned with research objectives. Then, it will provide chapter limitations and direction 
for future research, followed by concluding thoughts of the author. This thesis has 
addressed the research questions introduced in Chapter 1: 
1. Does the legislation and surrounding political interests constrain reorganisation 
in Indonesia? 
2. Would a bloated bureaucracy result in the need to reform and what realistic 
reform measure can be implemented to overcome the political and statutory 
challenges facing reorganisation? 
The preceding chapters have outlined research findings in detail. This thesis argues 
that successful bureaucracy reform depends on the capability to overcome political and 
legal challenges facing institutional reorganisation. The critical factors and constraints 
to the reorganisation of government institutions in Indonesia, specifically for political 
and statutory barriers, are summarised in the following sections under each of the 
research questions. 
8.2 Review of Key Findings 
8.2.1 The First Research Question 
The findings of the first research question affirmed that legislation and the surrounding 
political interests constrain reorganisation.791 Indonesian government bodies have 
become so large because legal rules have been used to create structures.792 There are 
laws in place that provide preservation of a large number of executive bodies.793 These 
laws state the establishment, nomenclature or the authority of a particular ministry or 
                                                 
791 See findings in Chapters 5 and 6. 
792 See interview answers from Prasodjo in p. 197. 
793 See findings in Chapters 6.3.2 and 6.4. 
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agency. Reforming such institutions first requires amending or revoking legislation 
linked to their organisation. 
The process of law amendment (and revocation) is equal to passing a new law. It 
requires a political process to achieve another consensus between branches of power. 
Hence, reorganisation can imply more than a plain administrative measure. Politics 
and statutes have a significant influence in shaping the bureaucracy and they also 
exercise too much control over the bureaucracy. 
Establishing effectivity and improving efficiency is a challenge, as the government 
does not have the flexibility to manage its bodies. Laws can either support or constrain 
reorganisation. The statutory problems surrounding the reform in Indonesia have 
existed over years and these problems were most likely because of the legal culture of 
law-making. 
It has been commonly assumed that legislation often reflects the vested interests of 
political forces and that these interests dominate the management of the government. 
Unfortunately, such interests sometimes contradict the real organisational needs of the 
government.794 New agencies are formed by legislation to create top-echelon jobs for 
the potential affiliations of a particular political party, to return favours during the 
election or to have someone as a puppet in the administration to benefit the party.795 
Reducing the size of government may help to improve the situation; with less budget, 
there will be less incentive for rent-seeking. 
Since the government is rather powerless when discussing bills with the DPR, it may 
feel reluctant to push its reform agenda through the bill that is being discussed.796 This 
makes it difficult to filter the DPR’s intention to insert provisions for the establishment 
of new agencies in statutes. In addition, the interview processes in this study observed 
that political and statutory problems constraining reform include silo-mindset and 
sectoral ego, lack of reform commitment, disharmony of laws, insufficient legislation 
support and reorganisation legal culture. 
                                                 
794 See interview answers in Chapter 4.3. 
795 See Chapters 4.4 and 4.5 
796 See Chapters 4.5, 6.2.2, and 6.3.1. 
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8.2.2 The Second Research Question 
The second research question findings indicated that reorganisation needs a legislation 
reform to overcome its political and statutory challenges. Because of the political and 
statutory problems surrounding organisations, the government has grown too large. 
Indonesia still has too many agencies, owing mainly to significant job duplications 
among them.797 As resources are limited, achieving effectivity and efficiency is 
important and it would be unwise to spend a lot of the budget maintaining the vast 
government organisations. 
The existing legislation framework did not provide significant support for reform. The 
spirit of efficiency is not evident in statutes; many of these have contributed to the 
creation of massive and fragmented organisations, resulting in overlaps and 
duplications.798 The use of statutes to create government bodies have undermined the 
presidential system adopted by the 1945 Constitution and are slowly reducing 
flexibility in organisational management. However, it is not too late to reform. 
The reform may succeed if political constraints are well-managed and the laws are 
redesigned to reduce impediments. To address the political and statutory problems, the 
Indonesian government needs a new legal culture of reform. To change this legal 
culture, Indonesia needs to redesign the law by establishing a new legislation 
framework to support reform.799 
The future of reform depends on the government's ability to address political and 
legislation challenges of reorganisation. Strategically, the government needs support 
from other political forces, such as parliament, political parties and the public, to 
conduct reform. Therefore, reform visions capable of unifying all reform stakeholders 
must be in place. 
Establishing a lean and efficient structure is a difficult task. Yet, it is not impossible. 
To do this, pragmatic interests in organisations should be minimised. This can be done 
by returning the process of creating agencies to that described in the 1945 Constitution. 
In this regard, legislation reform is required to change the current reorganisation legal 
                                                 
797 See interview answers in p. 83, 95, also see findings in Chapters 4.5 and 5.4. 
798 See Chapters 5.2 and 6.5. 
799 See Chapters 7.2 and 7.3. 
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culture by developing a new law that serves the purpose of bridging the gap of sectoral-
perspective statutes and the need for reform. The root of the problems studied here is 
the legislation, which is essentially a political product.800 If the government is eager to 
solve the problems examined in this study, it should first address statutes linked to 
reorganisation. 
This thesis has established key points for the proposed new law, the Bill on 
Institutional System of the Central Government Law. Sectoral statutes protect many 
executive bodies. The purpose of this suggested new legislation is to set up guiding 
principles of reorganisation.801 The effect of this is that the new legal framework will 
change the culture, mindset and customs of how organisations should be built. To 
provide flexibility and a consolidated reorganisation, it is crucial for statutes not to 
mention the terms of establishing new agencies. Reorganising the organisation of 
executive bodies is constitutionally the executive’s domain. Hence, the government 
should be given the flexibility to manage its organisations, as it has a thorough 
comprehension of the problems that need to be fixed in its organisations. 
The new law serves as a starting step to conduct reform. If the bill proposed in this 
thesis is developed into law, it can be a sign that both sides of power—executive and 
legislative—are on the same page of commitment to reform. The law might no longer 
be needed if all political stakeholders—executive and legislative—have reached 
maturity in governing, have implemented the principles of democracy and are fully 
aware of the importance of effectivity and efficiency. Bureaucracy reform requires 
strong commitment and support from both executive and legislative. It might be 
difficult to achieve the reform goals if the relevant stakeholders fail to understand the 
necessity of building an efficient and effective government. 
8.3 Recommendations 
This thesis has highlighted the problem of how politics and statutes constrain 
reorganisation. It will ignite the debate that something need to be done to reduce the 
bloating of the Indonesian government. Politics and legislation frameworks have 
contributed to the creation of large organisations with potential duplications. This 
                                                 
800 See Chapter 7.3. 
801 See Chapter 7.4 to see suggested reorganisation principles and other key points of the suggested bill.  
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shows there is a need for reorganisation. For more consolidated reorganisation, future 
statutes should not include the terms of establishing new agencies and not explicitly 
mention the name of a specific institution for a particular issue. The 1945 Constitution 
should be the primary reference in the making of a new government body, meaning 
that the establishment of a new ministry or agency is subject to the decision of the 
president. The Constitution applies a presidential system, which bestows the president 
as the apex of the executive the power to govern the administration, to appoint 
ministers and to create or dismantle ministries and agencies. 
Because the DPR have a stronger power than the government in law-making, the 
government may feel reluctant to push its reform agenda through the bill that is being 
discussed with the DPR.802 The imbalance power between the legislature and the 
executive prevents the government from imposing a filter to the idea of establishing 
new agencies, proposed by DPR in their bills.803 Therefore, the government needs to 
be firm and have a strong argument to filter proposals for new agencies by providing 
evidence that the budget cannot afford to have more agencies, or that it will become a 
potential duplication. 
In the Indonesian presidential system, the executive should have the flexibility and full 
authority to manage its bodies. While reform commitment from all stakeholders is 
essential, it should first come from the executive as they hold control of the 
administration. The reform requires bureaucrats with a sincere commitment to reform. 
Changes in the reform process can be uncomfortable, but they can be made acceptable 
if the goals of reform are clear and widely accepted by stakeholders. 
This thesis recommends that the Indonesian government develop a new legislation 
framework to support reorganisation and overcome the political and statutory barriers 
to reform. In this regard, it recommends that the bill discussed in Chapter 7 be 
developed further to become the law. If the law recommended by this thesis is passed 
and the government is given its independence and flexibility to manage organisations, 
the control and supervision of the DPR over the government are still relevant and need 
to be optimised. While managing administration is the power of the government, the 
                                                 
802 See Chapter 4.5. 
803 See Chapter 6.2.2. 
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legislative function of the DPR cannot be undermined. The constitution gave the DPR 
the power to conduct budgeting and supervisory functions. To ensure the government 
is not abusing power and to prevent other misconduct, the legislative should conduct 
checks and balances on the government effectively. The DPR needs to ensure the 
efficient use of resources. If it is found that public expenditure is largely spent on 
maintaining inefficient organisations, the DPR needs to instruct the government to use 
resources efficiently by simplifying organisations. In some cases, the DPR has the 
power to freeze the government budget. With its check and balance power, the DPR 
can recommend that the government create an agency for a particular issue. However, 
the DPR should no longer use legislation for pushing the creation of new agencies. 
8.4 Limitations and Direction for Future Research 
The conclusions outlined in this study must be considered within the context of certain 
limitations. First, this study is context-specific to the Indonesian political and 
administrative system. As the interviews were conducted in the second and third years 
of this research (in 2017 and 2018), and this study was started in 2016, it is possible 
that some events were missed, forgotten or are no longer relevant. 
Second, data were collected mainly from in-depth interviews, and thus, rely on the 
interviewees’ experience and memory. In case some events may have been incorrectly 
described by the interviewees, the researcher have corroborated other sources and 
interviewees to ensure that the thesis reflects the correct views.  
Third, this project involved a small number of participants (14 interviewees). 
However, they were selected based on their capacity to conduct or influence the 
direction of institutional reform in Indonesia. While these interviewees were of diverse 
backgrounds, this project would certainly have benefitted if it was able to obtain 
additional participants, particularly for exploring more sensitive issues such as 
corruption, which influenced how the organisations were built. 
This thesis takes note that corruption (including rent-seeks) is a major problem 
surrounding the bureaucracy. Corruption is an important factor that influences how the 
law is made, as affirmed by interviewees.804 Whilst it has been identified as a major 
                                                 
804 See p. 92. 
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issue in governance, the sensitive issue of corruption is not explored further to maintain 
the focus of the research in answering research questions. 
Similarly, the proposed bill also excluding terms for addressing corruption. This is 
because there are already other specific laws addressing corruption, such as Criminal 
Code Law and Anti-Corruption Law. The Article 2 of the latter is even very harsh in 
addressing corruption; it stipulates that corruption is an act of crime that attracts capital 
punishment.805 Analysis on the extent of the effectivity of anti-corruption law is an 
area beyond the focus of this study. However, as noted in Chapter 7, the bill proposed 
in this thesis is a starting point to commence reform. It acts as the first step to change 
the legal culture in reorganisation. Eventually, it will help to reverse the ‘culture of 
corruption’ in reorganisation and serves as a bridge to build reform commitment from 
all stakeholders. 
Last, the researcher knew some of the interviewees personally. While this may affect 
the accuracy of analysis of the situation being studied, care has been taken to minimise 
subjectivity. In dealing with the problem, the researcher interpreted what the 
interviewees said and then checked his interpretation with statutes and literature. This 
process linked findings from interviews with general concepts available in the 
literature and legal rules. However, as the findings also contain the view of the 
researcher, in most of the study, it only offers one of many possible explanations. Like 
other qualitative studies, another researcher can draw a different conclusion based on 
the same data. As such, it is difficult to generalise the findings in a statistical form and 
logically. 
Another limitation has been that it was not possible to test the recommendation made 
by this thesis. However, it is important to note that the researcher was familiar with 
the situation being studied because of his previous and current employment at the 
Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. As a result, he has inside 
knowledge and experience regarding the situation about the progress of institutional 
reform. Therefore, he is able to judge why suggested solution is likely able to resolve 
the problem.  This solution was also discussed with all the interviewees and most of 
                                                 
805 Undang-Undang 31/1999 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi [Act31/1999 on 
Eradication of Corruption / Anti-Corruption Act] 
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them agreed, especially the respondents from the executive, academia and the NGO’s. 
Some interviewees, although they agreed in principle, however, they pointed out the 
difficulties and obstacles. As discussed, over the years the legislative has always 
attempted to accommodate their interests in the organisational design of the 
government. Passing this law to the DPR can be difficult as the law may seem 
controlling the DPR’s involvement in the government machinery.806  The political 
parties in the DPR might oppose this law if they thought it would restrict their ability 
to formulate legislation that includes the terms for establishing a new body.807   
This thesis opens up several possibilities for further research. First, it would be 
interesting to study how the findings outlined in this study are put into practice in 
reforming the bureaucracy in Indonesia. This will feed the curiosity to understand the 
extent of the applicability of the core principles in this thesis. Second, one could study 
the leading role of the executive through the MoABR in conducting reorganisation. 
Third, further study on the applicability of the new legal culture in different settings 
can provide a better understanding of how certain legal cultures affect bureaucracy 
reform. 
8.5 Concluding Thoughts 
Any taxpayer wants the tax they paid to be used efficiently by their government for 
the benefit of the public. Citizens do not want their government to use resources 
inefficiently, but they demand better services from their government. Hence, the 
inefficient use of the budget to manage large organisations is unwise. Having too many 
agencies is a potential source of duplication of function, and some issues are too 
crowded to be handled by too many agencies.808 The government is expected to satisfy 
its citizens by delivering services. Therefore, citizens should not be confused by the 
intricate processes of multiple institutions for a single service. 
The Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform says that a large amount of 
public expenditure has been used to maintain the vast and massive bureaucracy. 
Having too many agencies addressing the same issue means that there are excessive 
                                                 
806 See interview answers from Prasodjo in p. 92 and interview answers from Kharis in p. 201. 
807 See Chapter 7.3 
808 See Chapter 5. 
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channels to implement policy and deliver public services. Some of the departments of 
the Indonesian government, to some extent, are created based on desire instead of the 
real necessity of the administration. 
It is never too late to reform. The Indonesian government should start to make its 
organisations more efficient while still able to execute policies effectively. Effective 
and efficient organisation will help the government simplify processes and eliminate 
useless processes. A lean and appropriate framework of structures makes cooperation 
between elements of the bureaucracy possible, produces interoperability and is crucial 
to save taxpayers’ money. The assumption is that a reduction of structures and 
personnel will result in savings in the government’s budget. Providing flexibility for 
the government to eliminate unnecessary agencies has the potential benefit of reducing 
public expenditure. Therefore, legislation should not restrict the flexibility of 
managing administration. 
There is always a limit for any government to manage its organisations. The 
Indonesian government may not be able to afford to have another agency that has the 
same function as an existing one. The money spent on maintaining unnecessary 
agencies is better spent on much greater purposes, like improving education, health, 
welfare and other basic social services. 
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Appendix A Initial Interview Plan 
Interviews will be conducted according to the following plan: 
1. Establishing rapport: 
a. Greetings and general introduction. 
b. Information about the study. 
2. Participant to sign a consent form. 
3. Topics to be covered in the interview: 
a. Participant background: 
i. General information background (age range, sex, education, etc). 
ii. Professional background (role and position). 
b. Overview of the Indonesian Bureaucracy Reform and Institutional 
Reorganisation in Public Sector: 
i. The goals of bureaucracy reform, particularly in the area of 
institutional changes. 
ii. Current progress and achievement of institutional reform.  
iii. What is challenges and obstacles to reform? 
c. Current practice on institutional reorganization: 
i. Overview of the current structure of the Indonesian bureaucracy. 
ii. What makes an effective and efficient organisation in public sector? 
iii. Business processes between and intra ministries and agencies. 
iv. Procedures in conducting restructuring and organizational changes. 
d. Political and Legal Challenges in Institutional Reorganization: 
i. The current administration political will on bureaucracy reform. 
ii. Public leader’s support for administrative reform. 
iii. Support from both executive and legislative branch of powers to 
reform. 
iv. Political motives for reform. 
v. Political and legal aspects that shape governance structure in 
Indonesia. 
vi. The current legal framework for reform. 
vii. Problems of disharmony of laws and policies. 
viii. What are possible solutions?  
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Reforming Indonesian Bureaucracy: Political and Legal Challenges 
in Institutional Reorganisation 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
HREC Project 
Number: 
HRE2016-0474 
Project title: 
Reforming Indonesian Bureaucracy: Political and 
Legal Challenges in Institutional Reorganization  
Principal 
investigator: 
Professor Gabriël Moens, Professor of Law, Curtin 
Law School 
Student 
researcher: 
Mas Pungky Hendra Wijaya 
Version number: 1 
Version date: 1 November 2016 
 
 
What is the Project About? 
Governments are required to be effective and efficient in their organisation. 
This effective institutional organisation is an important requirement for effective 
reform. However, reforming the bureaucracy in Indonesia is not easy since 
there are political and legal impediments in conducting reorganization in 
government institutions. Bureaucracy reform may succeed if political 
constraints are well-managed and the laws are redesigned to reduce 
impediments to successful bureaucracy reform. This research will examine 
critical factors and constraints of reorganization of government institutions in 
Indonesia, specifically for political and legal barriers to institutional 
restructuring and argue that successful reform will depend on the capability to 
overcome political and legal issues in reorganization. 
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This research is designed in a qualitative study that expected to find the 
identification of political and legal challenges in conducting institutional reform 
and examine the extent of those challenges that shape the governance 
structure of the Indonesian bureaucracy and how they constrain the 
reformation of the public sector in Indonesia. 
 
This research will contribute to the literature of administrative law and 
institutional reform in a number of ways. First, this research will provide 
knowledge of key determinants and challenges in reforming organisation of 
the government institutions in Indonesia. Secondly, it will provide identification 
of political and legal aspects that influence institutional reform in the 
Indonesian government. Some studies have included investigation of political 
and legal aspects of reform in developing countries. However, the extent to 
which political and legal features shapes the public sector governance in 
Indonesia, particularly in organizational changes, has not been thoroughly 
studied.  
 
To the best of knowledge, none of the previous studies undertaken in the study 
area have included key determinants and deep analysis to political and legal 
aspects of Indonesian government institutional reform, nor providing 
recommendation for the solutions of political and legal problems in conducting 
institutional reforms. This study will achieve research significance by filling 
these important knowledge gaps. It will also contribute to finding best solutions 
to political and legal challenges in conducting organizational changes. The 
outcome of this study will also be beneficial for policy makers in developing 
good governance as well as harmonising current legal rules of institutional 
structure in the bureaucracy. 
 
For the purpose of this research, ten interviewees are required to participate 
in this research. They are selected based on their capacity to conduct or 
influence the direction of institutional reform in Indonesia, these are: 
1. Minister and its deputy at the Ministry of Administrative Reform of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
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2. Those who work at the director-level at the ministries/agencies which are 
currently conducted reorganization. 
3. Academics in institutional reform and administrative laws in Indonesia. 
4. A Member of Parliament from the 2nd Commission of the House of 
Representatives. 
 
Who is doing the Research? 
The project is being conducted by Mas Pungky Hendra Wijaya, supervised by 
Professor Gabriël Moens (main supervisor) and Dr Prafula Pearce (co-
supervisor). The result of this research will be used by Mas Pungky Hendra 
Wijaya to obtain Doctor of Philosophy from Curtin University. His study is 
funded by the Indonesian Government through the Indonesian Endowment 
Fund Scholarship scheme (Lembaga Pengembangan Dana Pendidikan – 
LPDP Scholarship), provided by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia.  
 
Why am I being asked to take part and what will I have to do? 
You have been asked to participate in this research as your profile met the 
condition we are researching. The study will take place at a mutually 
convenient location. Should you decided to be a respondent for this study, you 
will be required to describe your experience in developing institutional reform 
policies or conducting institutional reorganization. You will be required to 
explain any political and legal impediments that you may encounter in 
conducting reorganization in public sector institutions. The interviews will take 
time for up to 60 minutes.  
We will make a digital audio recording so we can concentrate on what you 
have to say and not distract ourselves with taking notes. This is also to ensure 
the accuracy of the information as well as to prevent any misinformation or 
misunderstanding. The interviews will be transcribed.  
 
There will be no cost to you for taking part in this research and you will not be 
paid for taking part. However, you will be provided a souvenir as a token of 
appreciation.  
 
Are there any benefits to being in the research project? 
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There may be no direct benefit to you from participating in this research. 
However, this research can be used to express ideas, opinions, and concern 
related to bureaucracy reform, particularly in the area of organizational 
changes. We hope the results of this research will allow us to contribute in 
finding best solutions to political and legal challenges in conducting 
organizational changes. The outcome of this study will also be beneficial for 
policy makers in developing good governance as well as harmonising legal 
rules of institutional structure in public sector.  
 
Are there any risks, side-effects, discomforts or inconveniences from 
being in the research project? 
There are no foreseeable risks from this research project. We have been 
careful to make sure that the questions and topics in this interview do not cause 
you any distress. But if you feel anxious about any of the questions, you do not 
need to answer them. Apart from giving up your time, we do not expect that 
there will be any risks or inconveniences associated with taking part in this 
study. 
 
Who will have access to my information? 
The information collected in this research will be identifiable. This means that 
any information we collect that can identify you will stay on the information we 
collect and it will be treated as confidential and used only in the project unless 
otherwise stated. We can let others know this information only if you say so or 
if the law says we need to. All information will be stored securely at Curtin 
University. The following people will have access to the information we collect 
in this research: the research team and, in the event of an audit or 
investigation, staff from the Curtin University Office of Research and 
Development. 
 
Electronic data will be password-protected and hard copy data will be kept in 
locked storage. The information we collect in this study will be kept under 
secure conditions at Curtin University for 7 years after the research has ended 
and then it will be kept indefinitely. As a participant, you have the right to 
access, and request correction of, your information in accordance with relevant 
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privacy laws. The results of this research may be presented at conferences or 
published in professional journals.  
 
Will you tell me the results of the research? 
We will write to you at the end of the research in about 6 months and let you 
know the results of the research. Results will not be individual but based on all 
the information we collect and review as part of the research. The results of 
this research may also be available in a publication.  
 
Do I have to take part in the research project? 
Taking part in this research project is voluntary. It is your choice to take part or 
not. You do not have to agree if you do not want to. If you decide to take part 
and then change your mind, that is okay, you can withdraw from the project. 
You do not have to give us a reason; just tell us that you want to stop. Please 
let us know you want to stop so we can make sure you are aware of any thing 
that needs to be done so you can withdraw safely. If you choose not to take 
part or start and then stop the study, it will not affect your relationship with the 
University, staff or colleagues. If you chose to leave the study we will use any 
information collected unless you tell us not to.  
 
What happens next and who can I contact about the research? 
If you decide to take part in this research we will ask you to sign the consent 
form. By signing it is telling us that you understand what you have read and 
what has been discussed. Signing the consent indicates that you agree to be 
in the research project. You will be given a copy of this information and the 
consent form to keep. 
Any inquiries for this research can be addressed to: 
 
Principal Investigator 
Professor Gabriël Moens 
 
Department of Law – 
Curtin Law School 
Co-Supervisor 
Dr Prafula Pearce 
 
Department of Law – 
Curtin Law School 
Researcher/Student  
Mas Pungky Hendra 
Wijaya 
Curtin Law School 
 261 
Curtin Business School 
Curtin University 
Email: 
Gabriel.Moens@curtin.edu
.au  
 
Curtin Business School 
Curtin University 
Email: 
Prafula.Pearce@curtin.ed
u.au  
Curtin Business 
School 
Curtin University 
Email: 
p.mas@postgrad.curt
in.edu.au  
 
 
Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) has approved this 
study (HREC number 2016-0474). Should you wish to discuss the study with 
someone not directly involved, in particular, any matters concerning the conduct of 
the study or your rights as a participant, or you wish to make a confidential complaint, 
you may contact the Ethics Officer on (08) 9266 9223 or the Manager, Research 
Integrity on (08) 9266 7093 or email hrec@curtin.edu.au.
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Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform 
 
 
  
 264 
Appendix D Confirmation of Candidacy 
See Research Student Profile:  
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